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The socio-politica! bases o f  regional grow th ...
It has often been claimed that in the last two decades the world has witnessed a 
profound process of socio-economic restructuring. A process of structural change which has 
clearly exceeded the margins of a cyclical capitalist crisis and is affecting almost every 
domain in our society. According to large sections of the literature, the origins of the 
restructuring process have to be looked for in the technological changes which have affected 
our society in the last few decades. Rapid technological change is increasingly affecting 
production structures and methods. Mass and Taylorist methods of production, which had 
been the norm since the turn of the century, are slowly dying out and being substituted by 
more flexible production structures which allow for a more rapid and adequate response to 
new consumer demands. It is the rise of the ‘flexible economy’. Changes in production 
methods have been accompanied by a significant drive toward the globalization of the 
economy. World trade has greatly expanded in the last decades and national governments 
have slowly but decidedly been forced to give up their protectionist policies and to surrender 
to the new global markets.
The simultaneous processes of flexibilization and globalization of the economy have 
supposedly lead to a greater blurring of national policies and seem to have conferred a 
greater impetus to the local dimension. In a world increasingly dominated by global trends, 
regions and sub-national entities appear to have gained a substantial dynamism to the 
detriment o f nation-states. The rise in local competition, local markets and local strategies 
are increasingly being hailed as effects o f the process of socio-economic restructuring, and 
the regional and local dimension have come to be regarded as the genuine unit o f analysis 
of the flexible production era.
Running parallel to the economic transformations, important social and political 
changes have been detected on a global scale. Social changes have been characterized by 
deep transformations in class structure. The organization of society across classes has been 
the subject of a serious revision by the literature in recent years. For some, we are driving 
towards the breakdown of the class structure as it has long been conceived and accepted. For
2
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others, traditional classes are undergoing a severe process o f remodelling. Together with 
changes in the class structure, the social realm is being altered by transformation in the 
labour market. During the last two decades, most Western European countries have 
experienced levels of structural unemployment which were almost unknown until then. And 
despite the persistence of high unemployment levels, most economies have been able to 
progress at a significant rate. The new era has also witnessed a decline in the strength of 
trade unions and the rise of precarious, temporary or informal types o f employment. The 
culture of full employment is little by little losing ground and new forms of relations in the 
labour market are taking its place. New sorts of class division based on job status seem to 
be emerging: a class made up by those enjoying permanent jobs; another by those enduring 
long term unemployment, and a growing mass of workers who tend to be permanently in and 
out of the labour market.
Changes in the political realm have not lagged behind. The collapse of the Eastern 
block and the redefinition of the post-war strategic alignments have provoked a substantial 
shuffling around of the European map and greater international instability. In addition, 
political integration processes experienced a new impetus. The second half of the 1980s and 
the early 1990s have been featured by a significant élan in the process o f European 
integration. Not only progress was made in the deepening of the European Community, 
which ultimately led to the signature of the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of the 
European Union, but also new members were admitted, and demands of admission have 
soared. In other parts of the globe, integration has also advanced. The North American Free 
Trade Association (NAFTA) has been created and similar organization in South America and 
the Far East have gained in vigour.
Political changes have, however, not been limited to the international arena. Within 
nations, voting patterns have undergone serious transformations. There has been a decline 
in class voting and party realignment is becoming the common rule. Contrasts between left 
and right parties are increasingly veiled as political formations try to attract a larger electoral 
spectrum and become catch-all parties. Moreover, new parties have been formed around new
3
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and critical issues which had been relatively disregarded by traditional parties, and there has 
been a revival of regional parties and regional vote in numerous parts o f Europe.
In sum, according to large sectors of the literature on socio-economic restructuring, 
the new structures emerging from recent transformations greatly differ from the previous 
structures, which were the result of a society based on a certain model o f production. We 
are thus witnessing the emergence o f a new system -which can be labelled as the flexible 
production system or the post-Fordist system- that is opposed to the mass production or 
Fordist system, which prevailed in most advanced countries since the mm of the century.
And yet, when one considers growth rates, the much heralded opposition between the 
mass production and the flexible production eras is hardly identifiable, outside certain 
emblematic spaces. Regional growth patterns in some areas of Europe in the post-Fordist 
period differ only slightly from those observed in the Fordist era. This fact raises interesting 
questions about the conditions under which economic growth is accomplished. Why are 
growth rates so resistant to change in certain spaces, and why do they seem to follow long 
term patterns, when everything else seems to be changing? Are there forces which tie down 
growth levels even in periods o f profound changes, or is it that the process of transformation 
is being overstated?
The hypothesis driving this thesis is that social and political conditions connected to 
economic growth become more significant -or perhaps more visible- as a result of the process 
of socio-economic restructuring and of the transformation undergone by the traditional 
locational factors; that the supposed emergence of a new territorial structure is conditioned 
by factors which until recently had been either disregarded or considered as not robust 
enough to impinge on growth rates, and which influence processes of change to a larger 
extent than what has been supposed by large sections of the literature.
The four chapters and the conclusion that follow will try to test this hypothesis on a 
cross-sectional basis in Western Europe. The first chapter deals with how the scientific 4
4
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literature has regarded the process of socio-economic restructuring and the drive away from 
the Fordist model, and how this has affected growth theory, before formulating a theory 
about why there should be a more significant, or at least more visible, relationship between 
economic growth and regionally specific social and political factors.
Chapter II addresses a question that has been taken for granted by certain sectors of 
the literature, namely, the adequacy of regions as a post-Fordist unit of analysis. It then 
continues with a study of growth rates across Western European regions in order to establish 
groups of regions according to their growth behaviour which will later act as the base for the 
empirical analysis.
Chapters III and IV try to verify whether there is an association between place 
specific social and political conditions and growth rates in the post-Fordist Western European 
regional context. The chapter on the social basis of growth tries to test the hypothesis 
established in the first chapter about the connection between large sets of social variables and 
economic outcomes, whereas the fourth chapter does the same with a much more reduced 
set of political variables at a regional level. This last chapter adopts a somewhat experimental 
and Popperian approach to the question of the association between regional politics and 
regional growth: different statistical tests are conducted in order to determine whether there 
is a significant association between claims made in the literature about the role of certain 
kinds of political regimes and economic growth.
I would not like to conclude this introduction without acknowledging the advice, help 
and support of the numerous people who have in some way or other participated in the 
completion of this dissertation, and who, of course, are by no means responsible of its 
shortcomings. Although it is quite difficult to enumerate all the people who have participated, 
since there is always the risk of forgetting someone, my gratitude is specially directed to the 
following persons.
First of all, I am deeply indebted to Prof. Gosta Esping-Andersen for his excellent
5
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job as supervisor of this project. He has not only fulfilled his task with extreme diligence and 
promptitude, but has also provided very helpful insights about the weaknesses of previous 
papers. A great deal of the theories and ideas present in this thesis have been the result of 
long discussions with him, and of his great capacity to adapt his broad knowledge of 
scientific literature stemming from various fields into useful research questions and methods. 
But I am even more indebted to him for his contribution in my formation as a researcher. 
Throughout my already long personal relationship with him I have learned a great deal from 
his rigorous and upright approach to research, and he has been a very important source of 
support in times of scepticism on my own capacities.
I am also very grateful to Prof. Carlo Trigilia. In a series of long and very fruitful 
conversations with him, I have taken advantage not only of his enormous expertise on the 
topic I was treating, but also on his original, but nevertheless extremely rigorous and 
accurate, ideas on how to approach the question of the complex inter-relationship between 
socio-political conditions and economic growth. His criticism on previous papers has played 
an essential role on the final result. Much of the originality of the paper and none of the 
shortcomings are a direct result of his supervision.
Prof. Mercedes Molina has also furnished very useful ideas along the way. In spite 
of a long personal relationship which now goes back to more than seven years, she has been 
capable of producing a thorough criticism of my papers, which has always stimulated my will 
improve as a researcher. Her strong determination and her support has also been a extremely 
helpful motivation for the completion of this thesis.
I am also indebted to Profs. Colin Crouch, José Estébanez, Giandomenico Majone, 
and Yves Mény, who have read different parts of -or even in some cases the whole- 
manuscript and have provided constructive criticism. Susana Borras, Thomas Christiansen, 
La van Mahadeva and Done Vemer have also given helpful insights on my work. The 
participants in the seminar States, Markets and Inequality at the European University Institute 
have contributed with harsh comments, which have nevertheless have not undermined our
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friendship, and have acted as useful inputs to this thesis. I am particularly thankful to Jens 
Bastían, Hans-Peter Blotifeld, Mary Daly, Johan de Deken, Bemdhard Ebbinghaus, Theo 
Jans, Leopoldo Moscoso, Axel West Pedersen, Alexander Surdej, and Yossi Shavit. 
Humberto López and Lavan Mahadeva have helped in several stages of the statistical 
analysis, and Adrian Fa veil, Luis Alfonso Gómez, Claire Kilpatrick, and Lavan Mahadeva 
have taken care of the language corrections. I am indebted to all of them.
Last but not least, this thesis has been the result of three incredibly short but 
wonderful years in Florence. The marvellous friends I have made along the way are also 
responsible for the Final outcome. Silvia Evangelist!, Luis Alfonso Gómez, Claire Kilpatrick, 
Sylvaine Laulom, Lavan Mahadeva, and Leticia Verdú have been capable of putting up with 
me, my terrible cooking, and my thesis over long tea, coffee, wine and beer breaks and 
endless dinners, and still manage to call themselves my friends. My special thanks to Paula 
Adam, Louis Charpentier, Stefania Fabrizio, Jonathan Hopkin, Miguel Jiménez, Anna Lixi, 
Piera Loi, Marta López Torres, Humberto López, Caterina Paolucci, Javier Rambaud, 
Carmen Sarasúa, Tzella Tangadilou, Jose Luis Torres, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Angel 
Ubide, and to all the staff of the European University Institute, who have contributed to 
making my life better and more agreeable while in Florence.
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CHAPTER I
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
SOCIOECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND GROWTH THEORY
T h e  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  b a s e s  o f  r e g i o n a l  g r o w t h . . .
I .I .-  PRODUCTION CHANGE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATIONS.
Social scientists generally agree that in the last two decades we have witnessed a deep 
process of socio-economic restructuring in the Western World, which has led to the decline 
of the traditional ‘Taylorist’ system of mass production and the establishment of what has 
been called the postindustrial society. The former, identified under the label of mass 
production or Fordist system, was based on principles such as the rationalization of labour, 
vertical integration, the minimizing of the required general education and training, the 
hierarchical control of company branches, and the application of Taylorist principles to work 
(Boyer, 1989).
The establishment of the model of mass production was connected to the emergence 
of a social order which, according to liberal theorists, was characterized by a class structure 
reflecting to a great extent the hierarchical organization of the mass production firm. This 
social structure was dominated by a large middle class, which emerged from "the 
domestication of the working classes through full employment, social citizenship, and 
prosperity" (Esping-Andersen, 1996). The resulting new middle class was made up mainly 
of skilled manual workers and nonmanual white collar employees, who had benefitted from 
greater possibilities of upward social mobility (Blau and Duncan, 1967; Bell, 1973; Kerr, 
1983; Goldthorpe, 1992), from an enlarged access to education and from greater political 
representation, reflected in the rise of trade unions and left wing social democratic and 
socialist parties. Furthermore, the ‘industrial’ middle class was protected by a large social 
cut cushion provided by different versions of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
The shift in the system of production and the process of socio-economic restructuring, 
which began during the early 1970s, are said to have shaken the foundations of the 
established economic, social and political orders.
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As a result of changes in the technological and informational fields* the globalization 
of the economy and deregulation trends, several challenges affected the prevailing production 
order. First of all, there was a large under-utilization of equipment and a listless and 
inadequate reaction to consumer demands. There were also important time lags and costs in 
passing from innovation to effective production, with vertical integration and the 
internationalization of the production process becoming too rigid a system to cope with small 
batch production, more adapted to changes in consumer demands. Moreover, hierarchical 
organization in the work chain was subject to an increasing rejection by better educated and 
trained younger generations (Boyer, 1989; Cooke and Morgan, 1993).
Hence, since the beginning of the 1970s and especially during 1980s, the former 
highly capitalized units and centralized production methods have endured long lasting crises 
everywhere in the Western World, and the advanced First World countries have undertaken 
serious processes of industrial restructuring in order to remain competitive. Large plants in 
several sectors, which formerly served to maximize economies of scale and reduce 
production costs, have become too rigid to comply with new trends in consumption. Very 
rapid technological innovation and innovation diffusion have threatened the whole concept 
of vertical integration. Failures in the organizational structure of companies have become 
more evident and the lack of on place decision-making organizations in many branches of big 
firms has resulted in a belated response to challenges and increasing economic inefficiency.
Companies and firms have been forced to a larger or lesser extent to readapt their 
structures to the changing conditions in order to remain competitive. The remodelling of 
organizational schemes has been primarily aimed at optimizing manufacturing, decentralizing 
and flexibilizing production decisions, reducing costs, and improving the quality of the final 
product (Gottdiener, 1989; Cooke and Morgan, 1992a). The reorganization o f production 
means has led to the establishment of new company networks and to the reinforcement of 
links between firms and the surrounding environment. As a consequence, the new 
competitive postindustrial firm is becoming increasingly capable of diversifying and
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flexibilizing its production, of keeping costs low and of raising the quality and of renovating 
the links between manufacturers and consumers (Boyer, 1989).
From this perspective, it could be argued that the scope of the crisis of the system o f  
mass production has transcended the limits of a capitalist cyclical crisis, and influenced 
society as a whole. Although production structures were the first thing to be struck by 
changes, the process of socio-economic restructuring has also affected -to a larger or a lesser 
extent- the social and political systems identified with mass production. It has been claimed 
that a large and homogeneous sector based on the existence of highly-unionized classes o f 
skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers began to crumble with the downfall of Fordist 
production plants and the shift from economies of scale to economies of agglomeration and 
scope (Storper and Scott, 1989; Scott and Storper, 1992; Clark and Lipset, 1991; Clark, 
Upset and Remple, 1993). Similarly, the flourishing middle class made up fundamentally o f 
blue and white collar workers has been hit by an increasing fragmentation (Rodgers and 
Rodgers, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1993 and 1996). The motor of social change has been the 
processes of what has been known as the ‘dualism’ and ‘segmentation’ of existing social 
classes, which started to operate under the new socio-economic conditions. The decay of the 
T aylorist’ mode of mass production entailed a broadening of the gap between highly 
qualified and well-paid stable wage-earners and an increasing army of unstable workers. 
Under these conditions, work stability has become less widespread and individuals alternate 
periods of low-paid marginal jobs1 with occasional periods of ‘idleness’, due to
1 A s Joachim  Hirsch indicates: "The ‘post-taylorist’ rationalization o f the work process, both 
regarding actual production as w ell as services and administration, provokes a double division in  
society. W ithin ‘m odem ’ world market-oriented industry and financial sectors the gap between the 
‘established’, highly qualified and well-paid wage earners and the ‘precarious’, fluctuating and low- 
skilled workers is increasing [ . . . ] .  On this basis marginal industrial and service sectors are erected. 
This marginal sector fills with sm all industrial, craft and trade activities, the vacuum that the process 
o f  hiperindustralization generated by the world market is creating (Joachim Hirsch, 1985, p. 176, 
translated from German by the author).
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unemployment or staying out of the labour force2 (Goldthorpe, 1984; Hirsch, 1985; Storper 
and Scott, 1989; Komninos, 1989). Moreover, workers are being forced to resort to hitherto 
unusual occupational situations, like part-time and temporary employment, homeworking, 
self-employment, disguised employment, and the black economy (Bettio and Villa, 1989; 
Buchtemann and Quack, 1989; Caire, 1989; Rubery, 1989).
The outcome of these processes has led several authors to claim that the entire 
industrial class structure has been profoundly altered by the emergence of a large underclass 
of jobless and precarious workers in contrast with the existence of prosperous groups of 
stable and qualified labourers (Hirsch, 1985; Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989; Bettio and Villa, 
1989; Buchtemann and Quack, 1989; Caire, 1989; Pollert, 1991; Esping-Andersen, 1993 and
1996). Other authors maintain that the fading of established social classes has nourished a 
widening process of ‘proletarianization’, in which underprivileged workers and welfare 
dependents amount to a significant percentage of the total active population (Wright and 
Singelmann, 1982; Wright, 1985). Whereas, taking the argument to its utmost limits, it has 
been argued that social change in recent decades has rendered the concept of class structure 
wholly inappropriate for the analysis of a postindustrial society (Duncan, 1968; Dahrendorf, 
1988; Clark and Lipset, 1991 and 1993). The conclusion which emerges out of these 
different approaches is that socio-economic restructuring has caused a profound reshuffling 
of the established social structure.
In the political arena, it has been argued that socio-economic restructuring has put the 
long-established system of worker representation and traditional trade unions at stake. 
Economic decentralization hastened the dismantling of large plants, which hitherto acted as 
havens o f strong unionism and collective bargaining. All over Europe unions underwent
2 According to Scott and Storper, flexible ‘post-Fordist’ production methods are associated with 
high levels o f external flexibility through mechanisms like accelerated turnover, part-time work, short­
term labour contract or home working. And flexibility ultimately leads to the creation o f two 
distinctive segm ents o f  workers: "a highly remunerated segment consisting o f  professional, craft, and 
technical workers, and a poorly remunerated segment made up o f  politically marginalized social 
groups such as w om en, ethnic minorities, and rural-urban migrants" (Storper and Scott, 1989, p. 32).
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sharp declines in membership3, a factor which greatly eroded both their legitimacy for 
participating in social and economic processes, and their capacity for influencing them.
Furthermore, the role fulfilled by the state was also challenged. Several decades of 
Keynesianism and of active state intervention in the economy began to be questioned. On the 
one hand, the economic experiment of the first French Socialist government between 1981 
and 1984 taught the rest of Europe that neo-Keynesian policies could no longer be freely 
applied and that it was impossible for a one-nation solution to effectively counteract on a 
national scale the effects o f a global crisis. On the other hand, there was a growing 
enthusiasm in favour of reducing the level of state intervention in the economy, mainly 
promoted by conservative and liberal governments in Great Britain and the United States. 
Socialist and Christian-Democratic governments everywhere did not remain immune to these 
trends. Liberal measures were conspicuously applied in Germany, France, Spain, Portugal 
and other countries4. The deregulation of the labour market and the privatization of state 
owned enterprises have been important issues since the beginning of the 1980s, although 
radical transformations in this field have only been achieved in Great Britain.
Even certain pillars of the welfare state -an emblematic element of the Fordist society- 
have been shaken in recent years. Cuts in pension and health schemes are frequently 
recommended by international economic organizations, and have been introduced in the 
electoral agenda of many conservative and liberal parties. Other welfare programmes have 
been contested. Nevertheless, in most cases these attitudes have not been translated into a 
reduction of state intervention in the social and political arena.
3 A ccording to Patrick Fridenson, the decline o f  the rate o f  trade union membership in Europe 
during the 1980s reaches levels o f  50% in France, 30% in Great Britain and 15% in Italy. On the 
contrary, slight increases in trade union membership are observed in already highly unionized 
countries such as Denmark and Finland (Fridenson, 1991, p. 2).
4 O ne o f  the m ain examples o f  this tendency has been the emphasis o f  most governm ents during 
the second half o f  the 1980s and the beginning o f  the 1990s to keep inflation rates low , at the cost 
o f high interest rates and to the detriment o f  employment.
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The political panorama in Europe also experienced a noticeable metamorphosis 
throughout the 1980s. With the clear exceptions of Spain and Greece, and the fluctuating 
experiences of France and Portugal, left wing parties suffered electoral drawbacks which 
condemned them to opposition. Even Scandinavia, the cradle of welfare state, has not been 
spared from these patterns of socio-political change. Social-Democratic parties -in office 
since the outbreak of the Fordist system- have encountered greater difficulties in clinging to 
power5, and conservative parties, without challenging the global conception of welfare- 
statism, have contemplated partial dismantling and reform of the system in their agenda. As 
Franklin, Mackie and Valen indicate, this decline of left wing strength is a consequence of 
changes in the social arena, which have led voters to show "increasing unpredictability in 
their choice between parties" (1991, p. 3), as a result of the disruption of the Fordist 
cleavage structure as described by Lipset and Rokkan. To put it in Komninos words "policies 
of the post-Fordist regulation correspond to an apparently different relationship between 
politics and economy, to a relationship of separation which is said to ascribe to the 
restoration of market forces and the reduction of state interventions in the economy" 
(Komninos, 1989, p. 350).
1.1.1.- SPATIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREAKDOWN OF FORDISM.
The great majority of the scientific literature on the spatial consequences of the 
breakdown of Fordism agrees on the fact that social and economic restructuring has also 
altered the spatial distribution of production and, thus, the distribution of wealth. As a 
consequence of the crisis in the established economic, social, and political orders, a new 
form of spatial organization seems to be emerging. From this perspective, it has been often 
claimed that the old rural-urban, agrarian-industrial or even centre-periphery dichotomies in 
developed countries, which dominated the spatial panorama before and after the second world
5 Since the beginning o f the 1980s, there has been a significant increase o f support for centre and 
right wing parties in Scandinavian countries, which has eventually led a more frequent alternation in 
power o f centre-right coalitions with social-democratic governments.
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war, and which determined sharp contrasts in the distribution of wealth, are fading in favour 
of a more complex territorial pattern (Massey, 1984; Gregory and Urry, 1985; Agnew and 
Duncan, 1989; Entrikin, 1989; Scott and Storper, 1992; Leborgneand Lipietz, 1992; Benko
1992).
Fordism engendered a spatial system based on the accumulation of capital and labour 
in urban agglomerations - the ‘development poles1 (Perroux, 1957)- with satellite industrial 
zones strategically placed in natural resource or energy sites and along the great 
communication axes. Labour and capital tended to be concentrated in big industrial plants and 
production units in core regions, in order to take advantage of internal and external 
economies, as well as of economies of scale and scope (Scott and Storper, 1992, p. 10-14).
The process of socio-economic restructuring and changes in the system of production 
have stimulated transformations in the prevailing territorial pattern. Technological and 
informational advances, together with the internationalization of the economy set up new 
possibilities for the development of businesses and, in theory, allowed a greater incorporation 
of former remote areas to economic circuits, opening up new markets and increasing 
competition. Furthermore, the reduction of transport costs and the availability of relatively 
inexpensive and well-trained labour outside the traditional industrial strongholds spurred 
companies and businesses to relocate production units in former rural areas and Third World 
countries. Challenges to the domination of the traditional industrial system were, thus, both 
external and internal. As Storper and Scott point out, "internally, market saturation and 
thorough-going spatial decentralization in response to worker militancy were creating high 
levels of unemployment and productivity slowdowns in the core. Externally the competition 
from Japan and the newly industrializing countries was cutting dramatically into domestic 
markets in North America and Western Europe. The net result was intensified industrial 
restructuring and rationalization in the core leading to more plant closure, more 
decentralization, and greater unemployment" (Storper and Scott, 1989, p. 25-6).
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As a result of these changes, great industrial regions developed around industrial 
mass-production complexes could not stand the challenge and became increasingly menaced 
by the decline in manufacturing. Conversely, favourable conditions in former lagging regions 
encouraged the development of competitive economic activities and attracted foreign 
investment. ‘New industrial foci’ began, thus, to emerge in areas deprived of Fordist 
production complexes.
To a certain extent, it could be stated that the same mechanisms, which are originated 
with in the social sphere by the shifts in production structures, are supposedly being 
reproduced in the territorial distribution of wealth. Social ‘dualism’ and segmentation are 
being matched by a new and more divided international spatial configuration. In this new 
configuration, the role of old industrial regions could be considered similar to the one played 
by the large mass of highly unionized skilled workers; the new industrial foci could be 
compared to the highly-qualified and well paid wage earners of the postindustrial society (the 
A-team); and formerly lagging areas not profiting from the new conditions correspond, 
grosso modo, to the rising group of precarious workers, or the ‘outsider class’ (the B-team) 
(Esping-Andersen, 1996).
However, the scientific literature on the shift in the production structure and on the 
genesis of a new territorial pattern is far from being unanimous on the question of the actual 
scope and reach of the current transformations. Some authors put the stress on the fact that 
the increasing globalization of the world economy is leading to a greater concentration of 
wealth and production in a few central spaces, located in financial and administrative 
métropoles (Harvey, 1985; Castells, 1989; Sassen, 1990; O ’Brien, 1992; Hall, 1993). The 
French regulation School (Boyer, 1986 and 1989; Leborgne and Lipietz, 1992) underlines 
the importance of the breakdown of the capitalist model of accumulation and regulation, as 
the key element for understanding the current transformations in the production system and 
the reorganization in the spatial distribution of wealth. A third current, based on the 
influential works of Piore and Sabel (1984), Storper and Scott (1989), and Scott and Storper
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(1992), highlights the increasing flexibility of the production process as the main motor o f 
socio-economic change. From this point of view, the crisis of the Fordist mode of mass 
production is leading towards the development of high-tech flexible industries in areas where 
"the social conditions built up in Fordist industrial regions could be avoided or were not 
present" (Storper and Scott, 1989, p. 27). Finally, other authors claim that recent economic 
and social transformations are leading towards the creation of a more complex spatial pattern 
than the one suggested by the aforementioned theories (Williams et a l., 1987; Amin and 
Robins, 1990 and 1991; Sayer, 1989; Rodriguez-Pose, 1994). From this perspective, Amin 
and Robins state that the new society emerging from the process of socio-economic 
restructuring is much more complex and contradictory than what has been claimed by the 
‘flexible specialization’ approach. The new order is not charaterized by a sharp cut with 
respect to the old order, since many of the features o f the ancien régime linger on and 
influence the development o f the new processes (1991, p. 220).
1.1.2.- TOWARDS THE BIRTH OF A NEW  TERRITORIAL PATTERN OF 
GROW TH?
Contrasts in results between different approaches to the question indicate that it is still 
too early to determine what are the main characteristics shaping the new territorial 
distribution of wealth. Nevertheless, some features frequently pop up in distinct explanations 
of the rising postindustrial spatial order, which confer a certain homogeneity to the literature 
on the topic.
The most widespread idea is that the shift from mass-production methods to flexible 
ones and the increasing integration and globalization of the world economy have apparently 
not only altered economies, but have also transformed prevailing social, political, and 
territorial patterns, engendering a complex scope of highly segmented and hyper-specialized 
industrial and service regions or zones. Under these circumstances, the significance of sub­
national entities is likely to increase (Porter 1990; Krugman 1991b; Leborgne and Lipietz
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1992; O ’Brien 1992).
Another major tenet of the literature on the spatial consequences of post-Fordism, is 
that socio-economic restructuring is renovating long-established territorial growth patterns 
and reshuffling the spatial distribution of wealth. According to large sectors of the literature, 
the new territorial pattern is characterized by a dual organizational type. On the one hand, 
the globalization of the world economy and the expansion of trade and the development of 
networks has led capital and information to become increasingly concentrated in core 
administrative regions and, thus, to reinforce its links with economic and political power. At 
present, there is a stronger tendency than ever before towards the urbanization of capital and 
decision making structures (Harvey, 1985; Lipietz, 1993). An impressive development of 
networks between multinational companies head-offices located in world metropoli has been 
attained in recent years (Thrift, 1987; Cheshire and Hay; 1989; O’Brien, 1992; Hall, 1993; 
Meijer, 1993). As a consequence, over the last ten years, the ownership of the means of 
production has undergone a brisk ‘cosmopolitanization’ (Sassen, 1991). "Ownership is more 
and more international and global, divorced from national definitions" (O’Brien, 1992, p. 
100).
The globalization of world economy has, moreover, had a profound effect on the 
configuration of modem cities, reshaping the entire fabric of city structure. The world’s 
financial and decision-making capacity is becoming de facto  concentrated in a few blocks in 
the central business district (CBD) of a few selected metropoli. New York, Tokyo, London 
and even Paris or Frankfurt, have been fully integrated into this process. Their dominance 
over the rest of the world has been enhanced; that is, national or even continental 
frameworks no longer represent the limits of their influence. In a matter of minutes, their 
decisions influence events in all comers of the world. As a consequence of globalization, 
local financial and real estate markets are no longer controlled by local actors. Foreign 
investment even in core countries has impressively been gaining pace, in spite of barriers and 
regulation efforts. A study by Thrift (1987) indicates that London and New York City
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already have more foreign than national banks; Canadian investors, for example, own more 
than a third of all office space in Minneapolis and more than half of all new buildings erected 
in Denver during the 1980s. California vineyards are concentrated in the hands of European 
and Japanese companies. As Aoyama (1988) points out, 80% of the real estate in the CBD 
of Los Angeles is owned by non-American companies and Japanese corporations purchased 
half of the new office space constructed in the centre o f the city between 1980 and 1987. But 
this is not exclusively an American phenomenon. In Europe, foreign investment in real estate 
has soared in recent years.
In addition, economic investment is not neutral. It is associated with political and 
social power. The globalization of the economy implies that social and political control is 
progressively escaping from the hands of local or national legislators, politicians, and 
bureaucrats, whose margin of manoeuvre becomes increasingly restrained by global trends. 
Financial forces and private investors have grown to be so powerful that they can often alter 
political decisions or thwart long established social habits. There are hundreds of examples 
which confirm these trends, although one of the most significant cases of the power of 
companies and private investors as opposed to that of nation-states has been monetary turmoil 
within the European Monetary System (EMS). The Italian, British, Irish, Spanish and 
Portuguese central banks and governments have been unable to effectively neutralize 
speculative moves against their currencies, and have been forced to exit the EMS or to 
devaluate. An the American, French, and Scandinavian central banks live under the constant 
threat of speculative attacks. In brief, the national setting has become too narrow for the 
head-offices of international companies whose impact can be felt almost immediately on a 
world-wide scale.
On the other hand, and simultaneously to the deepening of the globalization process 
and the development of world networks, the flexibilization of production systems seems to 
have allowed the genesis of new development poles in previously isolated or lagging areas. 
In recent years, we have faced a shift from a predominantly sectoral and urban model to a
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more supple one, apparently less constrained by former hierarchical bonds with neighbouring 
cities, but still heavily reliant on and integrated with economic circuits and world networks. 
As a result, core countries have experienced in the last two decades a serious blurring of the 
difference in life-styles between urban and rural areas, and a corresponding increase in rural- 
area endowment of industrial work-places (Keeble, Offord and Walker, 1988; Porter, 1990). 
Some local rural areas have, furthermore, thanks to the ‘flexibilization’ of production and 
the bolstered mobility of industrial plants, registered a consistent expansion in terms of 
income (Stohr, 1989), whereas the de-industrialization pace has been accelerated in former 
foci of mass-production (Komninos, 1989 and 1992; Storper and Scott, 1989) like the Ruhr, 
the North and North-West of England, the Scottish Strathclyde, Wallonia or the Nord-Pas 
de Calais region.
Hence, as Sabel underlines "regionalization and internationalization of productions 
may proceed hand in hand; the more robust a local economy, the more it attracts and is 
attracted to complementary foreign localities" (1991, p. 30). The regions which are 
benefitting from these simultaneous trends associated to socio-economic restructuring can be 
classified into several groups. A first set of postindustrial areas made up o f decision, 
information and financial centres, which tend to concentrate, even more than during the 
industrial era, in core locations, and especially in the central business districts o f large 
metropolitan regions like New York, London, Paris or Tokyo on a world scale, or Brussels, 
Berlin, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Milan or Madrid on a European dimension. A second group 
of regions is taking advantage of the growing tendency to disseminate production units and 
research and development complexes to suburban extensions and intermediate locations, 
mainly in formerly non-industrialized areas which possess a high concentration o f  research 
centres and qualified human resources. Finally, routine activities and ‘Taylorist’ unskilled 
manual tasks -which were performed close to great agglomerations in the industrial era- are 
further uprooted from central positions to peripheral areas and ‘offshore’ placements, looking 
for low production costs and weak labour organization (Castells, 1989).
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Regions disadvantaged by socio-economic restructuring can be divided into two 
groups. In first place, the traditional industrial regions which have undergone a strong decay 
in industrial output and in relative prosperity, due to the inability of their industries and 
manpower to adapt to the present market conditions. Secondly, a large and heterogeneous 
group of peripheral regions with neither the dynamic actors, nor the appropriate conditions 
to adjust to present trends and, thus, curb economic decline.
Together with the appearance of a more complex pattem of distribution of wealth, 
another tenet of the literature on socio-economic restructuring is the rise of sub-national 
entities to the detriment of nation-states as frameworks for economic and social transactions 
(Vandermotten et a l., 1990; Murphy, 1991; Benko, 1992). In Europe, soaring 
interdependency rates, the globalization of the world economy, the completion of the Single 
European Market, and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, have been considered by 
some as significant additional steps towards the eradication -at least in the economic sense- 
of the borders o f the nation-state. Consequently, in some circles, the state is increasingly 
regarded as an outdated territorial structure whose influence on economic trends and activities 
is progressively shrinking.
1.1,3.- O RIG IN S AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE SHIFT IN THE PATTERNING OF 
GROW TH.
Since the publication of W eber’s work Über der Standort der Industrien, in 1909, 
most analyses on the territorial distribution of wealth and of growth rates have heavily relied 
on the scrutiny o f one or all o f W eber’s key factors for the location of industries: capital, 
labour and raw materials. The concentration of those three factors in a certain area 
determined the development of big mass-production complexes. Regions such as the Ruhr, 
the Sombre basin, Lorraine or Lancashire and South Yorkshire constitute paradigmatic 
examples o f this type of development.
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Economic elements have been the stars in such locational analyses. Much has been 
published concerning the influence of microeconomic components in growth. Research has 
been mainly focused on the supply side factors -productivity, labour, capital, land, 
technology or infrastructure- as the sources o f economic growth. Macroeconomics, 
inequality, and the demand side -primarily inflation and wage setting- have also attracted 
considerable attention.
A large proportion of this type of economic studies were conceived and developed 
under the rule of a system of mass production in which all three key factors (capital, labour 
and raw materials) could be considered as fairly immobile. The process of socio-economic 
restructuring has, however, affected the three pillars of locational analysis. The 
decomposition o f the Fordist mode of mass production which got underway during the 1970s, 
1980s and early 1990s seems to be transforming radically the conceptual framework in which 
the pioneering analyses of the territorial patterning of growth were created and conducted. 
The recent shifts in production and the globalization of trade have not only provoked a 
profound restructuring of the economic sphere of society; they have also shaken the 
theoretical pillars of locational studies and altered the conceptual conditions and the 
assumptions under which economic growth theories were formulated.
Technology, which, as Bresnahan and Trajtenberg point out, "is the single most 
important force driving the secular process of economic growth" (1992, p. 1) has progressed 
more than it could have been envisaged in the last decades. The recent advances in 
technology and in information technology have greatly enhanced the mobility o f locational 
factors, provoking a strong transformation in spatial growth trends (Castells, 1989; Leborgne 
and Lipietz, 1992; O ’Brien, 1992). Thanks to the strides in technology and in information 
technology, and to the generalizing of deregulating trends, financial capital can be nowadays 
considered almost ubiquitous. Fixed capital is no longer as rigid as it used to be. Moreover, 
the crisis of large production plants associated with mass production schemes, and the 
emergence of smaller and more flexible production units have -together with cost reduction
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advantages connected with the relocation of production- facilitated moving businesses and 
production plants to distant areas. Locational constraints linked to the shortage of raw 
materials and energy sources have been greatly overcome thanks to the reduction in transport 
costs and in the input of raw materials per unit of output. Labour might still be considered 
as the most rigid of Weber’s locational factors. Nevertheless, current deregulation trends as 
well as other actions undertaken in spaces such as the European Community are fostering 
labour mobility.
To put it in O ’Brien’s words, "the impact of technology on the method and speed of 
communications and calculation, gives the (...) markets a wholly new dimension" (1992, p.
10-11). Technology has provided the setting for the ‘routinization’ of a large number of 
service activities, and has eased the process of decentralization of traditional manufacturing 
chores either to suburban locations or even to distant regions (Morris, 1987). Simultaneously, 
it has allowed for a rising concentration of the core activities of banks in downtown sites of 
a few cities (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1992; O’Brien, 1992). As Markusen points out, the 
appeal to high technology industries has also become the preferred development strategy of 
most regions. Incentives and rewards are offered by local, regional and national governments 
in order to attract high-tech industries, which are generally perceived by political actors as 
the panacea for solving the development problems of the local community (Markusen, 1987).
Furthermore, information technology has been regarded as a key motor for change 
in growth rates. As Stohr underlines, transfers of information, innovation and entrepreneurial 
initiative, from outside as well as within the local community, are determinant factors for 
growth (Stohr, 1990). The increase in informational transfers stimulates growth, since it leads 
either to the improvement of joint research between firms and to a better cooperation between 
local authorities and corporations or, vice versa, it stirs competition. Likewise, the rotation 
of personnel between research and production units tends to improve the transfer of 
knowledge between research and application.
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In addition, it has been highlighted that the growing integration of the economy and 
the development of enormous informational and financial networks, have opened new 
horizons and possibilities for growth for actors in distant locations and have heightened the 
mobility of factors generating growth (Sassen, 1991; O’Brien, 1992). This has contributed 
to the appearance of new developing areas and to what has been contemplated as a certain 
levelling out of the gap between advanced and lagging regions. As a consequence, not only 
have traditional Fordist industrial sites been affected by decline and a relative loss in 
economic weight, but also regions surrounding the ancient core have benefited from a 
spectacular increase in the rate of diffusion of economic innovation. Areas hitherto isolated 
from what was considered the advanced economy have been fully incorporated in world 
capitalist circuits. This catch-up effect has been observed on an international scale; the 
Pacific-Rim, once peripheral to the development of world economy, is becoming a key area 
in the evolution o f the new modes of production (Markusen, 1985; Berry, 1989). But it is 
on a regional level, within the developed world, where phenomena such as the ascension of 
the ‘new industrial foci’, or the development of the renovated craft communities, like the 
Third Italy, is attracting most attention .
Deindustrialization, the rise of service and high-technology industries, and the 
development of new organizational structures and systems of management are now being 
frequently pinpointed as potential causes of the changes in the spatial patterning of growth 
(Storper and Scott, 1989; Scott and Storper, 1992; Dunford, 1991; Leborgne and Lipietz, 
1992). Improved organizational systems within the firm have allowed a rapid response to the 
major challenges affecting the old industrial order. Technology, information and 
organizational know-how are now often considered as the ultimate means of surmounting the 
problems related to decreasing productivity growth rates, to the lags and high costs in passing 
from innovation to manufacturing, and, above all, as the best ways to effectively elude the 
problems associated to the rigidity of mass-production (Castells, 1985; Boyer, 1989).
In sum, explanations of the genesis of a new patterning of growth have tended to
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emphasize the dynamics of transformation. Advances in technology, improvements in 
communication, progress in the informational field and in the organizational design of firms, 
or the development of market structures are frequently cited as the main factors driving the 
new growth dynamic. This stress on the dynamics of the economic evolution together with 
the fact that most empirical research on the topic has been restricted to the theoretical 
dimension or to case studies focusing on growth poles and industrial districts in formerly 
lagging areas6, might have induced the overemphasis on innovation and dynamic elements 
in the process o f socio-economic restructuring and produced the widespread impression that 
a new and distinctive postindustrial configuration of growth trends was emerging.
From that perspective, advances in technology, information, infrastructure and the 
blurring of national borders are contemplated as being capable of easily removing resource 
bottlenecks and fostering growth in areas where development was almost precluded during 
the Fordist era of mass-production. Progress in innovation and technology is frequently 
regarded as allowing growth to occur almost anywhere with little extra-cost, since the factors 
that activate growth have become extremely mobile in recent years and know no national or 
legal borders. Thus, taken to its limits, as O ’Brien does, this argument implies that "location 
no longer matters" (O’Brien, 1992, p. 73), or it matters much less than before; that, in 
theory, high economic growth can nowadays occur in any location, regardless of its start-off 
conditions. High growth, then, increasingly becomes an aleatory issue, since advances in 
technology and in information flows allow to supersede obstacles which condemned large 
areas to economic ostracisation and grant economic actors greater liberty of choice for the 
location o f economic activity. Theoretically, this would ultimately lead to a randomizing of
6 Studies on the spatial consequences of socioeconomic restructuring have been mainly focused 
on what have been called the ‘new growth spaces’ (Komninos, 1992, p. 217). These include the 
‘technopoles’ of Sophia-Antipolis and the C ité  Scientifique d e  V ile d e  France, as well as the cities of 
Grenoble and Toulouse in France; the so-called Italian industrial districts around Prato, Bologna, 
Arezzo, and the ‘wonder regions’ of Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, and Tuscany; the southern German 
Lander  of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria; the cities in the axis Cambridge-Reading-Bristol in 
England; and the high-technology centres of the Silicon Valley, Orange County, Phoenix, and Dallas- 
Fort Worth in the United States.
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growth patterns since local conditions for the establishment of economic activities would 
become more homogenous and the development of production and services would 
increasingly depend on subjective factors such as personal interests and preferences of the 
economic actors, rather than on objective circumstances.
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I.2.- THE NEED FOR INTRODUCING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
FACTORS IN THE STUDY OF GROWTH.
The argument that technical progress and socio-economic restructuring are reducing 
the sway of national and local conditions in growth and are increasingly randomizing growth 
patterns is, however, not explicitly supported by actual growth trends. Empirical evidence 
points to the fact that there seems to be no clear break between growth patterns during the 
climax of mass production during the 1950s and 1960s and recent years. The following pages 
will try to verify this fact. They depict the evolution of regional growth rates in Western 
Europe since 1950 until 1991, in order to unravel whether the theoretical premises portrayed 
in the previous pages are reproduced at the empirical level; that is, whether a new spatial 
pattern of wealth distribution is surfacing and whether socio-economic changes are producing 
a reduction of the influence of national borders on growth rates7.
7 Statistical sources on a regional level going back to 1950 are extremely rare in central countries 
of the European Union and almost non-existent for Greece, Spain and Portugal. Given the difficulties 
in compiling large and reliable regional data sets prior to 1970, the data analyzed and the maps 
presented in this section do not correspond to a uniform data basis. The data for regional maps 
between 1950 and 1970 is taken from Willem Molle, Bas van Holst and Hans Smit (1980). This data 
represents the average annual growth Gross National Product (GNP) at factor cost, measured in 
dollars for the 6 members of the Treaty of Rome -Belgium, France, the FRG, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands- and the 3 which joined the Community in its first expansion -Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom-. Data for Danish regions in this set represents the national average.
The data for the other two maps (growth of GDP in the 1970s and 1980s) is obtained from 
the EUROSTAT Regio database. It denotes the average annual growth of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) at factor cost, measured in ECUs, for the first 9 members of the European Community. Data 
for Greece, Spain and Portugal it is limited to the last map.
There are slight differences in the territorial division used in both datasets. These concern 
Belgium and Denmark. In Belgium, the Molle, Van Holst and Smit database enlarge the region of 
Brussels (included in the EUROSTAT Regio data set), incorporating the whole province of Brabant. 
In Denmark, the Molle, Van Holst and Smit division includes Jutland, Sjaeland, and Fyn, while the 
division used by the EC consists of the area around Copenhagen, the East and the West of the Great 
Belt.
In order to reduce the problems created by the use of different currencies, the levels of 
growth are introduced in percentages rather than absolute terms, 100 being the average GNP or GDP 
rate for the whole of the Community.
2 8
The theoretical framework
Regional growth rates in Europe since the 1950s have tended to follow long-term 
economic cycles, very closely linked to national trajectories. For example, regions in Britain, 
which enjoyed growth levels close to the European average during the 1950, started a strong 
decline, lasting throughout the 1970s, until ultimately stabilizing in the 1980s. German 
regions also experienced a slow but steady decline from the high growth rates of the 1950s 
which exceeded the European average by more than 35 percentage points. French regions 
have had a somewhat more stable trajectory, whereas Italian regions feature rising levels of 
growth.
In the 1950s the growth panorama was marked by extremely high growth rates in 
Germany. It was the period of the German economic miracle. The country, which had been 
completely devastated during the second world war, was capable of achieving full 
reconstruction in a very short period of time. American aid in form of the Marshall plan, as 
well as internal capacities and potential contributed to re-establish Germany as one of the 
main economic motors of Europe. This was a widespread phenomenon in Germany, since 
all German Länder but the Saar region (109) grew in the 1950s more than 35 points above 
the European average (Map 1.1).
In comparison to this high German growth rates, all other West European countries 
seemed to stagnate. Belgium was the most flagrant case. The richest country in Europe after 
the second world war had by far the lowest growth rate. Flanders (63) and Brussels (61) 
grew around 40 percentage points below the European mean, and the formerly prosperous 
industrial Walloon region (51) started to suffer the consequences of industrial decline. 
Neighbouring Luxembourg (74) was also affected by very low growth rates.
Denmark (76) and Ireland (84) fared somewhat better, although their levels of growth 
were 15% lower than the average o f the First nine members of the EC. Several regions in 
France, Britain and the United Kingdom encountered as well serious problems o f reaching 
the European average. The ile de France (84), Lorraine (79), Alsace (77), and Limousin (76)
29
M
E
A
N
 
A
N
N
U
A
L
 
G
R
O
W
T
H
 
O
F
 
G
D
P
 
(M
e
a
s
u
re
d
 
in
 
$)
19
50
-
19
60
i.ijii..4aiiJ.nHi.LjftlJUUJIMiUii|Miu»|iUtilUi i^Hn!!!!i!iHmiMBffWPm iM !!l i | . ^ |Be
.... : ••;———------ ——■ — ■ m*-',**ww^imb^mSuSr
The theoretical framework
in France, Trentino-AIto Adige (83), Umbria (80), the Marche (81), Basilicata (78), and 
Calabria (84) in Italy, and the South-East of England (77) were among the European regions 
with a lower growth performance. Growth rates in most other regions in these three countries 
and in the Netherlands hovered around the European average. Only the South-West of 
England (119), Wales (120), and Aquitaine (117) were clearly detached above the mean.
A clear-cut feature of this period was the significance of national borders in separating 
high from low growth areas. This is the case of the German border with its neighbours. 
Thriving growth rates were an exclusively German phenomenon and did not spread out to 
neighbouring regions with similar characteristics; high growth rates in an old industrial 
Fordist-type regions like the North Rhine-Westphalia contrasted with economic stagnation in 
nearby industrial Wallonia. The same thing could be said for the mainly rural Baden- 
Württemberg and its neighbouring Alsace. Similar national effects on growth achievement 
were observed along the Dutch-Belgian or the Belgian-French borders. No frontier effects 
were clearly noticeable along the French-Italian border or on both sides of the English 
Channel.
The descent in growth rates in the United Kingdom was the most distinctive attribute 
of the growth scene in the 1960s (Map 1.2). Growth fell sharply in all British regions and 
varied from 38.9% of the average of the first nine Member-States of the EC in Yorkshire 
and Humberside, to 69.9% in Northern Ireland. No other region in the EC or in Ireland and 
Denmark grew at such low rates. German regions also underwent a decline in growth rates 
with respect to the period o f booming growth of the 1950s. However, only two German 
regions -Bremen (91) and the Saarland (94)- were placed below the European average, 
whereas Rhineland-Palatinate (134) was among the regions with the highest growth.
As in the 1950s, growth rates in France fluctuated around the European average, with 
not very sharp interregional contrasts. The lowest growth was to be found in the old 
industrial regions of Lorraine (88) and Nord-Pas de Calais (86), as well as in Provence-
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The theoretical framework
Alpes-Cote d ’Azur (88) and in Corsica (85). Regions around Paris generally achieved fast 
rates of growth. The three countries of the Benelux, Denmark and Ireland improved their 
performance with respect to the previous decade. The greatest leap in growth rates was 
accomplished by Denmark (107), which from levels of almost 76% of the European average 
in the 1950s escalated to well above the mean in the 1960s. Dutch regions varied between 
112% and 119%. Belgian regions also progressed at a significant pace. Nevertheless, this 
progress did not serve to raise all of its regions above the mean. Only Flanders (105) 
exceeded this level, and Wallonia (88) was again the region with the lowest national growth. 
Lower increases in growth were observed in Ireland (90).
Highest growth was to be found in Italy. Basilicata (154) was the fastest growing 
region in the European Community, followed closely by Umbria (137) and the Marche (137). 
Sicily (136) and Calabria (134) also achieved very high rates o f growth, and Valle d ’Aosta 
(98) was the only Italian region below the European average.
The importance of national borders in the patterning of growth rates was still visible, 
although it had been somewhat muffled with respect to the previous decade. Very sharp 
contrasts in growth performance could be noticed in both sides of the British Channel and 
in the Irish-Northern Irish border. The fact that the lowest growth rates in Italy were found 
in the North-West o f the country did not hide the contrast between thriving growth in Italy 
and moderate growth in France. Conversely, the German border lost a great deal of its 
relevance as a divide between contrasting growth levels.
The 1970s were dominated by a slowdown in the rates of growth provoked by the oil 
shocks. As a result, strong national contrasts in growth rates which had been the norm in the 
two previous decades, decreased and international differences became less evident (Map 1.3). 
Nevertheless and despite the crisis, most of the pre-existent growth trends were still visible. 
As in the 1960s, the highest growth was found in the Netherlands and in Italy. In the 
Netherlands, high growth in the North (135) was mainly due to revenues from gas pits, but
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The theoretical framework
slightly lower rates in the other three regions of the country (West -106-, East -106- and 
South -104- Netherlands) came to confirm the upward trend in Dutch growth performance 
observed already in the 1960s. In Italy, regions along the Adriatic coast like Marche (116), 
Abruzzi (119), and Molise (125), as well as some areas of the deep Mezzogiorno (Basilicata - 
119-), and Umbria (120) relished relatively prosperous rates of growth in a context of 
economic recession. It was also the period of the emergence of the Third Italy. High growth 
rates in the northeastern regions of Emilia-Romagna (113), Trentino-Alto Adige (113), 
Veneto (108), and, to a lesser extent, Tuscany (104) put in evidence the dynamism of areas 
whose main industrial fabric was based on small and medium-size enterprises, in contrast 
with the problems that the Italian havens of mass production in the Piedmont (91 ) and Liguria 
(80 -the lowest growth rate in the EC-) were experiencing.
Certain symptoms of recovery were observed in the United Kingdom. After having 
attained the climax of relative decline during the 1960s, the 1970s brought about higher 
growth in relative terms. The exploitation of North Sea oilfields was one of the factors which 
helped curb declining trends. The slight improvement did not mean, however, lofty growth 
rates across British regions. Only the North (105) and East Anglia (101) were above the EC 
average. The East (89) and the West Midlands (89), Wales (88) and Northern Ireland (89), 
in contrast, were still placed among Europe’s lowest growing regions.
German and Danish regions, Ireland and Luxembourg made up the lowest growing 
areas in the EC. In these four countries only the Saarland (104) grew above the European 
average. Luxembourg (87) and the two Danish regions east of the Great Belt (84 and 89), 
in contrast, were placed below the 90% mark. Ireland (93), the rest of Germany and the 
West of the Great Belt (92) had levels of growth of between 90 and 100%.
France and Belgium hovered around the European mean, with strong internal contrasts 
in the case of the former between regions like Lower Normandy, Limousin, Franche-Comté 
and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (all four 104) and Upper Normandy (87). In Belgium, the
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traditional internal distribution of growth rates present since the 1950s was again reproduced: 
higher growth in Flanders (102) than in Brussels (101), and the lowest growth in Wallonia 
(97). In both countries, growth trends in the 1970s comply with tendencies already present 
in previous decades. Belgian regions registered a steady increase in relative growth rates, 
while French regions remain more or less stable around the European average.
The relevance of national borders as landmarks of sharp differences in growth rates 
is less manifest during the 1970s than in the previous decades. The two oil shocks brought 
about a slowdown in growth rates all over Europe, and thus an approach in national and 
regional growth levels. Hence, there was not only a reduction in the gap between fast and 
low growing areas, but also less contrasts among regions in growth behaviour. As a 
consequence, the Italo-French, the Belgo-Dutch, the Franco-Belgian, and even the British 
Channel no longer delimited disparate patterns of growth. The only explicit border effect 
could be noticed along the Western German border (with the exception of the boundary 
between Germany and Luxembourg). Relatively flourishing growth rates in the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and, to a lesser extent, Northeastern France contrast with low growth in the 
German Lander of Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Baden- 
Württemberg.
In the 1980s high growth measured in Ecus was concentrated in peripheral countries 
o f the EC (Map 1.4). The fastest growth rates were found in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and 
Ireland. Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, and Luxembourg had moderate growth with 
respect to the rest of the EC, and slow growth was located in France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Greece. The fastest growing regions were the North of Portugal (157), and 
Lisbon and the Tagus Valley (151) in Portugal, and the Canary Islands (153) in Spain, with 
rates in excess of 50 percentage points above the EC average. Rates o f more than 135% were 
also found in Lazio (147), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (140), Veneto (139), Campania (139), 
Abruzzi (138), Trentino-Alto Adige (136), and Molise (135) in Italy, and in Madrid (140), 
and the Balearic Islands (139) in Spain. Growth in all other regions in Italy, Portugal and 36
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Spain was above the European average. However, growth across regions in these countries 
was far from being homogenous. Wide gaps in rates of regional growth were detected in 
Portugal and Spain. 56 points separated the fastest growing region in Portugal (the North - 
157-) from the slowest (Alentejo -101-); the gulf between growth in the Canary Islands (153) 
and in Asturias (109) or Cantabria (109) was also immense. In Italy contrasts in growth rates 
were less explicit.
British, Danish and German regions tended to grow slightly below the European 
average, with the exceptions of Hesse (108), Hamburg (106), and Bavaria (104) in Germany, 
and the West of the Great Belt (103), and the area around Copenhagen (101) in Denmark. 
Only the mass production regions of the North (87), North West (87), and Yorkshire and 
Humberside (89) in the UK, and North Rhine-Westphalia (87), and Rhineland-Palatinate (88) 
were set below the level of 90%. In the British and German cases moderate and low levels 
of growth represent a continuation of growth trends observed in previous decades, whereas 
slight signs of recovery are observed in Denmark.
Slow growth characterized the regional economic evolution in Belgium, France, 
Greece and the Netherlands. North Eastern France, Wallonia and the Northern Netherlands 
experienced the lowest rates, and all other regions -but for Midi-Pyrénées (91), île de France 
(90), Aquitaine (87) and Auvergne (85) in France, and the tourist region of the Greek Islands 
(92)- were placed below the 85% limit.
Once again the sway of the national dimension on regional growth rates is clearly 
noticeable in the map. Almost all national borders delimit sharp contrasts in growth 
performances. This is evident between France and Italy, France and Spain, and across the 
strait o f Otranto between Italy and Greece. Dissimilar growth patterns are also observed 
between Germany and all its western neighbours but Luxembourg, and across the English 
Channel between the United Kingdom and France and Belgium. The only exceptions to this 
trend are the Portuguese-Spanish, Franco-Belgian, Belgo-Dutch, and Danish-German borders. 38
38
The theoretical framework
*
* *
The picture which emerges from empirical evidence demonstrates» as we have seen, 
that regional growth trends have tended to follow cycle patterns throughout the four decades 
contemplated in the analysis. Regional inequalities have been particularly resistant to change 
(Dunford, 1993, p. 737) and, although success and failure stories are evident, there is little 
sign of sudden alterations in growth rates happening in a cross-sectional scale, which might 
suggest a greater randomizing in the patterning of economic growth. Regional growth levels 
have tended to follow clear cut national trajectories, with little sign -with the exception of 
the low growth period of the 1970s- of a loosening of the national influence throughout the 
decades. And, within nations, despite phases of convergence and divergence, we have 
witnessed a certain consolidation of cross-national trends such as the tendency of metropolitan 
areas and the ‘new industrial foci’ built around research centres in intermediate regions to 
grow above the average, whereas traditional industrial zones and most peripheral regions 
endure lower growth rates. There are some exceptions, but as a general rule there seems to 
be no evidence to support the hypothesis that regional growth rates have undergone in recent 
years greater alterations than in previous decades.
There is practically no clear sign of growth patterns becoming more aleatory, since 
the growth tendencies of the 1980s were anticipated in some way by trends which were 
already recognizable in the 1950s and 1960s. A greater randomizing of growth trends would 
have implied a greater interchange of high and low growth levels in the same region across 
time periods, and a greater disconnection of regional and national patterns of growth. None 
of these elements are clearly manifest in the Western European arena in the last forty years. 
There is always a strong link between world growth levels and national and regional 
tendencies, and the ascent of the so-called ‘wonder-regions* responds more to long term
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trajectories than to sudden outbursts in economic activities linked to advances in technology.
It is true, to a certain extent, that traditional locational constraints are gradually losing 
relevance. Some regions in the periphery which formerly lacked the conditions to reach the 
stage of sustained growth are now among Europe’s growth champions, but these exceptions 
are insufficient to prove that "location no longer matters" to growth. Socio-economic 
restructuring has by no means rendered growth an aleatory issue. We must ask: what, if 
traditional locational constraints are losing relevance in the genesis of growth and there is no 
sign of a radical alteration of growth patterns, is the logic behind the persistence of long term 
growth trends? If advances in technology and the globalization of the economy allow for a 
much greater mobility of economic factors provoking growth and for the eradication of 
former bottlenecks, why have we not witnessed a complete disruption in growth trends? Why 
do growth patterns linger on and why are regional inequalities particularly resistant to change 
in a period of socio-economic restructuring?
In the first instance, the persistence of long-term growth trends might respond to the 
fact that the role o f technological change and the effects of world economic integration on 
growth could have been overstated, and, thus, traditional factors producing growth still play 
the significant part they used to play before. Secondly, it could be argued -following 
Markusen (1985)- that growth trends tend to follow product cycles and are, therefore, more 
closely linked with life cycles of industries or production units, than with external processes. 
Last but not least, it might mean that socio-economic restructuring has provoked a notable 
shift in the importance or visibility o f the constituents o f growth. Factors and constraints that 
used to be relatively unnoticed or were ignored, come to the fore as major elements of 
economic progress. This is the case of social and political factors, in particular, which until 
recently (and despite of some notable exceptions), were contemplated as supporting elements 
in the cocktail of growth and now appear more evident than ever as endogenous constituents 
of growth. Hence, in a context of increasing globalization of the economy and of the removal 
of trade and economic barriers, social and political factors come to play a more meaningful 40
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(or perhaps more visible) role in the genesis of economic growth and territorial disparities.
This thesis will deal with the analysis of this final hypothesis at the European regional 
level during the 1980s and early 1990s. What is the combination of social and political 
factors that -regardless of the importance of purely economic factors- is more closely related 
to thriving growth levels in the European Community? Are socio-political factors connected 
to growth equally significant across nations and regions in Europe, or do they vary noticeably 
according to nations or types of regions?
In short, my hypothesis is that the removal of physical and economic obstacles -via 
advances in technology and the globalization of the economy- which had hampered and 
limited the expansion of economic growth to certain areas, thus fostering the emergence of 
economic disparities, neither implies a clear cut waning of economic disparities, nor a 
randomising of growth rates. Old regional disparities persist, new ones are appearing and 
growth rates still differ, and the causes of old and new patterns of growth are still the result 
of a complex combination of economic, social, political and cultural factors in time and 
space. As a result of socio-economic restructuring, however, greater attention must be 
directed to the role played by social and political components as generators of economic 
growth.
1.2.1.- STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF TRADITIONAL TH EO RIES O F 
GROW TH.
The quest for the explananda of growth is not new. Since the pioneering work of 
Adam Smith, economists, sociologists, political scientists, geographers and other social 
scientists have progressively been attracted to the field of spatial disequilibria and growth. 
The analysis o f wealth and its uneven territorial distribution has led to the development o f 
many theories concerning economic inequalities, both from a theoretical and empirical point 
of view. Growth studies have flourished specially after the second world war and during the
41
The socio-political bases o f regional growth. ..
period of decolonization, and the analysis of growth has been tackled with most fervour by 
economists. Accordingly, the economic dimension of growth has tended to be 
overemphasized in most analysis, whereas the impact of social and political factors on growth 
trends has remained discreetly in the background, only coming to the foreground in a reduced 
number of explanations. The following pages contain a brief review of the major recent 
theories of economic growth, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses and paying special 
attention to the consideration of social and political factors as contributiong factors to of 
economic growth.
As Solow points out, in the last 50 years there have been three waves of interest in 
growth theory. The first one is associated with the work of Harrod (1942) and Domar 
(1946); the second with the neoclassical approach to growth and, finally, there is the recent 
endogenous growth approach (Solow, 1994, p. 45).
The first wave relied heavily on factors like investment and savings. In the Harrod 
model growth is triggered by the use of investment carried out by entrepreneurs under 
different market conditions. The behaviour of entrepreneurs and their use of investment is 
determined by rational expectations, and leads the economy to a constant disequilibrium. In 
Dom ar’s model the rate of growth is the product of the investment-output ratio and the 
output-capital ratio (Solow, 1994, p. 46). Factors employed by Harrod and Domar are 
basically economic: investment and output, savings, income, labour and productivity under 
conditions of no technical progress (Chaudhuri, 1989, pp. 55-59). However, these models 
entail numerous assumptions and leave several questions unexplained. First, because they 
suggest -particularly Harrod’s version- the existence of a highly unstable economy which is 
quite difficult to admit in reality. Second, they do not consider the capacity of learning from 
experience, or the learning by doing of economic actors (Chauduri, 1989, p 59-60). Third, 
the Harrod-Domar model does not explain why a fixed proportion of income is saved and 
what determines that proportion. And finally, prices are completely divorced from 
productivity considerations (Solow, 1994, p. 47).
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The neoclassical response to the Harrod-Domar model is to make the output-capital 
ratio the endogenous variable (Solow, 1994, p. 47), and to focus on changes in technology 
as one of the driving forces behind economic growth. Thus, a model in which technology and 
capital represent the main factors provoking growth emerges. The model adopts the following 
form:
Y=A(f)KaL1'® (1)
where Y is gross domestic product, A is the starting level of technology of a country, (t) is 
the exogenous rate of change of technology, K  is the stock of capital and L the stock of 
labour (Solow, 1956). The expansion of this model inaugurated a long and persistent tradition 
by which growth is conceived as a regression in which explanatory variables are entered 
independently and linearly (Levine and Renelt, 1992, p. 943).
The neoclassical model is based on two basic assumptions: perfect competition and 
exogenous technology which increases the productivity of labour at an exogenous and 
constant rate. Hence, in this model economic growth is spurred via increases in savings, 
which propel investment.
The main criticism directed at the neoclassical model is that, if technology is 
exogenous and increases in an homogenous way across countries and regions, capital 
accumulation and investment become the single most important forces behind changes in the 
standard of living. Nevertheless, the promotion of economic growth by raising the investment 
quota seems, as Solow concedes, "too easy an approach" (1994, p. 48). Furthermore, under 
the conditions assumed in the neoclassical model, the effect of savings and investment in 
growth is only temporary, since it will wane as the ratio of capital to labour increases (Pack, 
1994, p. 56). As the input of capital per worker rises, constant or decreasing returns to scale 
are generated, which lead to a decline in the marginal product of capital. This process causes 
a parallel downfall of savings, and, thus, less investment. As a result, the economy enters
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a stationary stage in which no growth is induced. The appearance of constant returns to scale 
and diminishing marginal products denote an internal contradiction within the model, since 
they imply "that the long-run rate of growth is completely independent of the savings- 
investment quota" (Solow, 1994, p. 48). Hence, "increasing the rate of per capita growth 
is not only not easy in this model, it is impossible unless technological progress can be 
altered deliberately" (1994, p. 48). As a result, assuming that technological progress remains 
constant, we will face a steady convergence in per capita income across nations and regions.
The neoclassical approach, therefore, leaves the main factor provoking growth - 
technology- unexplained8. Technological change and endogenous technological progress tend 
to be considered as a constant in most regressions and, thus, their influence in economic 
growth is negligible. However -as Romer points out- empirical evidence has come to reject 
the postulates of the neoclassical approach to growth. On the one hand, technology has not 
remained constant over time and across nations, but, on the contrary, it has improved at such 
a rate as to act as a constant fillip to economic growth. On the other hand, the predicted 
convergence in terms of per capita income associated with diminishing returns to capital, has 
not been observed on a world wide scale (Romer, 1986).
As a consequence of these criticisms, subsequent theories of growth have relied 
heavily on the analysis of technology and on the rejection of the neoclassical assumptions. 
Technology is neither exogenous or evolves at a constant rate, nor does growth occur in 
conditions o f perfect competition. This is especially true in the case of the endogenous 
growth approach; the recent and vigorous revival of growth theory in the economic arena. 
The foundations of the endogenous growth were set by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) by 
trying to ‘endogenize’ factors which were conceived as exogenous in the neoclassical model. 
Therefore, economic growth is considered "an endogenous outcome of an economic system, *4
1 Solow rebuts this criticism by explaining that "first of all, to say that the rate of technological 
progress is exogenous is not to say that it is either constant, or utterly erratic, or always mysterious 
[...] Secondly, no one could ever have intended to deny that technological progress is at least partially 
endogenous to the economy (1994, p. 48).
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[and] not the result of forces that impinge from outside" (Romer, 1994, p. 3)* Technology 
and technological progress -increasingly regarded as the "real force behind perpetually rising 
standards of living" (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p. 24)- thus become endogenous, and 
change differently in different countries or regions according to the amount o f human and 
physical capital devoted to research and development (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Rebelo,
1991). But the sway of technological progress on growth is greatest under conditions of 
imperfect market competition; the possibility of protecting property rights via the patent 
system and earning monopoly rents on discoveries provide an important incentive for 
researchers, fostering further advances in technology, a better adjustment between supply and 
demand and, ultimately, economic growth (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Young, 1993).
Despite its emphasis on technology and on imperfect markets, the endogenous growth 
approach does not represent a radical shift in growth theory. Many of the postulates of the 
neoclassical approach have been rethought and reworked, but the foundations behind both 
models remain remarkably similar. Basic equations of growth in the endogenous approach 
tend to adopt the following formulation:
Y=AK“Le (2)
where Y is output, income per capita, or growth; A denotes the state of technology, K 
denotes capital, and L denotes labour. In both approaches, growth is a function of the same 
basic factors, and contrasts in theories of growth lie mainly in differences o f the stress with 
which different authors and different approaches tackle different variables than in the quest 
for new determinants of growth. This situation has led a great part of the economic literature 
on growth to a certain impasse, since, despite significant advances in our understanding of 
growth processes, a great deal o f effort has been spent in checking the accuracy of basic 
assumptions of the neoclassical model. As Pack points out, "most o f the empirical work 
motivated by endogenous growth theory has actually tested implications of the Solow-style
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neoclassical growth model rather than endogenous growth theory itself” (1994, p. 58). This 
has somewhat narrowed the scope of the debate on growth, with three subjects attracting the 
most attention in the literature:
a) the convergence controversy;
b) the debate on perfect competition and rationality;
c) the focus on capital and innovation.
1.2.1.1.- The convergence controversy.
As Romer indicates, "the question that has attracted the most attention in recent work 
on growth is whether per capita income in different countries is converging" (Romer, 1994, 
p. 4). As mentioned before, the existence of diminishing returns to capital in the neoclassical 
model entails that -the levels of technical progress being equal and under perfect market 
conditions- the capital stock growth of lagging areas outstrips that in richer areas. Hence, 
lagging areas "should converge to the capital-labour and capital-output ratio (and the income 
levels) of richer countries" (Pack, 1994, p. 63). Empirical evidence and the assumption that 
technological progress differs across regions and countries advanced by the endogenous 
approach to growth, thwarted the idea of a steady convergence of income levels. Having 
different rates of innovation in different countries might provoke increasing and not 
diminishing returns to capital, thus, causing a greater marginal productivity of capital in areas 
with the highest level o f innovation (Romer, 1986; King and Rebelo, 1993). Needless to say, 
these areas tend to be the richer regions and countries.
This controversy has fascinated growth researchers, who have delved into this debate 
with frenzy. Many models have been put forward trying to check the convergence or 
divergence hypothesis in recent years. From the first attempts by Abramovitz (1986) and 
Romer, in which he determined that, all other variables being constant, the effect of 
investment rates on growth was positive, whereas the association of growth with initial
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income was negative (1987), several other authors have studied whether under different 
circumstances convergence will occur. Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a and 
1992b) propose models in which faster diffusion of technology and know-how in technology­
receiving countries than in technology-diffusing countries narrows the technology gap and 
causes greater returns to capital in lagging areas. Mankiw, David Romer and Weil (1992) 
tried to demonstrate the convergence hypothesis even with the neoclassical assumption that 
the level of technology is the same in every country in the world. Dollar (1992), and Levine 
and Renelt (1992) also found evidence to support the convergence hypothesis. Yet, as Crafts 
underlines, "catch-up is not automatic, nor its potential is always fully realized" (Crafts. 
1992, p. 395).
This whole focus on convergence, however, is only a detour from the basic study of 
the determinants of growth. Most results seem to support the idea of a steady convergence 
in growth rates, although there is no agreement on the rate of convergence9. Nevertheless, 
these results might be biased by sample selection, mainly by the lack o f long-time series and 
reliable data and by temporal and spatial constraints10. Despite the fact that some attempts 
to check the convergence hypothesis have traced GDP data back to 1880 in the case of the 
United States (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992b), on a longer perspective, neither convergence, 
nor divergence can be considered as long established historical trends. Both tendencies 
alternate according to historical circumstances. Political and economic empires have risen and 
fallen; areas of the world which experienced long periods of economic darkness, then rose 
up, only to plunge again into lagging positions after a certain period of time. And even in 
our times, empirical evidence proves that the convergence hypothesis successfully interprets 
only a certain part of the story. Countries like the newly industrialised countries (NICs) in 
the Pacific Rim, lead by South Korea, Taiwan and Hong-Kong, furnish the best example, or
9 Convergence literature has undergone heavy criticism in recent times. Quah, for example, has 
showed that the much heralded 2% convergence rate might as well be a statistical artefact caused by 
a unit root, rather than the result of economic conditions (Quah, 1995).
10 De Long pointed out the existence of a sample bias in the Maddison data set, which only 
includes successfully industrialized countries (1988).
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rising areas in the Third Italy or certain once lagging areas of the American South West 
(Silicon Valley, Orange Country, Phoenix, Tucson area) represent but a few examples of 
convergence. But on a world scale, the gap between the richer and the poorer countries has 
widened. In 1970 GDP per capita measured in US$ of the United States was 41,41 times 
higher than that of the countries which the World Bank describes as ‘low rent economies’. 
Twenty years later this gap was broader: GDP per capita in the US was 62,28 times larger 
than in the same group of peripheral countries (World Bank, World Tables 1992). Similar 
divergent trends were observed in other areas of the world.
Hence, it could be stated that growth does not seem to adapt to any predefined 
convergence or divergence hypothesis. It appears to change randomly following patterns 
more closely linked to what could be described as life-cycle criteria or rise and fall canons 
(Mancur Olson, 1982, Kennedy, 1988) than to logical economic rationalizations about catch­
up possibilities. Economic-based deductive hypotheses do not always succeed in giving a 
satisfactory explanation of the spatial evolution of the configuration of growth.
Consequently, we can conclude with Romer that "the convergence controversy 
captures only part of what endogenous growth has been all about. It may encompass a large 
fraction of the recently published papers, but it nevertheless represents a digression from the 
main story behind endogenous growth theory" (1994, p. 11). The determinants of growth 
have to be sought outside this debate.
1.2.1.2.- The debate on perfect competition and rationality.
The neoclassical growth theory developed by Solow (1956) and Denison (1961) set 
forth a model characterized by the existence of a closed economy with perfectly competitive 
markets, identical rational individuals (the famous homo oeconomicus), exogenous 
technology, token government intervention in the economy, and a production technology 
exhibiting diminishing returns to capital and labour separately and regular returns to both
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inputs jointly. Many of the assumptions make the model appear utterly unrealistic when 
compared with the complex interactions of the real world. The adoption of too many unreal 
assumptions, such as the ceteris paribus clause, the presence of identical rational individuals, 
or of competitive markets made traditional growth models less and less appealing to 
researchers. Moreover, the assimilation of exogenous technology to a constant value across 
countries contributed to view the neoclassical approach to growth as one in which society and 
the economy are deprived of most of their complexity, and transformed into huge platforms 
where hypotheses could be tested with the same accuracy as chemistry experiments in a 
laboratory.
One of the main goals of the endogenous growth response to the neoclassical model 
was to tackle these unrealistic assumptions. The chief stride forward was made by 
challenging the perfect competition hypothesis. It was obvious that markets have never 
functioned in real life under the circumstances predicted in the neoclassical model: a myriad 
of firms working under conditions of perfect information and perfect access to resources. 
Lack of information, monopolistic and oligopolistic practices and strong governmental 
interventionism tend to be the rule and not the exception.
The endogenous goal approach tried to capture the complexity of real markets into 
its modelling o f growth. However, most attempts to model imperfect competition were 
limited to making technology an endogenous factor, pondering public and private investment 
in research and development (Bresnahan, 1986; Griliches, 1988; Trajtenberg, 1990), and 
considering the possibilities of firms earning monopoly rents on innovation, in a more or less 
Schumpeterian way (Judd, 1987; Grossman and Helpman, 1989; Romer, 1990). These have 
been certainly significant steps towards a better understanding of how growth is 
accomplished, but they stick to the rigid corset imposed by the two traditional neoclassical 
factors: capital and technology.
In brief, the removing of the perfect competition and rationality assumptions represent
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steps in the right direction towards the unveiling of the determinants of growth. Yet they only 
cover a relatively narrow portion of the determinants of growth.
1.2.1.3.- The focus on capital and innovation.
Since the 1950, the mainstream of economic analysis o f growth has focused on the 
influence of two factors on the improvement of the standards of living: capital and 
technology. The neoclassical approach put the stress on the former, whereas the endogenous 
growth school concentrated on the latter. However, despite high concentration on one of the 
factors, none of the approaches disregarded the other: Solow examined thoroughly the 
question of technology (1970) and several endogenous growth authors have never overlooked 
investment (Englander and Mittelstand, 1988; Baily and Schultze, 1990; De Long, 1991; De 
Long and Summers, 1991). Social and political factors have attracted less attention.
The emphasis on capital and technology has had a detrimental effect on the study of 
other constituents of growth. The constant resort to linear regressions as the basis for 
quantitative analyses of growth might have influenced this choice of factors. Socio-political 
data which could be quantified and introduced into cross-country regressions of growth is less 
available and reliable than data on capital or even investment in technology.
In addition, the complexity in establishing causal relationships between growth and 
political and social variables is far greater than when capital or technology are used. In fact, 
it is fairly easy to conceive growth as a linear result of investment in capital (be it physical 
or human). Returns in terms of growth of investment in capital and increases in productivity 
thus appear fairly easy to calculate. Investment in technology and technological progress are 
factors which are more difficult to insert in a model of growth. Advances in technology can 
be considered, to a certain extent, as aleatory; technological progress is related to subtle 
determinants such as the genius of a few individuals devoted to research to generate 
innovation. However, most studies have shown that there is a casual relationship between the
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number o f researchers, the means at their disposal, their training, and hence, investment in 
research and the capacity to generate innovation. And applied innovation tends to be 
synonymous with economic growth. Most studies of growth demonstrate a strong correlation 
between increases in capital and technology, and growth.
However, this seemingly clear casual relationship between investment in capital, 
investment in technology, and growth does not hold when studying social and political 
factors. The age structure of a certain region, its social dynamism, the quality, quantity and 
availability of human resources, the class structure or the social cohesion, as well as political 
and institutional factors such as the level of political conflict, the institutional cobweb, the 
labour relations system, the orientation of governments, or the percentage of government 
expenditure are more difficult to conceive as elements encouraging or deterring growth than 
the above-mentioned capital and technology. First of all, because of difficulties in 
operationalizing these concepts. Secondly because of lack of data, and finally, because of the 
problems in establishing causal relationships. After all, as Levine and Renelt maintain "even 
if government funds are always spent on growth-promoting goods, there may be complex, 
nonlinear trade-offs between the beneficial effect of government services and the deleterious 
implications of distortionary taxes" (1992, p. 951). Sentences like ‘the more a country invests 
in machinery (or in technology), the greater its possibilities of growth are’, are not easily 
transposable with social and political factors. Can we maintain ‘the greater the level of social 
and political peace of any given space, the greater its possibilities of growth’? Or is it the 
reverse the case? Do countries with left-wing governments grow more than countries with 
right-wing governments? Does a rich institutional setting favour or deter growth? Do areas 
with younger populations have more possibilities of growth? These are questions which 
cannot be answered in a simple way. Correlations between these elements and growth rates 
tend to be very weak, and there is no explicit and direct casual link between isolated social 
and political variables and growth. Levine’s and Renelt’s review o f the robustness of the 
most seminal cross-country growth regressions of the late 1980s and early 1990s confirms 
the idea that there is a positive, robust correlation between growth and the share of
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investment in GDP11, whereas a large variety of trade policy measures, fiscal indicators and 
a large assortment of other social and political indicators are not robustly correlated with 
growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992, p. 959). This view supports previous findings made by 
Newman and Thompson, who state that "the impact of social indicators on later economic 
growth, while significant, is much smaller than the impact of economic indicators on 
subsequent economic growth" (1989, p. 469).
The fact that there appears to be a closer connection between investment in capital and 
in technology and economic growth does not mean that both variables suffice to interpret how 
growth patterns evolve. Large residual elements in most equations of growth indicate that a 
great deal of what growth is all about remains unexplained. Furthermore, as Levine and 
Renelt reveal, most cross-country growth regressions can barely withstand slight alterations 
in the list of explanatory variables used (Levine and Renelt, 1992, p. 942). And even Solow - 
whose model is at the origin of the use of cross-country regressions in growth- thoroughly 
criticizes recent attempts, because they "seem altogether too vulnerable to bias from omitted 
variables, to reverse causation, and above all to the recurrent suspicion that the experiences 
of very different national economies are not to be explained as if they represented different 
‘points’ on some well-defined surface" (1994, p. 51). He adds in his demolishing critique of 
recent growth studies, that "the temptation of wishful thinking hovers over the interpretation 
o f these cross-section studies. It should be countered by cheerful scepticism. The introduction 
of a wide range of explanatory variables has the advantage of offering partial shelter from 
the bias due to omitted variables. But this protection is paid for. As the range of explanation 
broadens, it becomes harder and harder to believe in an underlying structural, reversible 
relation that amounts to more than a sly way of saying that Japan grew rapidly and the 
United Kingdom grew slowly during this or that period" (1994, p. 51). Therefore, as Pack 
indicates, cross-country regressions explaining growth rates should not be swallowed as a
“ Nevertheless, cross-country regressions relying exclusively on variables like investment in 
capital and in technology may be biased from simultaneous causation, since, in general term, the 
greater the growth rate of a given country, the greater its capacity to generate larger savings, and thus 
more investment.
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casual story. "Such regressions provide rough order of magnitude and indications of where 
to search for explanations of growth, but cannot articulate the connection between factor 
accumulation and growth" (1994, p. 69).
Furthermore, most recent growth regressions do not take into account the fact that we 
are witnessing a significant structural change of planetary dimensions which is rendering 
investment and capital much more mobile than ever before. Socio-economic restructuring and 
rapid economic integration have removed most locational constraints to capital and 
technology. Advances in technology, in informational technology, world banking and de­
regulation trends have made financial capital almost ubiquitous, while productive capital, 
although still rather static, is much more mobile than hitherto. Raw materials no longer 
circumscribe the emergence of a certain type of industry: advances in technology which 
reduce the amount of raw material per unit of output, combined with progress in 
infrastructure and transportation technology (and, therefore, in transportation costs) have 
reduced the importance of the existence raw materials as a source of growth. And technology 
can easily be exported -or assimilated and copied- from the producing country to far away 
areas. As Grossman and Helpman point out, "it may be that the high technology products 
manufactured in one country can be improved as readily by research labs in a foreign country 
as they can by labs located nearby" (1994, p. 39). However, most growth regressions have 
been inclined to overlook these factors and to concentrate on embracing or rejecting the 
neoclassical model of growth. Of course, several exceptions need to be mentioned. There 
have been several attempts to model the globalization o f the world economy. Different 
degrees of integration into world markets have been studied by Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991), whereas Feenstra (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Dollar (1992) have 
concentrated in the analysis of the development of trade as a promoter o f growth. But, 
despite these exceptions literature on economic growth, on the one hand, and on socio­
economic restructuring and production shift, on the other, have followed parallel paths with 
little interchange of information.
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In sum, it could be stated that economic growth is increasingly not just the linear 
result o f the interaction of a limited number of economic factors, but the consequence of a 
complicated and multifaceted process in which social, political, and cultural elements -along 
with economic factors- play significant roles. However, most growth theories -because of 
what Streeck calls an ‘excessive fascination with high technology’ (1991, p. 28)- tend to 
overstate the sway of capital and technology, paying relatively little attention to factors that 
may have a great influence on growth. Political, social, cultural, administrative, juridical and 
demographic realities are being increasingly investigated, but they still play a supporting role 
to capital and technology. The former are factors which may favour or deter growth to the 
same extent as technology and capital do -especially, as has been stated before, in a world 
where technology and capital become increasingly mobile- and which very often predetermine 
the growth potential of an area.
There is thus a need to analyze in greater depth noneconomic components in order 
to better understand the genesis of growth, and to reduce the importance of what Vaizay long 
ago -when referring to technology- labelled the ‘residual factor’(1964). Now that technology 
has become an endogenous element in the equation of growth, other factors have to be given 
the same treatment and be introduced with more vigour in growth models. Moreover, there 
is also a necessity to revise the method of approaching growth and to imagine new models 
or ways o f tackling the connection between growth and a set of economic, social and political 
variables in a nonlinear basis. Several authors have already highlighted the need to resort to 
case studies or to the study of economic growth from the approach o f development 
economists and economic historians (Crafts, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1994). But even 
within the world of quantitative research cross-country and cross regional-regressions should 
be complemented with other nonlinear approaches relating growth and the possible factors 
behind it.
This thesis will deal precisely with these issues. Is the sway of social and political 
conditions on long-term growth now more evident than before? Is growth increasingly
54
dependent on the existence of a certain set of social and political conditions? Does the 
presence of low unemployment levels, advanced universities, low levels of conflict in labour 
relations but also high involvement of local actors and associations in community life and of 
a dynamic regional government encourage growth in regions to the same extent as 
technological progress and investment? Do variables like learning by doing, institutions, 
demography, age structure, political setting, or industrial relations matter to current growth 
rates? In the following pages I will try to give a brief outlook of recent attempts to introduce 
social and political factors in the analysis of long-term growth before trying to detect which 
are the main strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. Finally, I will set the theoretical 
basis of the empirical analysis of regional growth which will be conducted in the following 
chapters.
1,2.2.- SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS IN GROW TH THEORY
The concentration of most growth theories on capital and technology does not mean 
that other factors influencing growth have been completely disregarded or overlooked. There 
is a rich tradition in the analysis of noneconomic factors of growth; a tradition that goes back 
at least to Sombart, Weber, and Durkheim. Sombart, for example, draws special attention 
on the role of entrepreneurship as a key to generating capital and economic wealth (1928). 
From a more economic approach, Schumpeter continued this tradition with his notion of 
creative destruction: a concept which was widely dealt with by growth economists like 
Gerschenkron (1962), whose analysis of economic backwardness and industrialization is 
embedded in concepts like inherited social conditions, social attitudes, entrepreneurship, spirit 
and ideology. Kuznets (1966 and 1971) also paid considerable attention to noneconomic 
factors influencing growth like social structure, demographic patterns, or political structure.
Development economists also examined the influence of noneconomic variables in 
growth rates. Myrdal (1957), for example, constantly suggested the need to investigate social 
and political factors together with international trade in the analysis of growth. Rostow (1961
The theoretical framework
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and 1963) constantly refers in his works to the idea of the entrepreneurial culture of a 
country.
The appearance of the human capital theory in the 1960 shifted some attention from 
capital accumulation to education and training as two of the main constituents of economic 
growth. Singer pioneered this drift. In his 1965 article "Social Development: Key Growth 
Sector”, he pleaded for more attention to the social aspects of development o f health, 
education and nutrition (1965, p. 5), opening the path to the social analysis of growth. Seers 
(1969) took over Singer’s approach. He underscored the need to resort to social and political 
conditions in order to achieve a better understanding of growth trends. And Thirwall 
suggested expanding the notion of residual factors not only to technical progress, but to other 
factors such as learning by experience, education, or organizations skills (1972, p. 123). 
However, the gulf between theoretical production on the socio-political factors of growth and 
empirical output was large. Empirical studies carried out by supporters of social growth 
theories did not radically differ from those developed by neoclassical authors.
Coinciding with the decline of interest in growth during the 1970s, research on the 
connection between social conditions and growth dropped. And it was not until the end of 
the 1970s and early 1980s when two very different theories set the bases for a renewed 
approach to growth.
Fred Hirsch in his book Social Lim its to Growth (1977) inaugurated a new path for 
the study of growth from a social perspective. He asserts that social, as well as physical, 
resources impose a constraint to growth. Those limits are fixed, on the one hand, by the 
existence of 'positional’ goods, that is to say, those whose income elasticity o f demand is 
high but whose price-elasticity of supply is either low or zero, and, on the other hand, by 
the erosion of morality and of the established system of values. Growth is further restricted 
by the extension of welfare, since the maximization of one’s self-interest implies (surpassing 
Pareto’s optimum) a parallel reduction of somebody else’s and, ultimately, of collective well-
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being. The maximization of the individual’s or the individual group’s welfare implies a 
reduction in amenity-value and causes inflation, frustration and waste. The shift from a 
material economy to a positional one brings about a reduction in the growth of really 
productive industries in favour of distributive industries. As Hirsch puts it: ’’fewer people 
grow things or make things; more people service, entertain, consult, supervise. The effect 
is to reduce the area of the economy in which personal productivity can be identified and to 
increase the influence of accepted or imposed norms in the determination of relative pay 
That might be the most significant feature of the modem transformation in the structure of 
the labour force as between manufacturing and service industries. In the service economy, 
personal productivity is subjectively assessed rather than objectively measured" (F. Hirsch, 
1977, p. 43). Furthermore, according to Hirsch, the increase in power of manual workers 
and their unions might endanger the stability and the efficiency of advanced economic 
systems. As Reisman (1990) mentions, in Hirsch’s view "social limits to growth will not be 
eliminated by the mere process of material growth itself. Expansion may be an alternative 
to redistribution in the material sector of the economy ( ...)  it cannot be an alternative in the 
positional sector, where one man’s gain remains another man’s loss" (Reisman, 1990, p. 
271). , -- ’ ■
Mancur Olson, in The Rise and Decline o f Nations (1982), rather than concentrating 
in the individual, directs his attention towards social organizations. He tries to demonstrate 
that a nation’s rate of economic growth is inversely correlated with the presence of 
‘encompassing’ organizations and interest groups within its territory. In a socially advanced 
democratic society an important paradox is established: large groups, at least if they are 
composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest. According to Olson’s 
view of society, achieving either efficiency or equity through comprehensive bargaining is 
out of the question. "Some groups such as consumers, tax payers, the unemployed and the 
poor do not have either the selective incentives or the small numbers needed to organize, so 
they would be left out of the bargaining. It will be in the interest of those groups that are 
organized to increase their own gains by whatever means possible. This would include
57
1 ■» * ■1 1
The socio-political bases o f regional growth...
choosing policies that, though inefficient for the society as a whole, are advantageous for the 
organized groups because the costs of the policies fall disproportionately on the unorganized" 
(Olson, 1982, p. 37). Thus, special interest organizations erect themselves as barriers to 
economic efficiency. Due to the pressure from well organized groups, decision-makers are 
constricted to adopt resolutions, in a son of log-rolling process, which, although beneficial 
to a minority, may turn out to be harmful to the majority. Therefore "countries that have had 
democratic freedom of organization without upheaval or invasion the longest will suffer the 
most from growth repressing organizations and combinations" (Olson, 1982, p. 77).
These theories have introduced a new and challenging dimension in the analysis of 
economic growth. Progress is no longer explained just in terms of capital accumulation and 
investment, and technological progress. Social and political elements such as pressure groups, 
social classes, social actors or even individuals are not considered any more as mere 
spectators of the growth process. On the contrary, they become active participants, whose 
role is to limit and control the economic forces in a given society.
It is, however, in this bounding role where lies, in my opinion, one of the main 
weaknesses o f the above-mentioned social approaches to growth: social factors, at least from 
a Hirschean point of view, are only conceived as restricting factors of growth. That is, they 
alter and modify economic trends from the outside. Growth remains, thus, a fundamentally 
economic process in which other factors play a certain, but secondary role. Social factors still 
constitute external factors12.
12 There is however a fundamental difference between H irsch’s and O lson’s social approaches to 
grow th. W hile Hirsch, in fact, circumscribes social factors to the role o f  hindrances and obstacles to 
econom ic growth, with very little implication in the actual genesis o f growth, Olson goes one step 
further. He tries to introduce the influence (in this case, negative influence) of non-encom passing  
pressure groups into the equation of growth. As he mentions: "sufficiently encompassing or inclusive  
special-interest organizations w ill internalize much o f  the cost o f  inefficient policies, and accordingly  
have an incentive to redistributive income to them selves, with the least possible social cost, and to 
g iv e  som e weight to econom ic growth and to the interests o f  society as a whole" (O lson, 1982, p. 
9 0 ). This represents a meaningful attempt to raise a social factor to the status o f  independent variable, 
and, hence, to recast as internal what had always previously been considered as an external bounding 
factor to growth.
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The configuration of these social theories of growth from a deductive point of view 
is another meaningful impairment. The attempt to construct a priori social or political 
theories of growth, liable of being universally applied a posteriori, limits the explanatory 
power of these theories when confronted with empirical evidence. And although, especially 
in Olson’s theory empirical data seems to confirm -at least partially- his statements, it is 
highly unlikely that the theory would remain as ‘performant’ if the basic parameters were 
changed: time (i.e ., from post-IFd world war developed societies to Europe in the 16th 
century), space (from developed to underdeveloped nations) or scale (from European states 
to regions).
Endogenous growth theorists have also not been invulnerable to the appeal of 
noneconomic factors. Human capital, the dimension and capacity of governments to eliminate 
inefficiencies, and to a minor extent, demography, are the fields were the greatest 
breakthrough has been achieved.
Human capital, and especially investment in human capital has long been regarded as 
one of the main factors fostering growth. Together with physical capital and the technological 
factor, the insertion of investment in human capital in the regression o f growth has been a 
constant since the 1960s. More investment and more schooling was the traditional recipe for 
promoting growth for most neoclassical theorists (Romer, 1994). Since the reawakening of 
growth studies in the second half of the 1980s, the attention paid to human capital issues has 
been growing, and authors like Romer (1989), Dasgupta (1990), Barro (1991), Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil (1991) -just to mention a few- have dealt with the human capital dimension. 
The association of numerous educational indicators and variables with growth is constantly 
being put to the test in regressions. Much interest is concentrated in factors like primary and 
secondary school enrolments (Barro, 1991), college education, and literacy rates (Romer,
1989). Other chief issues are total and government expenditures in education and training 
(Barro, 1989), and -in close relationship with the technological factor- the number of 
scientists and engineers. Other authors have modelled the capacity of learning by doing as
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the necessary complement to technological innovation (Rosenberg» 1982; Young, 1991 and
1993).
The attraction of political factors in growth theory is more recent but not less 
widespread. Aspects such as political stability, the overall size of government and 
government intervention, and fiscal policy measures are increasingly being introduced into 
growth equations. Barro is one of the authors who has paid more attention to the association 
between political factors and economic growth. He has tried to measure political stability by 
including variables such as an index of civil liberties, and revolutions and coups (1991); he 
has evaluated the overall size of government in the economy by introducing government 
spending (1990), and the share of real government consumption expenditures and real 
government capital formation (1991). Other political attributes such as the type o f economic 
system, potential rent-seeking (Barro, 1991), the size of the black market and informal 
economy, and a series of fiscal policy measures like taxes, government deficits and 
government consumption and expenditure are important.
Endogenous growth theorists have also shown some interest in the association between 
demographical aspects and growth. Nonetheless, this field has represented a minor concern 
in the whole theory of endogenous growth, being constricted to some indicators -such as 
initial population indicators- in the Summers-Heston data set (1988), or some measures of 
population growth.
However, the increasing introduction of noneconomic and nontechnological factors 
as independent variables in growth models does not imply that social, political, and cultural 
factors have transcended their originally supporting role in the equation of growth. As 
mentioned before, noneconomic variables are included together with indicators o f investment 
and technical progress in models of economic growth which reproduce -with slight 
alterations- the neoclassical approach to growth. In these models technology and growth tend 
to  perform better than the social or political factors taken into consideration. As a result, the 60
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sway of social and political indicators on long-term economic growth is considered as fragile, 
since most policy, institutional and social indicators are not robustly correlated with growth 
or the investment share (Newman and Thomson, 1989; Levine and Renelt, 1992).
The lack of robustness of noneconomic indicators lies precisely in the supporting role 
they play to technology and investment. Most growth equations might be biased from 
simultaneous causation, omitted variable problems, and excessive focus on parsimony and 
linearity, problems which edge out the perception of a connection between growth and
noneconomic factors.
With regard to simultaneous causation, it has been often taken for granted that the 
more a country saves, invests in machinery and generates technological progress, the greater 
are its chances to grow. However, less attention has been paid to the fact that this sentence 
could be reversed: the higher the growth level of a country, the greater are its chances to put 
aside more resources to invest in machinery and in research and technology. This evident 
correlation between dependent and certain independent variables hides the role that other 
factors with no such connection might play as constituents of growth.
The goal of parsimony might also have ruled out the statistical influence of 
noneconomic factors on growth. The aim of focusing on a reduced set of variables signifies 
an extreme reduction of the complex scope of social and political factors which might have 
an influence on growth. The connection between one or two isolated social or political factors 
and growth is almost inevitably irrelevant. The population structure or the political 
orientation of a particular government do not alone determine growth rates. It is the complex 
interaction among very heterogenous social and political variables which determines the 
creation of a certain socio-political setting, which altogether amplifies or limits the growth 
potential of a certain area. Therefore, the robustness of socio-political constituents o f growth 
is severely impaired by the omitted variable bias.
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Finally, linearity is the third major handicap for appreciating the correlation between 
long-term growth and the socio-political setting. It is difficult to imagine a linear and well- 
established connection between certain social or political conditions and growth. Social 
stability and the absence of social conflict do not by themselves favour or deter growth. The 
same could be said for the capacity to integrate immigrants or the labour structure. But these 
factors, together with other socio-political elements do influence the way in which actors 
(such as entrepreneurs, investors, public decision makers, etc.) take their decisions on 
whether to invest in a certain place or not, whether to risk their money in growth producing 
activities in that precise place and moment or to look for a better place or wait for a better 
time. Individual decisions are the consequence of a series of complex mechanisms -among 
which chance occupies an important place- that influence individuals and that are difficult to 
grasp by any type of causal models (Boudon, 1984). In sum, the socio-political setting 
provides -as Streeck (1992) underlines- opportunities and constraints for economic action. It 
also bestows advantages and limitations on economic activity, determining the potential of 
any place to grow more or less than its neighbours.
There is thus a need to consider social and political components not as minor actors, 
but as active constituents of the process o f economic growth. In fact, I would claim that, 
given the complexity o f a society modelled by an enormous number of interactions and cross 
influences, the spatial expression o f social and political elements might be as important as 
(or, even, more important than) economic components in the genesis of growth. Such an 
approach, as Trigilia underlines, does not fit well in the high levels of analytical parsimony, 
which are common in traditional growth models. It has to work with a large number of 
variables, some of which are difficult to quantify (Trigilia, 1992b, p. 18).
I.2 .3 .- THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SOCIO-POLITICAL THEORY OF GROWTH.
The most significant advances to free socio-political factors from their supporting role 
vis-à-vis investment and technology in the analysis of growth, have been achieved mainly by
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a few economists, sociologists, and political scientists who have dared to leave the anchoring 
elements of traditional factors (capital and technology), and wander into the relatively 
unexplored territory of the socio-political dimension of growth. As a result of their 
dissatisfaction with growth theory, several economists have begun to direct their attention to 
other fields of social science, in order to draw on ideas, already present in Schumpeter’s. 
Gerschenkron’s or Kuznets’ thinking, from the subordination to technology and investment.
In this context, a group of researchers has increasingly studied the influence of factors 
such as the political on long-term growth (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Nordhaus, 1989; Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1991; 1993; Alesina and Perotti, 1993; Edwards and Tabellini, 1991).
Many of the studies on the socio-political causes of economic growth have focused 
on the institutional domain. Great advances have been made in the analysis of the relationship 
between instimtions or institutional change and growth, giving birth to what has been called 
the New Institutional Economics (Williamson, 1985 and 1993; Frey, 1993). However, as 
North underlines most of the attempts to bring institutions into the analysis of economic 
progress have been limited by considering the institutional framework as exogenous to the 
genesis of growth (1991, p. 5). Therefore, the limitations already mentioned in Hirsch’s and 
Olson’s theories are reproduced, to a greater or lesser extent, in the case of the New 
Institutional Economics: institutions are mainly contemplated as external or restraining factors 
and not as explicit constituents of growth. According to North, the institutional structure is, 
however, more than a simple restraining or limiting factor on economic growth. The bases 
of unequal growth can be found, not only in the economic sphere of every society, but also 
in the institutional arrangements which define the rules, the informal constraints and the 
attributes enforcing those constraints (1992, p. 477). Instimtions, thus, provide the 
framework for socio-economic development, influencing all kinds of activities taking place 
and defining the possibilities of economic growth in every society (North, 1990). Hence, 
"modelling institutions and the way they change is important for further progress in economic 
theory" (North, 1991, p. 3).
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Nevertheless, most attempts to analyze the influence of the institutional dimension on 
the genesis o f unequal growth have been centred on the static dimension of institutions (e.g. 
Doner, 1991). Institutional frameworks are compared cross-sectionally in order to understand 
how they affect economic conditions and growth trends. In contrast, little empirical research 
has been carried out on the topic of how institutional change shapes economic performance. 
As a consequence, there is little empirical evidence to support the rising choir of voices 
claiming that institutions, in general, and institutional change, in particular, matter to growth.
Running parallel to this concern by economists with the political setting, sociologists 
and political scientists have in mm been increasingly attracted by the intertwining of social 
and political phenomena and economic conditions. Numerous studies have been devoted to 
the influence of the political orientation of parties in office, trade union membership, welfare 
state size, government spending and processes of supranational integration on growth trends 
(Garrett and Lange, 1986; Lange and Garrett, 1987; Lane and Ersonn, 1987; Castles and 
Do wrick, 1990). As Esping-Andersen and van Kersbergen stress, the basic question in this 
type of growth-literature is whether welfare size affected growth negatively (1992)13. Other 
topics concentrate on the study the influence of left parties and the organization of labour 
have on growth (Lange and Garrett, 1985; response by Jackman, 1987; and again Lange and 
Garrett, 1987), while others focus on government spending levels (Castles and Dowrick,
1990), or search for the explanatory variables in the international economy (Garrett and 
Lange, 1986). Other options adopt a more encompassing solution in the analysis of the socio­
political constituents of growth. This more global approach defended by Lane and Ersonn 
(1987), is the one which, in my opinion, deals best with the problem of the omitted variable 
bias. Lane and Ersonn assume that economic growth is a function of the combination of 
several elements working together. First of all, of "the traditional economic variables: 
investment, labour supply, and trade -their levels and rates o f change. Secondly, social *64
13 Two significant articles on this subject could be cited: Walter Korpi’s "Economic growth and 
the welfare state: leaky bucket or irrigation system?" (European Sociological Review, vol. 1, 1985, 
pp. 97-118) and Friedland and Sander’s "The public economy and economic growth in Western 
Market Economies" (American Sociological Review, vol. 50, 1985, pp. 421-37).
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factors may have an impact on economic growth, either directly or in terms of their impact 
on the economic variables. Thirdly a set of political variables could be related to economic 
growth by means of their impact on the basic conditions for economic activity" (p. 6). 
Hence, they conceive economic growth according to the following general model:
EG=f(EV,SV,PV) • 1 (3)
where EG is economic growth, EV stands for economic variables, SV for social variables, 
and PV for political variables (p. 6).
Afterwards, they proceed to test different sets of variables which include proportion 
of investments to GDP, percentage of work force and proportion of exports to GDP (EV), 
which could be considered in fact -the proportion of investment left aside- as non traditional 
economic factors; population growth, educational attainment and employment per branch 
(SV) and democracy, left-governments and Olson’s theory of institutional sclerosis (PV).
These attempts to bring noneconomic conditions to the fore in the analysis of long­
term growth represented significant steps on the road towards isolating the relationship 
between the socio-political setting and growth. However, in spite of these suggestive 
advances, a great deal of the criticism aimed at the endogenous approach to growth can be 
applied to purely socio-political attempts to model growth. ;
First of all, in spite of concentrating exclusively on social or political factors, the 
social and political dimensions tend to be underrepresented in these analyses. In their aim to 
attain parsimony, researchers concentrate on no more than three or four socio-political 
variables in order to explain different rates o f growth: Walter Koipi focuses on the 
percentage of labour force in agriculture, on social security expenditures, and on government 
transfers (1985); Garrett and Lange on the power of left-wing parties and labour organization 
(1985 and 1987); Lane and Ersonn on institutional sclerosis (1987); Castles and Dowrick on
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government spending levels (1990); Alesina and Rodrik on political conflict (1991); and 
Alesina and Perotti on income inequality (1993). These studies constitute, without any doubt, 
significant steps towards the comprehension of growth as a socio-political -as well as an 
economic- phenomenon. But, when contemplated as isolated variables, social and political 
indicators face the same problems of lack of robustness. Conclusions were often relatively 
unstable when compared with empirical results achieved by models based on technology and 
capital. The lack of reliability of some results led to criticisms about the relevance of the 
advances. Jackman, for example, criticized Garrett and Lange for sustaining ‘unwarranted’ 
conclusions in their claim that in the presence of encompassing unions, governments have 
a critical role in reducing the risks run by labour in pursuing a collective gain strategy, in 
order to achieve optimal economic performance (Lange and Garrett, 1987, p. 822). Jackman 
argues that Lange’s and Garrett’s results might be strongly biased by the growth behaviour 
of Norway in the period analyzed and, thus that any association between leftist strength and 
growth is spurious (1987, p. 247-253). The lack of plausibility of the conclusions attained 
by social and political models of growth might be due to the fact that social and political 
factors taken into consideration are isolated from a myriad of other factors, and, therefore, 
most of the complexity of the context in which they are inserted is lost, in favour of a 
theoretically more comprehensible but less performant model.
Secondly, the return to linear models in the study of growth limits their explanatory 
power. As mentioned before, there is no clear-cut linear connection between any o f the 
traditional factors included in economic, social, or political growth models and economic 
growth. Nevertheless, the cause-effect association between investment and growth, or 
between technological progress and growth, is far more significant than the relationship 
between growth and any social and political factor. This is acknowledged by socio-political 
theorists of growth. According to Lane and Ersonn, the degree o f association with growth 
varies depending on whether we consider economic, social and political variables. Investment 
is directly associated with economic growth, whereas "different social milieux or context may 
have different implications for the basic parameters that determine economic growth, e .g .,
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capital investment, labour input, and technology" (1987, p. 9), and political variables "may 
be relevant for the economic factors that condition economic development" (p. 10). Using 
a comparable reasoning, income inequality in Alesina's and Perotti’s conception does not 
impinge directly on growth rates. It first fuels social discontent and increases social 
instability, creating later uncertainty in the political and economic environments which, as 
a consequence, reduces investment (1993). And cutbacks in investment prompt a reduction 
in growth rates. The fact is that linear models are perhaps not the most appropriate way to 
tackle the socio-political bases of growth. Not because they are not well structured and 
provide useful results -indeed, linear social or political models of growth might prove to be 
very performant in certain cases- but because they tend to overreduce the complexity of the 
socio-political context and to shatter complex links which taken as a whole -and not individually- 
are the factors which determine whether any given socio-political context is advantageous 
or harmful to growth.
1.2.3.1.- The genesis of growth in a post-Fordist society.
As we have seen, the mere introduction of sets of social and political variables into 
linear models of growth does not by itself solve the problem of what type of relationship 
there is between the socio-political setting and economic growth. In some cases, even an 
excessive belief in the virtues of social and political factors as motors of growth may prove 
to be detrimental to our understanding of growth.
Economic growth has been and is not just the linear result o f the interaction of a 
limited number of either economic, social, or political factors, but the consequence of a 
complicated and multifaceted process in which social, political, and cultural elements -along 
with economic factors- play significant roles. When capital and technology become 
increasingly mobile, and when traditional economic locational factors are no longer able to 
explain on their own how and why economic activity flourishes in certain areas and not in 
others, there is a need to resort to the social, political and cultural environments in order to
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grasp why, despite the profound changes which have affected our society, long-term growth 
trends tend to suffer only slight alterations and economic disparities linger. Socio-economic 
restructuring, technological progress and changes in production might not have reduced the 
influence of investment and technology in fostering growth, but it might have rendered the 
subtle connection between social and political indicators and long-term growth patterns more 
visible. However, this enhanced visibility does not affect the correlation between isolated 
social and political factors and growth. It concerns the influence a whole socio-political 
environment in a given place might have on actors who bear the task of taking growth 
promoting decisions. Entrepreneurs, politicians, companies, institutions, and individuals do 
not make decisions in an abstract world or in a perfect market environment. They have to 
act in a determined time and space setting which strongly influences their perception of risks 
and opportunities, of the privileges and limitations an area possesses for promoting economic 
activities, and of what are the advantages and drawbacks they will have to face in their 
growth supporting activity. The information that actors have is also limited and partial. It is 
greatly influenced by social and political conditions, and burdened by preconceptions and 
biased sources which play a crucial role in factors like the diffusion of innovation and the 
decision to invest.
Furthermore, the socio-political environment conditions the acceptance o f innovation. 
Social and political conditions in some places might foster the genesis and diffusion of 
innovation, via the social recognition o f innovation and entrepreneurship, support to 
technology and incentives which protect innovation. In other places, in contrast, the lack of 
scientific research, insufficient skills, inadequate legislation on the topic, or even low 
receptiveness and willingness to change by the population, cuts down the possibilities for 
economic progress. And this fact does not only affect the genesis of endogenous innovation 
or the capacity to foster local entrepreneurship, it also conditions the receptiveness of foreign 
originated change.
A well functioning market alone is insufficient to generate economic growth. I f  social
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and political conditions in the context of a local or particular space did not count, then, the 
greater mobility of investment and technology related to socio-economic restructuring, would 
have probably resulted in a levelling out of disparities in wealth and an increase in economic 
convergence. However -as we have already seen- this seems not to be the case.
Hence, the social, political and institutional environment of every space has an 
important role to play in supplying what Streeck calls the basic requirements for the genesis 
of advanced neoindustrial production patterns: a congenial ‘organisational ecology1, the 
‘presence of redundant capacities’, and a rich supply of ‘collective inputs’ (1991, p. 24). 
That is, the social and political setting provide the population structure, the education and 
skills, the labour and industrial structures, the politics and the institutions which determine 
the opportunities and constraints, the advantages and limitations o f every place for the 
implementation of growth promoting activities. Economic actors take growth promoting 
decisions in a given place as a result of the positive or negative perception they have of the 
social and political environment.
From a social point of view, demography and education, social dynamism, 
receptiveness of new trends and innovation may turn out to be important factors in the 
genesis of economic growth. It is, therefore, crucial to map out sets of variables, such as 
population activity and unemployment, education, living standards and social mobility, in 
order to get a complete picture of how the social sphere works in each place. The quality, 
quantity and availability in time of human resources (what has been traditionally referred to 
as ‘human capital’ in some economic analysis), the skills and the accessibility of the labour 
force, well-being and living standards in the broadest sense of these concepts, predispose a 
society to benefit from factors such as the genesis, diffusion, adoption, mastering and 
acceptance of innovation. And an innovative society is more able to compete in an open 
economy than societies which lack the dynamism to transform their lower capacity to 
innovate and accept foreign innovation into productive effort, and, thus, economic growth. 69
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The same could be said for political conditions and institutions. Tense political 
environments, corruption, instability, conflicts among administrations, inadequate legislation, 
and slow bureaucracy are some of the political and institutional burdens which might deter 
growth promoting activities to the same extent as lack of capital or obsolete technology. But 
this does not mean that a reduction of the state and political apparatus is the solution for 
achieving greater growth. As Streeck underlines, a rich political and institutional environment 
is also a guarantee against unfair practices and against the rule of aggressive habits which 
might drive economic actors out of the market and lead to the setting up of suboptimal 
market and economic conditions for growth. According to Streeck, institutional mechanisms 
contribute to "overcome suspicion among competitors, insure firms against opportunistic 
defections of partners from implicit contractual understandings, and enable firms to invest 
not only in their own performance but also in that of other firms in their environment, 
thereby contributing to the collective good of a dense organisational ecology of potential 
strategic allies" (Streeck, 1991, p. 35), and, consequently to setting the most adequate 
environment for the development of economic activity.
1.2,3.2.- Economic actors as social actors.
One of the main assumptions of traditional theories of growth was that of the perfect 
information o f economic actors in the market, which led them to take the most adequate 
economic decisions at any given time. However, there are no differences between an 
economic actor and a social actor; the same individuals who operate in society make up the 
investors, entrepreneurs, workers, consumers, and decision makers in the economic arena. 
Thus, either all individuals have perfect information, or the information in the hands of 
economic actors is partial and strongly influenced by the socio-political and cultural 
environment in which social actors have grown, operate and live. Therefore, economic actors 
will decide whether to invest or not invest, whether to risk or not to risk their money, 
whether to consume or not to consume -in sum, to generate growth promoting activities- 
based on their perception of a set o f social and political circumstances. 70
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Social actors in their role as investors and entrepreneurs will decide whether to invest 
their money -and their time and work- in their place of origin or in other areas, depending 
on the returns they expect to have in any given place and under a certain set of socio-political 
circumstances* And their expectations are largely determined by their opinion about the social 
and political environment -as well as by the economic situation- of the possible location of 
the growth promoting activity. Investors and entrepreneurs have to evaluate whether the 
social setting provides the appropriate amount of workers with the specific skills for the task, 
and whether the predominant type o f labour relations is the most adequate for the fulfilment 
of economic activity. They also have to consider the institutional setting in order to ascertain 
that their investment is secure from arbitrary decisions by administrations, sudden changes, 
or unfair practices by other investors or entrepreneurs. In addition, they have to evaluate the 
market perspectives which are largely determined by the social attitudes of a given population 
to change and novelty, and, besides, the social dimension conditions the development of 
entrepreneurship. Investors and entrepreneurs have to consider factors such as the social 
acceptance of entrepreneurs, fiscal and labour regulation and incentives in order to direct 
their efforts to growth promoting activities, or other activities -perhaps more profitable from 
an individual point of view- with less emphasis on growth.
Social actors in their role o f workers also shape growth. Institutions and society are 
responsible for giving workers the adequate skills and training for the fulfilment of economic 
activities. Lack of manpower, deficient education and training, low capacity to recycle skills, 
and lack of redundant capacities become serious handicaps for the completion o f productive 
activities. The social, political, and institutional settings also define labour relations and 
social unrest. The absence of well defined rules, or traditions of breaking established rules 
in the field of labour relations, severely impair the normal pursuit of economic activities, and 
may ultimately become a strong deterrent for investment.
Social actors are also consumers, who by means of purchasing certain goods or 
services help to stimulate economic activity. With the increasing globalization of the world
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economy, consumption of local products by local consumers is losing relevance on a global 
scale, but it is still essential for the development of newborn companies, whose capacity to 
compete in distant markets is fairly limited. The receptiveness of consumers in a certain area 
to local products and to innovation thus also becomes an incentive or an obstacle to economic 
progress.
Finally, even if actors take economic decisions based on their perception of the whole 
socio-economic and political context, there is a great degree of a subjectivity in economic 
decision making. Ideas or prejudices about the supposed laziness of this or that group, or 
about the intelligence or lack of intelligence o f certain human groups, are deeply embedded 
in collective thinking. They are socially re-produced and influence economic actors. 
Moreover, it is not always true that economic actors make decisions led by the determination 
of obtaining the highest profits. Numerous economic resolutions are taken taking into account 
other factors -ranging from altruistic, to sentimental, or even purely irrational decisions- than 
pure economic profit.
In brief, the social and political conditions -taken as a whole and not as isolated 
factors- bestow every place with a set of capacities, skills, an image and a framework which 
make it attractive or unattractive to socio-economic actors, who ultimately decide on the basis 
of their perception o f these conditions whether to pursue their economic activities in this or 
in another location.
I.3.2.3.- Present and inherited social and political conditions.
The social and political environments are not just the result o f how social and political 
circumstances combine in any given place in a certain time. They are the outcome of a 
complex combination of processes which are being developed in the present and which have 
taken place in the past.
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Inherited social and political structures have contributed to the formation of a unique 
socio-political frame in every place, which grants every location an image, an appeal, and 
a set of constraints and opportunities, of advantages or limitations which constitute a great 
deal of the growth potential of every space. The nature of spatial disequilibria and different 
rates of growth, is derived from the uniqueness of the process in which inherited social and 
political conditions are combined with present economic, social, and political circumstances. 
The blending of the economic, social, political and cultural settings is accomplished in 
different ways according to changing time-space coordinates. As a consequence, no two 
places bear the exact same conditions for the development of economic activity, and the 
implementation of the same economic process in different locations will result in diverse 
economic outcomes, because every socio-political setting will impinge diversely on that 
process.
In addition, the economic, social and political circumstances which influence 
economic activities are not felt on the same time scales. There is a significant lag in the 
rhythms of economic, social and political change. In an advanced capitalist society, 
investment is translated into economic growth in a relatively short period of time. Political 
and social conditions, in contrast, might exert a meaningful influence on economic activity 
only on a medium or even long term basis. Shortage of educational skills affects not only 
present but future economic activity, and the correction of this deficiency can only be 
achieved in the span of a generation. The same happens with the institutional setting. The 
economic effects of the passing of the law are not automatic. In certain cases the beneficial 
or detrimental effects o f a certain political act or a certain institutional change on the 
economy are only felt after a period of several years. And within the social and political 
realms, some changes might have a more immediate effect on the economy than others. For 
example, changes in the structure of the labour market, or in employment rates affect 
economic developments more rapidly than changes in training and skills of the population. 
And the process of change in education and training tends to occur at a faster rate, than 
changes in demographic tendencies.
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Moreover, the social and political dimensions are extremely resistant to change in 
comparison to the relatively feeble rigidities of the economic world. Economic integration 
in the EU, for example, has clearly outstripped social and political integration.
Finally, cultural transformations affecting the economy can only be observed in the 
much longer term. The metamorphosis of collective norms and of traditions is achieved only 
after a very long process -often lasting centuries- of adaptation to innovation.
In sum, it could be stated that socio-political conditions play an indirect but 
determining role in the genesis of economic growth and of territorial disparities, although this 
role might have been hidden until now by the various factors mentioned: the focus on 
investment and technology in the genesis of growth, the lack of a clear cut and direct 
relationship between social and political elements and growth, the adoption of linear models, 
and by the delayed influence that the socio-political context exerts on economic activity. 
However, the changes associated with the process of socio-economic restructuring -which 
have rendered capital and technology much less territorially constrained- might spur research 
from different perspectives on the socio-political bases of growth. Consequently, in a more 
integrated and competitive world, local social and political circumstances might play an 
essential role in the genesis, reception and assimilation of technology and information, and 
in the development of economic activity. The successful adoption of novel technologies and 
techniques, and the manipulation of expanded information, relies heavily not only on the 
capacity of a few individuals or companies to invent new procedures and to compile massive 
amounts of information, but also on the capacity of any social and political actor or group 
to supersede handicaps and to respond rapidly to challenges. It is in this sense that the social 
and political setting pre-determines the receptiveness to novelty and the acceptance of 
innovation in a determined place, and, thus, the capacity o f every society to generate 
economic growth. Current levels of growth of a nation, a region or a locality are the outcome 
of how different production systems and social and political regimes have been successively 
combined (Massey, 1984, pp. 117-118). 74
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The socio-political bases of regional growth...
Prior to trying to evaluate empirically the socio-political bases of regional growth in 
Western Europe, two questions have to be addressed. First of all, the significance of regions 
as a valid unit of analysis and, secondly, how to measure the dependent variable, how to 
measure growth, and whether a new regional growth pattern is emerging.
One of the main dilemmas when analyzing growth in a post-Fordist environment is 
whether regions and not nations constitute the most adequate unit of analysis. According to 
Krugman’s, Porter’s, and O’Brien’s postulates (vid. Chapter I), with the establishment of a 
flexible production model, identified by greater economic decentralization and a supposedly 
decreasing influence of national borders, regional growth patterns become less dependent on 
national growth trends, and more connected to the endogenous conditions of every region.
This question is closely related to the problem of the measurement of growth rates. 
If regional growth rates are completely unaffected by the national context, then the choice 
of growth rates is limited between growth rates measured in a common currency or in 
purchasing power standards. If, in contrast, regional growth rates vary according to national 
conditions, then the choice of growth rates will have to take into account the influence o f the 
national dimension in order to avoid misinterpretations induced by national growth rates. 
Thus -and in spite of the fact that this question has awaken relatively little interest in 
scientific literature- the option between plain or nationally weighted regional growth rates 
becomes a fundamental issue.
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I I . l . -  W H Y  REG IO NS AND NOT NATIONS?
The cross-sectional study of growth has been mainly carried out at a national level 
and not at a regional one. Since the pacesetting works of Schumpeter, Harrod, Domar, and 
Solow, applied research on the topic has dealt with the growth trajectories of nations. The 
endogenous approach to growth has been no exception: the renewal of interest in growth was 
to a certain extent provoked by the compilation of new datasets which allowed to research 
the question of economic growth from new perspectives and with greater accuracy The 
databases compiled by Maddison (1982), and by Summers and Heston (1988) -which acted 
as the base for most recent studies on growth- contained information at a national level. As 
a consequence, recent research on growth has focused on issues like convergence, increasing 
and diminishing returns to investment, or the role of technological progress in a national 
context.
Growth studies performed from a more sociological or political perspective have 
remained faithful to the same spatial dimension. As Esping-Andersen and Van Kersbergen
(1992) point out, previous empirical studies concerned with the influence of social and 
political variables on growth chose the nation as the unit of analysis. Lange and Garrett
(1985), Garrett and Lange (1986), Lane and Ersonn (1987), or Castles and Dowrick (1990) 
have analyzed in different articles the influence of various types of government, government 
spending, trade union membership and other political and social variables on growth at a 
national level. The same could be said for other social and political attempts to tackle 
economic growth. Mancur Olson (1982), when testing his theory empirically, resorted to 
comparisons of growth performances of Western European and American nations. Further 
attempts to test Olson’s theory (Choi, 1983) have stuck to nations, and Williamson’s (1985 
and 1993), and Alesina and Rodrik’s (1991 and 1993) theories of institutional and political 
change and growth have been conceived for the national dimension.
On the contrary, the study of regional growth has been largely limited to case studies.
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And even at this level, it has only been dealt with tangentially. Regional case studies have 
flourished in recent years. Nevertheless, most of this literature has been concerned with the 
questions of technological change and socio-economic restructuring, with the focus on 
regional growth limited to a discrete background. This interest in regional questions has 
produced several approaches to the issue of regional restructuring and regional growth, which 
have tended to concentrate on separate groups of case studies. These approaches could be 
assembled -in a somewhat sketchy manner- into the following sets:
a) The flexible specialization approach. Beginning with the works of Piore and Sabel 
(1984), this mainly North American approach has been based on the idea that the crisis in 
the Fordist model of mass production has provoked a process based on a reinforcement of 
linkages between supply and demand, in which technology plays the leading role (Gottdiener, 
1989; Storper and Scott, 1989; Dear and Wolch, 1989; Scott and Storper, 1992; Cooke and 
Morgan 1992a; Castells and Hall, 1994). Empirical studies conducted by this approach have 
been fundamentally American based, concentrating in areas like the Silicon Valley, the 
Orange County, Route 128 in the Boston area, and the city of Phoenix.
b) Closely related to the previous approach, although stemming from a very different 
origin, we find the Italian industrial district approach (Becattini, 1979; Bagnasco, 1988; 
Trigilia, 1988 and 1992b; Pyke, Becattini and Sengenberger, 1990; Dunford, 1991; Porter, 
1990, and also Scott and Storper, 1992). This approach emerges from the analysis of the 
success of small and medium enterprises in the centre of Italy. Empirical research on the 
districts of Prato or Faenza, or on the region of Emilia-Romagna, is based on principles such 
as the permanence o f a deep-rooted craftsmanship tradition as a source of entrepreneurship; 
a strong degree of competition between enterprises, forcing industries to look for original 
solutions to problems; and the presence of a solid social network.
c) The influence of case studies is less evident in the French regulation school. This 
approach, inspired by the work of Gramsci, claims that the breakdown of the capitalist model
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of regulation and accumulation is the key to understanding the current transformations in the 
system of production. The crisis in the model has given leeway to meaningful local changes 
and to the establishment of production networks (Aglietta, 1976; Boyer, 1986 and 1989; 
Leborgne and Lipietz, 1989, 1992; Benko, 1992; Lipietz, 1993). Empirical analyses by the 
French regulation school have been mainly conducted at the level of industrial sectors. 
Nevertheless, industrial clusters in certain regions have also been a repeated object of 
empirical study.
d) The diversified quality production school constitutes the fourth approach to the 
question of socio-economic restructuring and production change. This fundamentally German 
approach stresses the role played by institutions as a motor of changes in the production 
process. As in the case of the French regulation school, diversified quality production 
theorists tend to focus on the analysis of industrial sectors in order to construct, test, or reject 
their theories (Willman, 1986; Sorge and Streeck, 1988; Sorge and Warner, 1986; Streeck, 
1987, 1989, 1991, 1992). However, this emphasis on industrial sectors and institutions leads 
to a combination of both in certain regions which have become the paradigmatic example of 
success stories in this approach. The German Land of Baden-Württemberg is the preferred 
laboratory for the analysis of how industrial sectors and institutions in order to generate 
diversified quality production environments (Semlinger, 1993).
Thus, the study of economic growth and development has been dealt with until 
recently on a double level: national cross-sectional studies, on the one hand, and regional and 
industrial sector case studies, on the other. However, several exceptions to this rule can be 
highlighted. First of all, and at the level of the European Community, a cross-sectional 
analysis of regional growth between 1950 and 1970 was undertaken by Molle, Van Holst and 
Smidt (1980), whose regional data set, together with the REGIO database of the Statistical 
Office of the European Communities, have become the base for further regional studies. The 
European Commission has published since 1981 five Periodic Reports on the Socio-economic 
Situation and Evolution o f Regions in the EC (1981, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1994) in which
(
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factors such as the regional evolution of GDP, employment, and economic sectors are 
thoroughly studied. More recently, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a and 1992b) have 
addressed the question of convergence across states and regions in the United States and in 
the European Community, and Mick Dunford has scrutinized the evolution of regional 
disparities using the empirical data incorporate the REGIO databank (1993).
Most of these studies deal with points like the existence o f convergence or divergence 
at a regional level or limit themselves to the analysis of regional trajectories, without making 
the step of examining in depth the causes which spark growth. More in depth studies of the 
bases for economic growth are achieved when only a certain type or homogeneous group of 
regions is spotlighted or when a pre-determined nation is analyzed at a regional level. This 
is especially the case of urban regions, where a myriad of European range studies have 
delved into the origins of the enhanced concentration of wealth in recent years (Brunet et a l. , 
1989; Cheshire and Hay, 1989; Cheshire, 1990; Dunford and Kafka las, 1992). The same 
could be said for industrial declining regions (Quévit et a l 1991), lagging peripheral areas, 
or inland regions. Attempts to unveil the political bases of regional growth in given national 
contexts have been carried out on Germany by Manfred Schmidt in his book CDU und SPD 
an der Regierung (1980) and on Italy by Robert Putnam (1993).
In brief, the field of cross-sectional studies on the causes o f growth at a regional level 
has been relatively restricted in comparison with the strength and vigour of cross-sectional 
studies at a national level and regional case studies. Among the reasons that I could refer to 
in order to explain this shortage of cross-sectional analyses, two stand out. In first place, the 
existence of a long tradition of research on comparative growth has aroused an absorbing and 
fruitful debate on the conditions o f growth at a national level, which has thus captivated most 
attention.
But perhaps the main reason behind the scarcity of cross-sectional analysis of regional 
growth is data. As Romer points out, the renewed interest in growth at a national level found
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a crucial stimulus in the emergence of new data sets with information for many countries and 
long periods of time (1994, p. 4). The Maddison (1982), and the Summer-Heston (1988) 
datasets, together with information coming from the UN’s, World Bank’s, IM F’s, and 
OCDE’s data banks make up the core of a reasonably well structured information set - 
although still full of gaps- for the study of long term growth. Some of the lacunae in these 
datasets are being Filled up by analyses carried out by individual researchers.
Similar databases for the study of long term growth rates at a regional level in Europe 
are simply not available. In the EC the Statistical Office is making a huge effort in order to 
compile a well organised and complete bank of regional data: the REGIO databank. 
However, this is a long range and arduous task that will still take many years until it is fully 
accomplished. Up to date, regional information is partial, full of gaps, and unsuitable to 
undertake studies of growth on a long term basis. There is a considerable amount of 
information available on questions like GDP, gross value added and employment per sector, 
which, in the cases of a considerable number of regions could be traced back to 1950. 
Indicators on activity rate, unemployment, agriculture and land use, population, and other 
demographical aspects are fairly well represented in the REGIO database since the beginning 
of the 1980s. There is, nevertheless, little or no information for the whole of the EU at a 
regional level on other social aspects like education, migration, poverty, minorities, industrial 
relations and trade unions. And political data is almost completely absent. Researchers need 
to resort to national statistical sources in order to fill in the gaps. But then again, using 
national sources entails serious problems of compatibility and comparability o f data. As a 
result, the lack of reliable data at a regional level is the main reason why researchers pursue 
the national path rather than the regional one. 81
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I I .l .l .-  REGIONS VS. NATIONS. ON THE QUESTION OF THE EMERGENCE OF 
REGIONS AS A VALID UNIT OF ANALYSIS.
If the choice o f regions in the EU poses, as we have seen, significant problems to the 
study of growth, in general, and of the socio-political bases o f growth, in particular, why 
stick to regions as the unit of analysis? Why not resort to nations in order to comply with the 
long tradition of analyses of growth at a national level and to dodge apparently 
unsurmountable obstacles like the shortage of reliable data?
The choice of European regions and not nations in this dissertation as the unit of 
analysis is by no means an arbitrary or capricious one. One of the criticisms directed in the 
previous chapter towards traditional models of economic growth was their disregard for the 
vast structural changes which the world is undergoing since the 1970s. As mentioned before, 
this has led to the formation of a gap -despite a few, but significant exceptions- between 
literature on socio-economic restructuring and cross-sectional modelling of growth. Growth 
modelling uses the nation as the basic unit of analysis, whereas research on socio-economic 
restructuring is increasingly extolling the role played by regions in the postindustrial world.
Numerous authors from the field of socio-economic restructuring and production 
change have stressed recently the growing importance of regions and their new role as basic 
economic actors in the configuration of a new spatial pattern of economic development. Some 
of the studies in this field have raised interesting questions about the adequacy of pursuing 
comparative national approaches in the framework of the present shift from a mass 
production structure to a flexible one (Trigilia, 1986 and 1988; Komninos, 1989; Porter, 
1990; Ohmae, 1990; O’Brien, 1992). To a certain extent, literature on socio-economic 
restructuring underlines that current trends are leading to a meaningful loss o f influence of 
state boundaries in the genesis of growth. From this point of view, it is considered that, as 
the integration of world economy progresses, the autonomy of nation-states to set their own 
independent economic policy diminishes. Economic ‘sovereignty* is progressively eroded. 82
82
Regions and growth
and economic activity seems to be distributed either on a macro-national scale or 
concentrated in regional clusters (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1992). Thus, the influence of the 
nation-state enters a slow but steady decline and the region is proclaimed by some as the 
post-Fordist territorial unit p a r  excellence.
Nonetheless, and in spite of this rising tide of studies saluting the virtues of the region 
as an adequate unit of analysis in the post-Fordist world of flexible production, little 
empirical research has been carried out in order to check whether this assertion holds across 
different regional settings.
This section will, therefore, deal with the question of the adequacy of the choice of 
regions against nations as a valid unit of analysis in the European Union, and with the 
specific choice of a certain regional level among the possible regional divisions available in 
the European context.
11.1.1.1.- Regions as the unit of analysis.
The decline of the Fordist mode of mass production and the introduction of flexible 
production structures has led to a revision of established spatial patterns and focused 
considerable attention on the emergence of new foci of regional development. Literature on 
post-Fordism has stressed that traditional long-established spatial contrasts have been shaken 
by the rise of economic networks (Sassen, 1990), by the evolution of technological 
knowledge and managerial structures (Storper and Scott, 1989, pp. 21-40; Scott and Storper, 
1992, pp. 7-38; Leborgne and Lipietz, 1992, pp. 39-68) and by advances in information and 
information technology (Castells, 1989). Furthermore, the sharp decline in transportation 
costs has contributed to reducing the handicaps of distant regions as competitors in the 
economic arena. Therefore, in theory, growth and development in a post-Fordist world could 
blossom in regions which, due to structural or locational constraints, played a very reduced 
economic role during the entire Fordist era.
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Running parallel with these developments, soaring interdependency rates and the 
globalization of the world economy have meant that the role of the nation-state has also been 
challenged. The greater degree of market integration, the completion of the Single European 
Market and the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht have been considered by some as 
significant additional steps towards the eradication -at least in the economic sense- o f the 
borders of the nation-state in the EC. Thus, in the post-Maastricht European framework, the 
state is beginning to be increasingly regarded by some as an outdated territorial structure 
whose influence on economic trends and activities is progressively shrinking.
While the national frame appears to be losing ground because of market integration 
and increasing economic interdependency and when one-nation macroeconomic policies seem 
to fail in achieving their goals, regions, on the contrary, are increasingly contemplated as 
compact markets where competition is developed and, above all, where the flexibility of 
production methods and economic restructuring is accomplished (Komninos, 1989, pp. 348- 
364 and Porter, 1990). Hence, the region is gaining ground as the star territorial unit of 
economic analysis in Western Europe. As Paul Krugman points out:
"as Europe becomes a unified market, with free movement of capital and 
labour, it will make less and less sense to think of the relations between its 
component nations in terms of the standard [nationally-oriented] paradigm of 
international trade. Instead the issues will be those of regional economics"
(1991a, p. 8)
Even Michael Porter in his book The C om parative A dvantages o f  N ations questions 
the role of the nation as a relevant unit in economic analysis. Porter indicates that 
"competitors in many internationally successful industries, and often entire clusters of 
industries, are often located in a single town or region within a nation" (p. 154-5). Thus, for 
Porter, the city or the region becomes "a unique environment for competing in the industry" 
(p. 156), and he concludes that "the importance of geographic concentration raises interesting
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questions about whether the nation is a relevant unit of analysis" (p. 157).
Consequently, a significant body of literature has been developed around the economic 
function of sub-national areas. The study of the spatial consequence of shifts in production 
structures and the rise of the service economy has been mainly focused on regions and cities, 
with little reference to nations, especially when matched to the long tradition of comparative 
studies taking the nation as the unit of analysis. Therefore, great attention has been shifted 
to the study of phenomena like the economic ascension of regions representing high 
technology growth centres and technopoles (Silicon Valley, Orange County, the London- 
Bristol axis, or the Munich and Stuttgart areas), renovated craft communities (the Third 
Italy), or service and financial centres (New York, Los Angeles, London, Paris, or 
Frankfurt). These examples have been thoroughly examined in recent years (Stoiper and 
Scott, 1989, pp. 34-37; Castells and Hall, 1994). Moreover, the number of regional and 
urban studies has risen exponentially in the last two decades.
In brief, it has been acknowledged that the globalization of the economy, the process 
of deindustrialization and the establishment of flexible production methods entail a certain 
reduction of the influence of national borders in the territorial patterning of growth and, 
therefore, the room for manoeuvre left over for national entities is shrinking as the 
integration of the world economy continues to erode national ‘sovereignty’.
11.1,1.2.« The economic influence of states.
However, as mentioned before, there is little empirical evidence to support the idea 
of the vanishing national influence on the economic arena. The doctrine of flexible 
production -which is the main source of this renewed interest in economic, social, political 
and geographical literature on the regional dimension- has been mainly developed either on 
theoretical grounds or by resorting to the analysis of case studies. As Sayer underlines, it 
could be said that literature on post-Fordism is "based on selected [regional] examples whose
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limited sectoral, spatial and temporal range is rarely acknowledged“ (Sayer, 1989, p. 666). 
In contrast, little research has been carried out outside this reduced number o f ‘favourable’ 
case-studies.
The purpose of this section is to try to shed some light on the question of the 
emergence of regions as a unit of analysis which could ultimately overshadow the nation. Is 
socio-economic restructuring really leading towards a greater influence of regions in the 
economic sphere and, hence, in economic growth trends? Do nations matter less now than 
before as determinants of economic trends?
These are questions whose extreme complexity and breadth clearly exceed the scope 
of this chapter. The spatial effects of economic integration and specialization are generated 
by a multitude of complicated and interwoven factors which would be impossible to grasp 
in the space of a few pages. Aware of these limitations, my intention is mainly to concentrate 
on one of the intervening factors -namely, economic growth- in order not to settle the 
question, but to spur the debate on the supposed decline of the nation-state and its 
progressive replacement by the region as a valid unit of analysis in the post-Fordist world.
II. 1.1.3.- Changes in regional and national growth trends.
The main problem when trying to analyze whether the influence of regions is growing 
to the detriment of nation-states is, precisely, how to approach the question and how to prove 
it. Since there are so many variables which may have a certain sway on this problem, any 
approximation to the topic will be necessarily partial and provide a limited explanation, and 
thus should not be swallowed as a strick casual relationship. One of the possible ways of 
tackling the region vs. nation question -and perhaps the most adequate in the framework of 
this dissertation- is to resort to changes in regional growth trends as a means to determine 
whether there is an increase in the influence and importance o f regions.
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Regarding growth trends, the theory of the increasing protagonism of regions to the 
detriment of the nation-state presupposes that, due to greater economic integration, 
burgeoning flexibility in production and the achievements of supranational regional policies 
in the EC, the national differences in economic behaviours that were noticed in the previous 
chapter are subject to shrink steadily until, ultimately, borders no longer mark the sharp 
differences in growth rates observed during the mass production era. Thus, in a mass 
production model, regional growth rates would be fairly similar within national borders and 
deviations in growth levels would tend to be higher among nations than among regions 
belonging to the same country (because of the greater influence of national economic policies 
and the greater impact of national barriers to factor mobility). Conversely, in a flexible 
model of production growth rates of GDP at a regional level across countries would tend to 
converge, due to increasing economic and political integration, enhanced trade and the 
decentralization of production, whilst internal national variation in growth rates would be 
higher that during the Fordist era, as a purely statistical consequence of the reducing gap in 
national growth levels. The behaviour of regional growth rates would, therefore, be more 
difficult to predict. On the one hand, the concentration of financial assets in capital regions 
is likely to enhance economic inequalities, while, on the other hand, the decentralizing of 
production structures and regional policy could contribute to reducing the gap between 
advanced and lagging regions. Furthermore, the diminishing relevance or, even the removal, 
of economic and trade barriers could encourage the genesis of cross-national growth trends, 
where the existence of a development axis (e.g. the Mediterranean Axis, the Blue Banana or 
the Atlantic Arc) is more likely to influence regional growth rates than the national frame. 
Economic disparities in growth rates will be, in consequence, more related to socio-economic 
conditions within a certain region than to its insertion in a given national context.
These global tendencies could, to a certain extent, be countered by efforts at the 
national and EC level to reduce regional differences, via the use of regional policy or of 
structural funds. However, even a successful regional policy, which is capable of reducing 
intranational disparities -which is not always the case-, would not alter the model. An
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economic blurring o f national borders in a period of greater economic integration implies that 
international differences in growth rates would decrease at a greater pace than intranational 
variation. Using relative rates, instead of absolute numbers this would denote greater 
convergence on an international level than on the intranational dimension.
11.1.1.4.- Empirical analysis.
In order to check the hypothesis that national borders matter less now than during the 
heyday of mass production, I propose a simple test comparing international and intranational 
divergence in regional growth rates in the EC in the 1960s and the 1980s. This part of the 
analysis concentrates on the evolution of regional and national growth trends in the six 
original member states of the EC, plus Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, in order 
to determine whether there has been, in the last decade, a certain homogenization of regional 
behavioural patterns in growth rates in comparison with regional growth rates two decades 
ago. It is supposed that, if the sway of the nation-state is diminishing, national patterns of 
regional growth rates would clearly differ in a mass production model from those in a 
flexible one.
The empirical analysis includes GDP regional data from 1960 to 1991 *. It is based 
on the comparison o f the different regional behaviours o f growth rates in two decades:
a) 1960-1970: depicting the climax of the Fordist mode of production and of a 
scarcely integrated world economic market;
b) 1980-1991: portraying the decade of flexible production and of the emergence 
of regions as consolidated economic actors;
in order to explore whether the behaviour in economic growth of regions in the EC is
1 Cf. footnote 7 in Chapter I for a precise description of data sources and the problems associated 
with it.
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becoming independent of the national setting in which they are located (and, thus, whether 
we are witnessing the appearance of new and consolidated regional markets), or whether, on 
the contrary, the national framework still constrains and regulates regional economic 
performance. 160
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Figure II.1. Regional growth of GDP between 1960 and 1970.
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The comparison of regional growth rates in the 1960s and in the 1980s, however, 
provide little evidence to support the hypothesis of the dwindling importance o f national 
frontiers. Figure II. 12 shows regional growth rates -assembled according to country of 
origin- at the zenith of the Fordist mode of mass production: the 1960s. As could be 
expected, significant national disparities in regional growth rates are observed. Several 
nations -such as Italy, and the Netherlands on the top end of the scale, and the United 
Kingdom and Luxembourg in the lower end- diverge clearly in their growth patterns from 
the European average. Furthermore, regions within a nation cluster together. Small regional 
disparities can be observed in internal growth patterns in most of the EC countries, but for 
Germany and Italy. Internal divergence is especially reduced in France and the Netherlands. 
The case o f France represents the paradigm of the influence of the national dimension on 
economic growth, since disparities in growth rates among the twenty-two French regions are 
extremely low.
The graph depicts, as expected, a nationally dominated panorama in the 1960s. 
National macroeconomic policies and trade barriers -established in order to protect national 
industries- still had a vast influence on growth rates. Therefore, we can posit that regional 
growth in the 1960s was heavily influenced and constrained by national economic policies.
The figure representing regional growth rates in the EC in the 1980s displays a 
comparable tableau to the one depicted for the sixties (Figure II.2), in spite of the much 
heralded drive towards regional protagonism. Instead of finding greater international 
homogeneity, growth rates in the 1980s seem to follow fairly similar national patterns to the 
ones observed two decades before. Internal disparities in growth are only more significant
2 The graph represents the categorized box plots of the mean annual growth of GDP for each of 
the 9 first members of the EU. Each of the box plots is an analysis of the internal variation in 
regional growth rates and provides information about the national average, the standard error, the 
standard deviation and the regional outliers in terms of growth rates.
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Figure II.2. Regional growth of GDP between 1980 and 1991.
in France and the Netherlands3 during the 1980s than during the 1960s. Nevertheless, this 
type of behaviour tends to be the exception and not the rule: internal divergence in regional
3 Although in the Netherlands abnormally low growth rates in the region of the Northern 
Netherlands are provoked by changes in national accounts concerning the spatial allocation of benefits 
from North Sea oil and gas pits, which were in 1980 concentrated in that region, before it was 
decided to distribute them on a national basis.
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growth is slightly less noticeable in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in the 1980s 
than in the 1960s.
Furthermore, there is little homogenization of national growth rates. If in the 1960s 
there were six nations which fluctuated around the European average (Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), their number in the 1980s is reduced to 
four (Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom). Regions in Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands experience considerably lower growth rates than their 
Community counterparts, while regions in Italy and in Ireland -as well as in Portugal and in 
Spain, not included in this part of the analysis- have growth rates which are clearly above 
the Community average.
Consequently, it can be suggested that, despite greater economic and political 
integration and a slight reduction of the importance of the national context in determining 
regional growth rates, the national dimension still accounts for a significant share of all sub­
national economic growth behaviour. In the 1980s, the variance of regional growth rates 
within a national context is much lower than when cross-national settings are compared, and, 
therefore, the pace towards a regional economic homogenization of growth rates is slower 
than what might have been expected. As is shown in Figure II.34, which compares regional 
GDP per capita in 1960 and 1991, in only one country of the EC -Belgium- do regional 
economies diverge; a performance which could be, to a certain extent, associated with a 
lower influence of national economic achievement on regional growth rates. On the contrary, 
in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, regions find enormous 
difficulties in escaping the corset of the national economic context. Regions in France and 
the United Kingdom fare worse in 1989 than in 1960, but the downward movement has *92
4 The graph includes the multiple scatterplots of the regional distribution in I960 and 1991 of 
GDP per head in each of the nine first member-states of the EU. Standardized regional levels of GDP 
in 1960 are represented by a dot on the left column of each country box. Regional levels of GDP in 
1991 are illustrated by a triangle on the right had side of the box. The aim of the Figure is to 
determine whether recent transformations have lead to greater intra-regional disparities in levels of 
GDP in 1991 than in 1960.
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affected the whole country and not a just a certain group of regions. The same argument can 
be applied to Germany and Italy, where no significant differentiation in the range of internal 
disparities is observed.
* 1991
• I960
Figure II.3 . Regional GDP per head in 1960 and 1991.
The fact that the nation-state still makes up a solid unit of analysis for the study of 
socio-economic restructuring, casts certain doubts on the claim that we are witnessing the
93
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emergence of a new territorial pattern of growth, and reinforces the statement that the 
national framework -in spite of the clear tendency to the globalizing of the world economy- 
still accounts for a great deal of the spatial patterning of growth rates.
In the light of the empirical evidence, however, it cannot be declared that the 
importance of national dimension has remained unchanged since the 1960s. A slight reduction 
in the influence of national borders is observed between the 1960s and the 1980s. In sum, 
we are witnessing a slow drift towards overcoming the influence of national borders in 
determining growth rates. However, this process is happening at a much slower rate than 
predicted by a large amount of the literature on socio-economic restructuring.
The most salient issue arising from this discussion is that ignoring either the national 
or the regional dimension may strongly distort any conclusions emerging from the analysis 
of growth trends. Any analysis of regional growth rates in a cross-national setting which 
disregards the effect of the national dimension might be severely handicapped. The growth 
rate used as the dependent variable in this dissertation, therefore, will take account of 
distortions created by the national dimension.
II. 1.2.- REGIONS AND REGIONALIZATION IN TH E EU: THE CHOICE O F  THE 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS.
Once the choice of the region as the unit of analysis is justified, the next step consists 
of establishing which of the existing administrative regional levels in the EC should be used 
as the frame for the present analysis. The EC has established the NUTS (Nomenclature of 
Statistical Territorial Units) administrative and statistical regional division. This 
categorization is divided into three levels. Before the recent expansion o f the EU, level 
NUTS I included 71 regions; level II, 176 and level III, 829. However, none of the three 
regional subdivisions established by the EC can be considered as homogeneous from a cross- 
national point of view. There are significant differences, in terms of territorial extension, 94
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population and, above all, political power among the regions included in each of the 
categories. Regional NUTS levels, therefore, are hardly comparable outside the national 
frame.
In level I, for instance, we discover that the contrast in extension among regions 
stretches from the 215,000 Km2 of the region of Central Spain, to the 161 Km2 of Brussels. 
Similar disparities can be observed in terms of population, since regions range from more 
than 17 million in the South West of England and North Rhine-Westphalia to less than
300,000 in Madeira and the Azores.
However, it is with regard to the political dimension where comparability problems 
among European regions reach their peak.
II. 1.2.1.- Regionalization in the European Community.
In contrast with the tangibility and historical endurance of the state -and despite some 
specific exceptions-, regions lack the tradition and the global recognition given to nation­
states. As a consequence, literature on the concept of region is legion and there is little 
agreement on what should be considered as a homogenous region. The different nature of 
regional systems across states and nations, therefore, makes comparing regions cross- 
nationally a difficult task.
From Austrian, Belgian or German federalism to British, Dutch or Greek centralism, 
different forms of territorial organization of EC member states are adopted. Historical, 
political and economic factors play a role in this organization. However, this role varies 
enormously from country to country, and even within a nation.
This is not the place to delve into the complex subject of the regionalization process 
and levels in the EU. The purpose of this section is more humble. It consists in briefly
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delineating the different levels of national territorial organization in the European 
Community, in order to determine to what extent differences in levels of autonomy among 
regions can affect the study of growth behaviours and the formation and analysis of spatial 
disparities.
As it was mentioned before, in Western Europe there is no common denominator for 
territorial division. Different European nations have solved in completely different ways the 
problem of how to divide up and rule the state. The answer to this challenge has led to the 
establishment of scarcely homogeneous political and administrative regimes, which could be 
grouped into four different sets:
a) Federal states: Regions or states within the nation enjoy a large political 
autonomy which, according to the Constitution, bans the intervention of the national or 
federal government in certain sectors which are the exclusive competence of regional bodies. 
In this group, we find three states of the EC (Germany, Belgium and now Austria).
b) Regional states: Regional states encompass those states which are in 
between the traditional centrally articulated modem state and the federal state. In the 
framework of a regional state, regions enjoy a certain autonomy, which entails a clear 
decentralization in the decision-making process, but, in contrast to the federal state, does not 
imply a strong restructuring of the state. Spain and Italy belong to this group.
c) ‘Regionalized state*: The ‘regionalized state* is a less developed form of 
decentralization. This group is made of those national states which have defined (or are in 
the process of defining) a set of regions. These new regions are granted a limited decision 
making power and a meagre budget. Within this group, we find France and Portugal.
d) Central states: Central states are characterized by a non-existent (or almost 
non-existent) transfer of power from the centre to the regions. Regions act as mere
96
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administrative detachments of the state, with neither political significance, nor decision­
making power, which is an exclusive competence of the central government. Central states 
are still the most common territorial organization in the EC; Denmark, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as well as Finland and Sweden can 
be included in this group.
Nevertheless, within each territorial regime, there is still a sharp contrast among 
nations. German federalism, for instance, has little in common with the Belgian experience; 
the competences and organizational structure of Spanish regions differ, in spite of certain 
similarities in origin, from the Italian territorial organization; regionalizing processes in 
France and Portugal share only a few common features and, finally, British centralism has 
little resemblance to that of Greece or the Netherlands.
Together with the political power awarded to the regions, the regionalizing criteria 
differ from one country to another. While in most states the idea of the region as a 
community, or of the region as a nation has prevailed, in other states cultural or historical 
reasons have given way to economic reality, leading toward the constitution o f what could 
be called economic or planning regions (as is the case in the United Kingdom). The former 
are based on historical, cultural and geographical criteria -in brief, on the existence of a 
regional identity-, while in the latter economic and functional principles dominate.
By combining both elements -political autonomy with regional identity- we obtain a 
very heterogeneous final result. Within the EC we find regions with long historical and 
cultural traditions, with a strong regional identity and with a high degree of political and 
financial autonomy (e.g. Bavaria, Hamburg, Catalonia, Galicia, the Basque Country or 
Sicily) and regions with no or very little regional identity and political power (e.g. the South 
West and South East of England, the North of the Netherlands, Central Greece, the West of 
the Great Belt region, etc.). Between both extremes, there are meaningful nuances. Some 
areas, such as Wales, Scotland, Brittany or Alsace find a strong cohesion in the presence of
97
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a strong regional or national identity« whereas other regions with little internal cohesion or 
identity enjoy high levels of political autonomy (e.g. Madrid« Castile-La Mancha, Rhineland- 
Palatinate or Baden-Württemberg).
II. 1.2.2.- The choice of regional level.
Talcing into account the differences in regional autonomy and in regional identity 
mentioned above« the regional division used in this dissertation has not been chosen 
according to any of the three N.U.T.S. levels used by the European Community. The 
significant differences in terms of size, population and political power among the regions 
included in each of the three categories made it advisable to apply another regional division 
to our study. The classification used in the analysis responds mainly to the existence of 
comparable levels o f self-government in countries with a certain degree of administrative 
decentralization (Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, France and Portugal) and to comparable 
dimensions in territory or population for the remaining nations (Denmark, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). The final regional level selected 
corresponds to the following national administrative levels: Régions (B), Länder (D), 
Comunidades autónomas (E), Régions (F), Regioni (I), Landsieden (NL), Regioes autonomas 
(P), Standard regions (UK), the whole nation in the cases o f Ireland and Luxembourg and, 
finally, two sub-national divisions currently used by the European Community which do not 
correspond to any real administrative entity (and, thus, established only for EC purposes) : 
Grupper a f Äm ter (Dk) and Groups o f development regions (Gr) (Map II. 1) (Table IL 1).
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Table ILI
NAMES OF REGIONS USED IN THE ANALYSIS 10
REGION NUIS REGION NUTS
LUXEMBOURG (GRAND-DUCHY) R6 PUGLIA R39I
IRELAND R8 BASILICATA R392
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN RII CALABRIA R393
HAMBURG RI2 SICILY R3A
LOWER SAXONY RI3 SARDINIA R3B
BREMEN RI4 NORTHERN NETHERLANDS R4I
NORTH RHINE-WESTPHAUA R15 EASTERN NETHERLANDS R42
HESSE Ri 6 SOUTHERN NETHERLANDS R45
RH INELAN D-PALATIN ATE RI7 WESTERN NETHERLANDS R47
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG RIS FLANDERS R ii
BAVARIA R19 WALLONIA RS2
SAARLAND RIA BRUSSELS R53
BERLIN RIB NORTH R71
BRANDENBURG R1C YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE R72
MECKLENBURG-WESTERN POMERANIA RID EAST MIDLANDS R73
SAXONY RIE EAST ANGLIA R74
SAXONY-ANHALT RIF SOUTH EAST (UK) R75
THURINGIA RIG SOUTH WEST (UK) R76
ILE DE FRANCE R21 WEST MIDLANDS R77
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE R22I NORTH WEST (UK) R78
PICARDY R222 WALES R79
UPPER NORMANDY R223 SCOTLAND R7A
CENTRE R224 NORTHERN IRELAND R7B
LOWER NORMANDY R225 HOVEDSTADSREGIONEN R901
BURGUNDY R226 EAST OF THE GREAT BELT R902
NORD-PAS DE CALAIS R23 WEST OF THE GREAT BELT R903
LORRAINE R241 NORTHERN GREECE RAI
ALSACE R242 CENTRAL GREECE RA2
FRANCHE-COMTÉ R243 ATTICA RA3
PAYS DE LA LOIRE R251 AEGEAN ISLANDS. CRETE RA4
BRITTANY R252 GALICIA RBII
POITOU-CHARENTES R253 ASTURIAS RB12
AQUITAINE R26I CANTABRIA RBI3
MIDI-PYRÉNÉES R262 BASQUE COUNTRY RB21
LIMOUSIN R263 NAVARRE RB22
RHONE-ALPES R271 RIOJA RB23
AUVERGNE R272 ARAGON RB24
LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON R281 MADRID RB3
PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D'AZUR R282 CASTILE AND LEON RB41
CORSICA R283 CASTILE-LA MANCHA RB42
DEPARTEMENTS D'OUTRE MER R29 EXTREMADURA RB43
PIEDMONT R311 CATALONIA RB51
VALUE D*AOSTA R312 VALENCIA RB52
LIGURIA R313 BALEARIC ISLANDS RB53
LOMBARDY R32 ANDALUSIA RB61
TRENT! NO-ALTO ADIGE R33I MURCIA RB62
VENETO R332 CEUTA AND MELiLLA RB63
FRJULI-VENEZIA GIULIA R333 CANARY ISLANDS RB7
EMILIA-ROMAGNA R34 NORTH OF PORTUGAL RC1I
TUSCANY R35I CENTRAL PORTUGAL RCI2
UMBRIA R332 LISBON AND THE TAGUS VALLEY RC13
MARCHE R353 ALENTEJO RCU
LAZIO R36 ALGARVE RC15
CAMPANIA R37 AZORES RC2
ABRUZZI R38I MADEIRA RC3
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H.2.- THE CHOICE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE.
The choice of the category of growth to be considered as the dependent variable is 
related to the question of the influence of the national dimension on regional growth rates. 
Now that is has been settled that regional growth rates are closely linked to national growth 
behaviours, what type of growth should we examine: monetary or real growth, growth 
measured in ECUs, or in purchasing power standards?. In the first steps of the analysis {vid. 
Chapter 1), I measured annual rates of growth using GDP per capita measured in ECUs with 
no national dummy. The initial analysis of the data showed, however, a strong national 
influence on regional growth trends. Figure II.4 represents the results of the scatter plot 
between regional growth rates measured in ECUs for the period 1980-1991 (on the y  axis), 
and the regional distribution of GDP per capita in 1980 (on the x axis). The graph suggests 
the existence o f a strong dependency of regional growth rates on the national context5, a fact 
that was already evident in the analysis of regional growth rates in the 1980s conducted in 
the previous chapter (vid. Map 1.4). There is a distinct and well-delimited national growth 
pattern for regions in peripheral, as well as in core countries of the EC. Regions belonging 
to the same nation occupy different areas in the scatter plot. Portuguese regions, which had 
the lowest levels of GDP per capita in 1980s enjoy levels of growth above the European 
average. Similar growth rates are observed in the cases o f Italy and Spain, although their 
stan-off levels of GDP were higher than in Portugal. Greek regions cluster together in the 
bottom left hand comer, indicating low levels o f initial GDP per capita and low rates of 
growth. Even in the European core, where growth levels tend to be more homogenous, 
explicit national groupings are perceived. British regions, grow on average at a higher pace 
than French, Dutch, and Belgian regions. And, in spite the fact that growth rates in Denmark *
5 The linear fitted function between the initial level of regional GDP per capita (represented in 
the x axis) and the mean annual average growth of GDP (represented in the y  axis) is equal to:
y s=138.68-0.36x+c (1)
(25.5) {-6.69)
* t-statistics in parentheses.
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and Germany are fairly similar to those in the United Kingdom, the diverse starting points 
in GDP per capita between both groups mark the configuration of well-defined national sets 
in the figure.
Figure II.4. Average annual regional growth rates (1980-1991) vs. GDP per capita in 1980.
Furthermore, the results o f preliminary regressions conducted with this dependent 
variable confirmed the strong dominance of the state effect, in contrast to what in the 
literature on post-Fordism tends to be considered as a fundamentally regional phenomenon.
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Regional data in these regressions were purposely introduced in national order, so that scores 
in the Durbin-Watson test could be considered significant. Durbin-Watson results were 
extremely low in all models6 7. These types of autocorrelated errors constitute a typical 
example of spatial autocorrelation, through which "in regional cross-section data, a random 
shock affecting economic activity in one region may cause economic activity in an adjacent 
region to change because of close economic ties between the regions" (Kennedy, 1985, p.
98-99). The pattern of residuals confirms that values for regions tend to follow clear national 
patterns.
Figure II.4 also suggests a decreasing gap in regional inequalities during the 1980s. 
Regions in peripheral countries (except Greece), regardless of their initial level of 
development in the EC, experience much higher growth rates than regions in core countries 
such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, or France. This evidence apparently comes to 
support claims made by the European Commission of a certain effectiveness of regional 
policy (CEC, 1991 and 1994).
However, this decreasing gap is not evident when development levels within nations 
are scrutinized. Both in Italy and Spain it was mainly the richest regions that grew the most 
quickly. In the case of Italy, the highest levels of growth between 1980 and 1991 are found 
in the Lazio (145.57)\ Friuli-Venezia Giulia (140.48), and Veneto (139.00), regions which 
in 1980 had levels of GDP per capita above average. And the lowest growth rates were 
observed in lagging regions such as Basilicata (122.02), Calabria (129.76), and Sicily 
(130.93), together with areas of the once prosperous Centre (Umbria (121.46), Emilia- 
Romagna (125.72), Tuscany (127.85), and Marche (128.48)). In Spain -with the exception 
of the highly tourism oriented Canary Islands (153.03)- high growth was mainly concentrated
6 In most cases, Durbin-Watson scores were around 1.1. These results indicate the existence o f  
autocorrelated disturbances generated by the introduction o f  data in a national order, which provokes 
a high correlation o f successive residuals. The introduction o f  regional data on an alphabetical order 
(thus avoiding the national effect) made Durbin-Watson scores rise to more than 1.6.
7 The average growth rate o f the EU between 1980 and 1991 is equal to 100.
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in the richest regions, such as Madrid (139.52), the Balearic Islands (139.19), or Catalonia 
(134.62). A similar model is reproduced in Portugal, where the rich area around Lisbon 
(151.22) and the industrial North (157.00), enjoy a greater growth momentum than lagging 
zones in the Centre (127.20) and in Alentejo (101.34).
Although few conclusions can be extracted from the use of crude growth rates, this 
evidence seems to confirm the strength of the nation in determining regional growth and the 
persistence of regional imbalances. Growth rates throughout the 1980s and the distribution 
of GDP per inhabitant still strongly follow national patterns, while the spatial ‘flexibilization’ 
described by most of the adherents of post-Fordism is, in most areas, still at its initial stages. 
This corroborates the previous conclusion that the decline of the importance o f the nation in 
the spatial organization of production systems has probably been exaggerated, and that the 
national sphere still determines a great deal of the spatial distribution of wealth.
As a consequence, in order to avoid distortions related to the state dimension, growth 
rates included in the analysis are weighted nationally, according to the following equation:
(2)
where:
- yt denotes the nationally weighted mean annual rate o f regional growth of GDP
per capita measured in ECUs between 1980 and 1991,
yi represents the mean annual rate of regional growth of GDP per capita
measured in ECUs between 1980 and 1991,
- yH denotes the mean annual rate of national growth o f GDP per capita measured
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in ECUs between 1980 and 1991,
- ye represents the mean annual rate of growth of GDP per capita measured in
ECUs in the European Union between 1980 and 1991.
The division of annual regional growth rates by a national coefficient, which 
represents the relationship between national growth rates and the EC’s average growth, 
enables us to compare cross nationally the variation in regional growth rates in a determined 
national context. This method has the advantage of being a simple way of contrasting cross- 
national data, while preserving intranational variation at the same time. It also allows us to 
avoid misinterpretations provoked by very high growth rates in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, 
which otherwise would have led to the consideration of the socio-political conditions in those 
three countries as the panacea for regional growth.
The panorama emerging from nationally weighted regional growth rates (Map II.2) 
differs radically from the one stemming from unweighted growth rates. Firstly, national 
borders no longer mark sharp differences in growth behaviours, and even in certain cases 
growth rates differ less across common borders than in neighbouring areas in a nation. This 
is the case, for example, o f the Franco-Belgian frontier. Nationally weighted growth levels 
in Wallonia (92.68) are clearly below those observed in Flanders (103.96) and in the Brussels 
area (101.68), but are closely related to those in the industrial declining regions o f Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais (87.80), Champagne-Ardennes (93.51), and Lorraine (81.74) in Northern France. 
To the east a similar phenomenon is observed between Belgium and Germany. Growth in 
regions with a comparable industrial structure like Wallonia, North Rhine-Westphalia 
(91.12), and Rhineland-Palatinate (92.22) contrasts clearly with that in dynamic neighbouring 
regions like the Southern Netherlands (118.50), Hesse (112.34), Flanders or Luxembourg. 
Regions along the boundary between France and Spain also constitute a well-delimited set 
in terms of growth. High growth rates are experienced on both side of the Pyrenees, in the 
intermediate dynamic regions of Midi-Pyrénées (109.54), and Aquitaine (103.92) in France,
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and Catalonia (105.58), and Aragon (105.03) in Spain. Cross-national homogeneity in growth 
can also be detected along the French-Italian border and along the whole Alpine area.
Secondly, the use of nationally weighted growth variables marks a sharp reduction 
in the international variance of growth rates. Regional growth rates no longer cluster 
nationally as when raw data was used (Fig. II.4), but tend to assemble cross-national groups 
of regions sharing similar socio-economic features (Fig. II.5).
II.2.1.- TH E FORMATION OF REGIONAL GROUPS ACCORDING TO GROW TH
RATES.
Last but not least, the substitution of plain growth rates by nationally weighted ones 
draws empirical evidence closer to the postulates of the literature on socio-economic 
restructuring. As mentioned in Chapter I, different currents within the literature on post- 
Fordism and socio-economic restructuring had stressed the emergence of new growth spaces 
in certain regions sharing common features. Harvey (1985), Castells (1989), Sassen (1990), 
Dunford (1992), O ’Brien (1992), Hall (1993), and Castells and Hall (1994) among others, 
put the stress on the greater concentration of growth and wealth in métropoles, ‘world cities’, 
or ‘Euro-cities’. Piore and Sabel (1984), Scott and Storper (1989 and 1992) and a huge 
branch of the literature on the flexibilization of the production process, highlight the rise of 
new growth spaces in former intermediate regions, which take advantage of a certain number 
of socio-economic factors in order to generate and/or attract investment. Both groups point 
to old industrial regions as the great losers in the new spatial configuration. These regions 
had neither the possibilities, nor the capacity to adapt to current changes and thus were left 
aside in the restructuring process (Quévit et a/., 1991; Hudson, 1994). Finally, the role 
played by former peripheral regions in the new spatial configuration emerging from socio­
economic restructuring processes was less defined. Whereas some authors stressed that 
advances in technology opened up new possibilities for peripheral areas (O’Brien, 1992), 
others underscored the fact that the greater globalization of the world economy was leaving 107
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peripheral regions in Europe aside from major economic circuits, since they were too 
peripheral to compete in high quality production with core areas, and too central to rival with 
Third World countries in low cost mass production processes (Vandermotten et a l, 1991).
The basic conditions which define core, old industrial, intermediate, and peripheral 
areas were already evident at the beginning of the 1980s. Core urban areas were and are 
characterized by a significant concentration of company headquarters, national and 
international banks, a powerful financial sector, and considerable levels of political decision 
making power (Krátke, 1991; Iranzo, Del Rio and Molina, 1993, Meijer, 1993; Molina, 
Iranzo and Estébanez, 1995), This was reflected in 1980 in a dominant service sector which, 
in all cases, employed more than 65% of the active population and provided more than 65% 
of the total gross value added.
The main features which distinguished old industrial zones in the 1980s were an over­
representation of traditional industries and an under-representation of services to industries 
(Quévit et a l., 1991; Quévit, 1994). Employment in the secondary sector is still at present 
well over the EU average, despite significant losses in industrial employment in the last two 
decades, and the average size of enterprises tends to be clearly above the EU average (Quévit 
et al. , 1991). Regions classified as old industrial areas in this analysis are, therefore, those 
which in 1980 had more than 40% of the total active population employed in industry, and 
at least 40% of the total industrial employment in the coal, iron, steel, and electrical 
subsectors.
Peripheral areas can be defined by their distance to the major economic activity 
centres. They are generally characterized by relatively high levels of population growth in 
the European context, low incomes and output per head, a historically and distinctive 
specialization in agriculture, and low levels of industrialization (Keeble, Offord and Walker,
1988). The above average specialization in agriculture was already evident in 1980, and has 
served -together with distance to the main economic centres- as the fundamental criterion for
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the definition of peripheral regions8.
Intermediate regions are by definition all those regions which do not belong to any 
of the above mentioned categories. They are neither specialized in advanced service 
activities, nor in manufacturing, or agriculture, and they tend to be geographically located 
between core and old industrial areas, and peripheral areas. However, this type of regions 
has been regarded by some sections of the literature as areas which encompass the adequate 
conditions and lack the constraints, that make them -with core areas- the recipients of the 
benefits of flexible production methods (Storper and Scott, 1989; Kratke, 1991; Scott and 
Storper, 1992).
These four groups of regions (core areas, old industrial zones, intermediate, and 
peripheral regions) delimited by the literature on the topic, form fairly homogenous cross- 
national sets in terms of initial growth levels and growth behaviour9. In figure II.5 -which 
represents the scatter plot between the nationally weighted regional distribution of GDP per 
capita in 1980 on the x  axis and nationally weighted regional growth rates for the period 
1980-1991 on the y  axis- the removal of the state effect implies that regions bearing 
analogous characteristics tend to assemble in nearby areas of the graph. Figure II.5 has been 
divided into four sectors, taking the EC average on both axes as the dividing line. Clockwise, 
sectors A and B depict regions with lower than average initial GDP per capita which grew - 
in the case of A- at a lower pace, and -in the case of B- at a higher pace than the European 
average. Sectors C and D represent regions with high initial GDP per capita. Regions in 
sector C grow higher than the EC average, whereas regions in sector D experience below
8 Regions defined as peripheral in this analysis tended to have levels of employment in agriculture 
in 1980 which exceeded 15% in 1980.
9 There is relatively little internal variation in growth performance in core and old industrial areas. 
Growth behaviours differ more in intermediate and peripheral regions, both because of the large 
number, and because of the greater heterogeneity of regions included in each group. Therefore, and 
in order to cope with greater divergence in growth levels, intermediate and peripheral regions have 
been labelled as dynamic and less dynamic, according to their growth performance.
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Figure II.5. Regional typology emerging from the analysis of nationally weighted growth rates (1980-
1991) vs. nationally weighted GDP per capita in 1980.
In sector A we find regions undergoing a clear decline in their relative economic 
position. Regions included in this sector belong fundamentally to two groups. The best 
defined group is the one made up by former mass production areas, which tend to cluster on 
right hand side of sector A in growth levels between 80 and 95% of the European average,
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and that in certain cases (Asturias, the Basque Country, Upper Normandy, Champagne- 
Ardennes), overlap into sector D. These are regions which have been suffering a serious 
decline since the late 1960s and even before in the cases of industrial regions in Great Britain 
(North, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, and Wales) and the North-Pas de Calais in 
France, or Wallonia in Belgium, where the crisis was already evident by the beginning of 
the 1960s and late 1950s. As a result of this structural crisis, in 1980 most former mass 
production regions -the havens of the industrial revolution- had levels of GDP per capita 
slightly below the national average, with the exception of Italy and Spain, where industrial 
regions were still among the wealthiest in the nation, mainly because of the backwardness 
of peripheral areas in these countries. The 1980s have confirmed the declining growth trend 
of former industrial regions, which have been unable to respond rapidly to structural changes 
and cope with new demands.
Peripheral regions are not as homogenous in their growth behaviours as former mass 
production regions. They share the same low initial levels of GDP per capita, but the scope 
of their growth levels is much wider than in old industrial areas. However, a certain group 
of peripheral regions stand out for their relatively low levels of growth during the 1980s: 
these are the peripheral non dynamic regions, which occupy the left hand side of sector A, 
slightly overlapping the set of former mass production regions. In that group we find the 
Alentejo, and the Centre of Portugal, Galicia, Andalusia, and Castile-La Mancha in Spain 
and Basilicata, Calabria and Sicily in Italy. Some regions which could be considered as 
peripheral non dynamic perform slightly better than average during the 1980s and are 
included in sector B. This is the case of, for example, Extremadura in Spain, or Campania 
in Italy.
Sector B includes a set of peripheral regions which exhibited a remarkable economic 
dynamism during the 1980s. In this group we find the tourist resorts of the Canary and the 
Greek Islands, which experienced the highest growth rates, as well as the North of Portugal, 
Murcia in Spain, and Abruzzi and Molise in Italy.
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Capital and large urban regions are gathered in sector C. Brussels, Hamburg, the lie 
de France, Lazio, Lisbon and the Tagus Valley, Madrid, and the South East of England, all 
make up regions which link a good start-off relative position in terms of GDP per capita with 
growth rates that are only second to those found in certain peripheral dynamic areas, or in 
isolated cases, like the Southern Netherlands.
There is not a single group of regions which could be identified with sector D alone. 
On the one hand, the set of former mass production regions identified in sector A overlaps 
with sector D, whereas the areas closest to the lines representing the European average are 
populated by intermediate regions with relatively unsuccessful growth trajectories during the 
1980s. It is precisely a large set of intermediate regions which occupies the centre of the 
Figure. This group includes those regions which in 1980 had levels of GDP per capita 
between 80 and 120, and whose average growth levels fluctuate within the limits of ±10 
percent with respect to the European average growth. However, the diversity in growth rates 
among regions belonging to these groups allows us to define -as in the case of peripheral 
areas- two subgroups within intermediate regions. On the one hand, intermediate regions with 
growth levels above the EC average make up the set of intermediate regions which has been 
able to better take advantage of the new set of conditions generated by the shift in production 
methods and socio-economic restructuring. They constitute the intermediate dynamic group. 
On the other hand, intermediate regions which grew below the European average were unable 
to adapt to changes as rapidly as intermediate dynamic regions, and compose the intermediate 
less dynamic group.
In short, although it is still early to determine clearly what type of territorial pattern 
is emerging from the shift in the model o f production and the process of socio-economic 
restructuring, major spatial trends outlined in the literature and empirical evidence suggest 
the formation of a complex landscape of regions emerging from recent transformations. As 
a result, six different groups of regions according to their growth behaviour during the 1980s
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could be identified10 (Map II.3):
II.2.L1.- Capital and large urban regions.
Despite the fact that advances in technology and deregulation trends have rendered 
capital and information highly mobile, both factors have become increasingly concentrated 
in large metropolitan areas, especially in those where the existence of a developed financial 
market is combined with political power.
Capital and large urban regions in the European Community (Attiki, Berlin, Brussels, 
Copenhagen, Hamburg, lie de France, Lazio, Lisbon and the Tagus Valley, Madrid, the 
South East o f England, and the Western Netherlands) have been favoured by these trends. 
Economic and political power are now more concentrated than ever in a few blocks found 
in ‘emblematic spaces' in the central areas of large metropoles, a process which has not yet 
reached its climax (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1992). In these ‘decisional centres’ financial 
behaviour and politics go hand in hand, controlling socio-political and economic activities 
taking place in distant locations. The interlinkage between capital areas and financial centres 
has also been enhanced: in recent years we have witnessed the consolidation of a global 
network of decision centres. Furthermore, capital and large urban regions have benefited
10 The definition of six different groups of regions according to general trends in the literature and 
empirical evidence is not undisputed. Why is Scotland an intermediate region and not a peripheral 
one? Why is Champagne-Ardennes classified under the label of former mass-production area and not 
as an intermediate region? Why are Emilia-Romagna and Rhone-Alpes considered as intermediate less 
dynamic and not as dynamic regions, when both had been regarded for a long time as motors in the 
socioeconomic transformations in Europe? These and many other questions concerning the ascription 
of individual regions to groups will assail the careful reader. Classifying the 111 regions included in 
the analysis cannot be done without controversy, but in order to reduce it to a minimum, certain 
criteria have been followed. First of all, it has been considered whether different authors have 
included a certain region into a given regional category. Secondly, growth rates have been taken into 
account in order to distinguish between dynamic and less dynamic regions. For the distinction 
between intermediate and peripheral areas, priority has been granted to the European context rather 
than to the national one. And finally, in certain indeterminate cases, factors such as the start-off levels 
of sectoral employment and of sectoral share in GDP, as well as their evolution, have been taken into 
consideration.
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from industrial decentralization; polluting and obsolete industries have been moved from core 
areas and substituted by technologically advanced production complexes.
From a social perspective, capital and urban regions have enjoyed the greatest social 
dynamism. The stock of qualified labour available, the existence of top-level universities and 
the relative absence of social conflict, has eased the assimilation of innovation and 
technological advances and fostered economic growth.
II,2.1.2.- Form er core regions undergoing industrial decline.
The second group of regions are the former havens of the Fordist mode of mass 
production. The North and the North West of England, Yorkshire and Humberside, and 
Wales in Great Britain, the Saar Region, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and 
Bremen in Germany; Wallonia in Belgium; Nord-Pas de Calais, Picardy, Champagne- 
Ardennes, Lorraine, Upper and Lower Normandy in France; Asturias, Cantabria, and the 
Basque Country in Spain; Liguria, and Piedmont in Italy; and the Northern Netherlands have 
endured, to a greater or lesser extent, serious industrial and economic crises in the last two 
decades. In these areas, it is frequently considered that the rigid economic and social 
structure erected during the era of mass production has become a handicap in adapting to the 
changing socio-economic conditions (Scott and Storper, 1992). The shift from mass 
production to more flexible methods has rendered the large Fordist industrial sites obsolete 
and unable to compete in a wider and more open market. As a consequence, these regions 
have had to face profound processes of industrial reconstruction that, with the exception of 
a few cases, have been unable to curb the trend of economic decline (Quévit et a l., 1991).
Together with economic havoc, socio-economic restructuring has brought social 
discontent to the former centres of mass production. On the one hand, a significant 
percentage of the large mass of skilled and unskilled blue collar workers which had 
dominated during Fordism, has experienced difficulties in adjusting to changes. On the other
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hand, younger and better prepared generations could not find an outlet in the labour market. 
Low social mobility and the limited share o f economic activity of certain social sectors - 
especially females- had, together with a veiy rigid labour structure, also hampered the 
economic development of these areas.
i
II .2.1.3.- In term ediate dynamic regions.
Intermediate dynamic regions are, with capital regions and urban financial centres, 
the chief beneficiaries of socio-economic restructuring. The flexibilization and the 
decentralising of the production process, as well as advances in technology and improved 
accessibility, have rendered these zones more accessible and capable of taking advantage of 
spread effects emanating from economic centres. A large proportion of enterprises fleeing 
congestion, negative externalities and high land prices in capital areas, and companies 
affected by important reconstruction needs in traditional Fordist zones, have moved from 
central spaces and settled in intermediate regions (Scott and Storper, 1992). Moreover, many 
intermediate regions had the financial and human resources, as well as the necessary 
technological and organisational know-how, to activate their local industrial fabric, creating 
or redynamizing local small and medium-size enterprises. Regions like Flanders in Belgium, 
the West o f the Great Belt in Denmark, Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, and Bavaria in 
Germany, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands in Spain, Midi-Pyrénées, 
and Aquitaine in France, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy, Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Friuli- 
Venezia Giulia in Italy, the South and the Hast of the Netherlands and the East Midlands, 
Hast Anglia, the South West of England and Scotland in Great Britain have benefited from 
the combination of processes like the uprooting of industries in core areas and the upsurge 
of local entrepreneurship.
Social and economic conditions have also played a meaningful role in the boom of 
intermediate dynamic regions. Most of these areas lacked the economic and social problems 
associated with heavy industry and had a balanced, medium-sized industrial network at the
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beginning of the process of socio-economic restructuring. In addition, the existence of a 
much more flexible social cross-section than in traditional Fordist strongholds, and the supply 
of dynamic and qualified labour by local universities and colleges, helped surmount the 
problem caused by a lack of social adaptation to transformation. This also encouraged the 
development of an active local entrepreneurial class, that has played a key role in dynamizing 
local economies.
H .2 .I.4 .- Interm ediate less dynamic regions.
Not all intermediate regions were capable of seizing the advantages offered by 
changes in production methods and by socio-economic restructuring. Many intermediate 
regions were either left aside by new processes, or lacked the adequate economic, social 
and/or political conditions to attract investment and technology and to recast local enterprises 
into competitive ones. This has been the case of certain intermediate areas whose relative 
isolation, defective accessibility to major markets, insufficient industrial network, and below 
average levels of education have condemned them from the start to continue playing the 
supporting role they had during the mass production area. Schleswig-Holstein, and 
Rhineland-Palatinate in Germany; the Centre, Burgundy, Franche-Comté, Brittany, Pays de 
la Loire, Poitou-Charentes, Limousin, and Auvergne in France; Umbria, and the Marche in 
Italy; the East of the Great Belt in Denmark; and Navarre, and Rioja in Spain, belong to this 
category.
However, some of the regions which today can be considered as ‘intermediate less 
dynamic* were among the first to take advantage of the new socio-economic conditions, 
achieving extremely high relative growth rates during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
Italian regions of Emilia-Romagna, and Tuscany, the southeastern French zones of Rhône- 
Alpes, Provence-Alpes-Côte d ’Azur, and Languedoc-Roussillon, and, to a lesser extent, the 
West Midlands, were regarded during a substantial time span as the new emerging centres 
of post-Fordism. The Italian industrial districts in particular attracted considerable attention,
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because of the capacity of conglomerates of small and medium-sized firms to generate an 
innovative supply, in conditions of extreme competition between industries, and in rich 
institutional and community settings (Porter, 1990). Nevertheless, as Becattini (1990), Brutti 
and Calistri (1990), and Trigilia (1992a) point out, the present crisis of Italian Industrial 
Districts is the result of the difficulty of an economy whose dynamism was based on SMEs 
to cope with the expanding demand for investment, R & D, and highly proficient human 
resources in order to remain competitive. Another factor which has provoked the decline in 
economic dynamism of industrial districts, has been the recovery of large enterprises in the 
North, after a profound process of industrial rationalization. Once the réadaptation to new 
conditions of large enterprises was achieved, SMEs have found greater difficulties in selling 
their products and in coping with the growth in competition from increasingly integrated 
markets. Even the paradigmatic example of intermediate dynamic enterprises -Baden- 
Württemberg- has not been immune to the decline in economic dynamism of regions with a 
strong network of SMEs, although it still performs better in relative terms than Emilia- 
Romagna or Rhône-Alpes, thanks to its advanced institutional infrastructure (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1993) and to the efficacy of its industrial policy in intensifying inter-firm co­
operation (Semlinger, 1993).
II .2 .1.5.- Peripheral dynamic regions.
Peripheral regions make up the most heterogeneous group in the post-Fordist 
panorama. The common features shared by them are mainly related to their territorial 
isolation: little accessibility, relative social and economic backwardness and the fact that a 
large number of the peripheral regions have remained apart from the process of 
flexibilization of production.
Within the group of peripheral regions there are, however, significant differences in 
economic achievement. The subgroup of peripheral dynamic regions is fundamentally made 
up by regions which either have been capable of offering conditions and skills highly
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demanded by the global market, or that have specialized in highly performant sectors, 
predominantly in the tourist sector. Among the former we find Abmzzi, Molise, Puglia in 
Italy (vid. Trigilia, 1992b), the North of Portugal, the North of Greece, Murcia in Spain, 
whose industries have supplied the European market with relatively low cost and quality 
products, and Ireland, which has been successful in attracting foreign capital. The latter is 
made up of the tourist resorts of the Madeira in Portugal, the Canary Island in Spain, 
Sardinia in Italy, and the Greek Islands.
Nevertheless, the relative economic prosperity experienced by these areas in the last 
few years does not imply that it has been achieved without risks. Industrial products 
manufactured in the North of Portugal, the North of Greece, and agricultural production and 
transformation in Murcia are under the constant threat of competing products coming from 
outside the EU. And the tourist sector in numerous peripheral regions of the EU has 
remained performant throughout the 1980s and especially in the early 1990s, mainly due to 
the fact that competitors (Yugoslavia, Turkey, Egypt, and the Maghrib Countries) have 
undergone serious political crises which have thwarted their possibilities.
II.2.1.6.- Peripheral less dynamic regions.
In a majority of European peripheral regions, economic globalization has contributed, 
however, to the progressive destruction of the production system. Enterprises in these regions 
are becoming unable to compete with, on one side, high quality production from central 
areas, on the one hand, and with low cost production from the Third World, on the other. 
As Vandermotten points out, peripheral areas in Europe are at the same time too peripheral 
with respect to the innovation core, and too central with respect to the world’s periphery 
(Vandermotten ex a l 1991). In the brief lapse of a few years, the economies o f Campania, 
Basilicata, Calabria, and Sicily in Italy, Northern Ireland, Central Greece and the 
Peloponnese, Galicia, Castile and León, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, and Andalusia in 
Spain, and the Alentejo, Algarve, the Azores and the Centre of Portugal have experienced
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an impaired insertion into world economic circuits: there has been a rapid transition from an 
agricultural to a service economy, skipping the intermediate stage of industrial supremacy. 
Unemployment rates and employment in the service unskilled sector have soared. In contrast 
to the disruption of the traditional production fabric without the generation o f alternatives, 
the demand side of the economy has, on the contrary, achieved a full integration into world 
markets. Global consumption has increased (especially in the case of the Italian Mezzogiomo) 
(Trigilia, 1992b), despite the fact that personal income is still significantly lower than in core 
and intermediate regions.
These areas have plummeted into deep economic depression and factors like high 
employment in agriculture, and the low level of education of human capital has curbed the 
possibility of economic growth (De Long, 1991; Rodríguez-Pose, 1994).
H .2.2.- ECONOM IC GROWTH AND TH E SHIFTING TERRITORIAL PATTERN.
Regional economic growth patterns during the 1980s in the European Community 
confirm to a great extent the theoretical and empirically based territorial division outlined 
above {vid. supra Map II.3).
Capital and urban regions, with the exception of Berlin and Athens have achieved 
growth rates above the European average during the 1980s (Table II.2). Rates of growth 
were especially high in Hamburg -where the fifth highest rate of relative growth was 
achieved-, Lazio, Madrid, and the lie de France. In these areas, industrial restructuring has 
been complemented by the development of a powerful decision-making service sector, thus 
favouring economic growth. It is highly meaningful to remark that the only exceptions to the 
rule of high growth in capital and urban areas are -with the exception of Lisbon- precisely 
those with medium-size financial markets. In addition, economic development in Berlin was 
greatly conditioned by the physical isolation of the city and its special status, which resulted 
in extremely low growth during the period 1980-1986. The fall of the Berlin wall and the
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reunification refurbished the city’s economic dynamism. Berlin registered high growth rates 
from 1989 to 1991.
Table II.2
NATIONALLY WEIGHTED MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH IN CAPITAL
AND URBAN REGIONS 
(1980-1991)
REGION MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH OF GDP
EUR12 = 100
Hamburg (D)
Lazio (I)
Madrid (E) 
lie de France (F)
Lisbon and the Tagus Valley (P) 
Brussels (B)
South East (UK) 
Hovedstadsregionen (Dk) 
Western Netherlands (Nl)
Attica (Gr)
Berlin (D)
110.07
109.73
109.42
108.32
104.56
101.68
101.20
100.36 
100.31 
97.83
88.36
Source: derived from EUROSTAT data.
High growth in capital and urban regions was mainly achieved thanks to rapid 
economic expansion during the first half of the decade. These political and financial centres 
preceded the rest of the Continent in the process of economic recovery after the oil shocks. 
All the regions included in this category, bar Athens, and, to a much lesser extent, 
Copenhagen, achieved greater growth rates than their respective national average until 1986.
A
Since 1986, growth rates declined in relative terms in all regions in this group but lie de
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France, the South East of England, the area around Copenhagen, and the Western 
Netherlands, a phenomenon which coincided with the upsurge of intermediate dynamic 
regions and the moderate recovery experienced by several former industrial centres. Up until 
1989, the regions of Paris and London led their countries in terms of growth during the 
1980s, and only relatively poor performances in 1990 and 1991, pulled them back: second 
place in the case of Paris, fourth in the case of London.
C a p i t a l  a n d  u r b a n  r e g i o n s
4 -Ita ly  
+ Spain
1980-81 1982-83 1984-85 1986-87 1988-89 1990-91
1981-82 1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90
Figure II.6. Annual variation (in %) of the share of capital and urban regions in the total GDP of 
Italy and Spain.
Figure II.6 corroborates the declining trend observed in growth rates during the 1980s
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in the capital regions of Italy and Spain11. Despite yearly ups and downs, annual increases 
in the share of the Lazio in the total Italian GDP averaged more that 2 percentage points with 
respect to the previous rate during the first half of the 1980s. A sharp decline was observed 
starting in 1986, but there were clear signs of recovery by 1989. In the case of Madrid, an 
initial period of relative decline was quickly followed by high relative growth starting in 1983 
which lasted until 1987
Former mass production areas are characterized by low growth rates throughout the 
1980s. Wales, Bremen, the Saar region and Lower-Saxony are the only Fordist regions which 
barely surpass the European growth average (Table II.3). This is due to the fact that the great 
majority of the former Fordist zones have been unable to transform in a brief interval of time 
the traditional and rigid industrial structure identified with mass production into a more 
flexible system capable of responding to new market demands.
In general terms, it could be stated that regions with the greatest dependency on basic 
Fordist sectors like coal-mining or iron ore and steel (Lorraine, Picardy, Nord-Pas de Calais, 
Asturias, Wallonia and the North, and North West of England) have plunged into deep 
economic recessions, despite the financial efforts made by national governments and the 
European Commission to stop this trend of decline.
Conversely to capital and urban areas, there is no clear cut trajectory in growth 
behaviours o f former mass production regions during the 1980s. As shown in Figure II.7, 
the annual variation of the share of former mass production regions in the total GDP of Italy 
and Spain follows two very different trajectories. In Liguria and Piedmont, where a deep 
process of economic rationalization was undertaken, the early 1980s were a period of deep 
recession. The return to competitiveness of numerous industries in this area resulted in
11 Information in this Figure and the following Figures in this chapter refers only to Italian and 
Spanish regions, since they are the only two countries in the EU which have regions included in all 
six categories of regions established in the analysis.
123
The socio-political bases of regional growth...
Table 11.3
NATIONALLY WEIGHTED MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH IN FORMER 
MASS PRODUCTION REGIONS 
(1980-1991)
REGION MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH OF GDP
EUR12=100
Wales (UK) 102.67
Bremen (D) 102.65
Saarland (D) 100.50
Lower Saxony (D) 100.07
Piedmont (I) 99.72
Liguria (I) 99.00
Lower Normandy (F) 98.05
Yorkshire and Humberside (UK) 96.33
North (UK) 94.12
North West (UK) 93.74
Champagne-Ardenne (F) 93.51
Wallonia (B) 92.68
Upper Normandy (F) 91.49
North Rhine-Westphalia (D) 91.12
Basque Country (B) 90.83
Nord-Pas de Calais (F) 87.80
Cantabria (E) 85.65
Asturias (E) 85.25
Picardy (F) 82.81
Lorraine (F) 81.74
Northern Netherlands (Nl) 64.67
Source: derived from EUROSTAT data.
economic recovery from 1984-85 on. However, this recovery has not yet sufficed to bring 
back these regions to growth rates above the European average. In Spain, where the
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industrial rationalization process adopted a much more ‘cosmetic’ form, a declining trend in 
the share of former mass production regions in the total GDP of the country is observed, in 
spite of conjunctural peaks.
Former mass production regions
Figure II.7. Annua! variation (in %) of the share of former mass production regions in the total GDP 
of Italy and Spain.
This lack of a clear cut growth trend is also observed within different states. In the 
United Kingdom, the four former industrial mass production havens (the North and North 
West o f England, Yorkshire and Humberside, and Wales) only share growth rates above the 
national average in the period 1989-91. Before that, below average rates are the norm in the 
cases o f the North, the North West, and Yorkshire and Humberside, with occasional periods
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of above average growth rates12. In Wales the only declining period is between 1983 and 
1986. In France contrasting trajectories are also perceived. The North-Pas de Calais and 
Lorraine fit the model of recovery after a period of deep recession and industrial 
rationalization. On the contrary, growth rates in Picardy remain more or less below the 
French level throughout the whole decade.
Intermediate dynamic regions perform, as a group, second only to capital regions and 
urban areas (Table II.4). Aside from the statistical peculiarity of Luxembourg13 14, and Alsace 
and Lombardy, which experience rates of growth slightly below the EC average, all regions 
in this category accomplish high relative growth. The most vigorous regions are those which 
have succeeded in combining internal dynamism, and a privileged position along the 
communication axes or close to large metropoles, with an appealing image to attract external 
investment. That is the case of the Southern Netherlands, Hesse, Midi-Pyrénées, Bavaria, 
East Anglia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Catalonia, and Aragón. The Balearic Islands have, 
besides, benefited from the expansion of the tourist sector.
As a rule, intermediate dynamic regions follow a rising growth trajectory during the 
1980s. Italian and Spanish regions in this group start o ff the decade with rates of growth 
below the national average. However, the shift to positive values is achieved quite early in 
the case of Spain and since 1985 in Italy (Figure II.8). Comparable regional behaviours are 
observed in Germany, and France. In Germany, Hesse and Bavaria progress throughout the 
decade with growth levels higher than average'4, and Baden-Württemberg falls behind only 
since 1989. Midi-Pyrénées, aside from the period between 1983 and 1986, has seen a
12 These periods are 1983-86 for Yorkshire and Humberside, and 1986-89 for the North West of 
England.
13 Luxembourg has been among the best performing regions in terms of growth during the 1980s. 
However, being a uniregional state, it has no intranational variation and therefore, using nationally 
weighted growth rates implies that growth equals the 100.
14 With the exceptions of 1980 and 1981 in the case of Hesse, and 1990 in the case of Bavaria.
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NATIONALLY WEIGHTED MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH IN INTERMEDIATE
Table II.4
R<
DYNAMIC REGIONS 
(1980-1991)
REGION MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH OF GDP
EUR12 = 100
Southern Netherlands (Nl) 118.50
Hesse (D) 112.34
Midi-Pyrénées (F) 109.54
Balearic Is. (E) 109.16
Bavaria (D) 108.81
East Anglia (UK) 106.85
Friuli-Venezia Giulia (I) 105.89
Catalonia (E) 105.58
Aragon (E) 105.03
Veneto (I) 104.78
South West (UK) 104.71
Flanders (B) 103.96
Aquitaine (F) 103.92
Eastern Netherlands (Nl) 103.74
West of the Great Belt (Dk) 102.90
Trentino-Alto Adige (I) 102.29
Scotland (UK) 101.19
Valle d ’Aosta (I) 100.96
East Midlands (UK) 100.79
Valencia (E) 100.38
Baden-Württemberg (D) 100.01
Luxembourg (L) 100.00
Alsace (F) 99.54
Lombardy (I) 99.40
Source: derived from EUROSTAT data.
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Intermediate dynamic regions
Figure II.8. Annual variation (in %) of the share of intermediate dynamic regions in the total GDP 
of Italy and Spain.
constant economic expansion. In Aquitaine the ups and downs are much more significant. 
Variation in growth in British intermediate dynamic regions is more erratic, with a slight 
stagnation in relative growth rates in East Anglia and the South West since 1986, which 
contrast with rising trends in the East Midlands.
On the other side of the scale, we discover the intermediate less dynamic regions. 
Two subgroups can be established within this set: those regions with remnants o f mass 
production structures, such as Franche-Comté, West Midlands, and Rhineland-Palatinate, and 
those that have been left aside or have been incapable of adjusting their structures to the new 
socio-economic processes (Auvergne, Limousin, Brittany, Schleswig-Holstein, Umbria,
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Table 11.5
NATIONALLY WEIGHTED MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH IN INTERMEDIATE
LESS DYNAMIC REGIONS 
(1980-1991)
REGION MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH OF GDP
EUR12= 100
Auvergne (F)
Limousin (F)
Poitou-Charentes (F) 
Languedoc-Roussillon (F)
Pays de la Loire (F) 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (F) 
Navarre (E)
Brittany (F)
West Midlands (UK)
Centre (F)
Rhône-Alpes (F)
Burgundy (F)
Franche-Comté (F)
Marche (I)
Tuscany (I)
East of the Great Belt (Dk) 
Emilia-Romagna (I) 
Schleswig-Holstein (D) 
Rhineland-Palatinate (D)
Umbria (I)
Rioja (E)
Corsica (F)
102.22
100.91
100.57
99.73
99.33
99.16
98.90
98.50
98.27
98.22
97.99 
97.26
96.99 
96.85 
96.37 
95.68 
94.76
93.22
92.22 
91.56 
87.44 
80.62
Source: derived from EUROSTAT data. *129
Marche, or Navarre). Both groups, as well as the areas that enjoyed the greatest spurt in the 
early stages of the process of socio-economic restructuring (late 1970s and early 1980s) like
129
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Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Rhone- Alpes, Languedoc-Rousillon, and Rioja, have been unable 
to keep up with the growth pace set by the dynamic areas of the EU.
With few conjunctural exceptions (Auvergne, Limousin, Poitou-Charentes), 
intermediate less dynamic regions perform below the EU mean (Table II .5). However, 
usually, growth rates in intermediate less dynamic regions remain fairly close to the 
European average. The only exceptions are Rioja and Corsica, whose performance was more 
than 10 points below the European average.
This type of regions tend to maintain a relatively stable trajectory throughout the 
decade. Italian intermediate less dynamic regions, for example, display constant rates of 
decline of their share in the total Italian GDP. And Spanish regions, despite presenting a 
typical saw profile, follow a parallel growth trajectory to that of Italian regions (Figure II.9).
The same could be said for France and Germany. French intermediate less dynamic 
regions perform slightly below the national average, with occasional periods o f above average 
growth. These high growth intervals are fundamentally centred between 1983 and 1986. 
Limousin and Auvergne are an exception to the rule, since they consistently score around the 
French average. Growth rates in Schleswig-Holstein and in Rhineland-Palatinate are placed 
slightly below the national average until 1986, when they suffer a downward turn.
All peripheral dynamic regions grow above the European average. However, within 
this set, we encounter large internal differences in growth patterns. This group includes two 
of the regions with the highest rate of growth (the tourist resorts of the Canary and the Greek 
Islands), alongside with regions that barely achieve above average rates of growth15 (Table
II.6). *I
15 As in the case of Luxembourg, the growth rate of the Republic of Ireland is biased downwards 
by the statistical treatment of data, since no internal regional variation is contemplated by up to level
II of the NUTS regional division of EUROSTAT.
130
Regions and growth
Intermediate less dynamic regions
Figure II.9. Annual variation (in %) of the share of intermediate less dynamic regions in the total 
GDP of Italy and Spain.
The variation in growth rates can be attributed to the vastly diverse economic and 
social conditions of several of the regions included in this category. As mentioned before, 
some of these regions have little more in common than problematic accessibility to core 
areas. However, in the Greek and Canary Islands this handicap has been surmounted by the 
resort to tourism.
Furthermore, rates of growth in peripheral dynamic regions have followed a 
downward trajectory. As we can see in Figure 11.10, the highest growth rates in Italian and 
Spanish regions belonging to this set, were attained in the early years of the decade, in the
131
A
The socio-political bases of regional growth...
Table II.6
NATIONALLY WEIGHTED MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH IN PERIPHERAL
DYNAMIC REGIONS 
(1980-1991)
REGION MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH OF GDP
EUR12 = 100
Canary Is. (E) 120.02
Islands of the Aegean and Crete (Gr) 115.18
North (P) 108.56
Murcia (E) 104.82
Abruzzi (I) 104.24
Molise (I) 101.91
Northern Greece (Gr) 101.57
Puglia (I) 100.62
Sardinia (I) 100.48
Ireland (Irl) 100.00
Madeira (P) -
Source: derived from EUROSTAT data.
case of Italy, and in the central years in the case of Spain. Since 1986-87 growth levels 
fluctuate around the national mean. Similar trends are observed in other peripheral dynamic 
regions. Growth in the North of Portugal, in Northern Greece and in the Greek Islands, and 
in the Republic of Ireland is cast in the same mould: high growth levels between 1980 and 
1986, followed by rates slightly above the national average between 1986 and 1989, and a 
moderate decline with respect to the national mean in the period 1989-1991.
Finally, peripheral less dynamic regions fare worse than any other group, but former 
mass production areas. Leaving aside the exception of Campania and Extremadura, peripheral
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Peripheral dynamic regions
Figure II. 10. Annual variation (in %) of the share of peripheral dynamic regions in the total 
GDP of Italy and Spain.
less dynamic regions grow below the average. Growth rates are particularly low in Basilicata, 
Galicia, the Centre of Portugal, Castile and León, and the Alentejo (Table IL7). These low 
growth regions have remained -in spite of local or sectoral progress- anchored in an 
agricultural society, which is being progressively transformed by the growth o f a precarious 
service sector (Rodríguez-Pose, 1995).
Growth trajectories in peripheral less dynamic regions are also fairly similar. In Italy 
and Spain (Figure II. 11), as well as regions belonging to this set in Portugal, Greece and the 
United Kingdom, witnessed a sudden relative decline in the period of 1983-1984, coinciding 
with the upturn in the economic cycle. By the end of the decade, peripheral less dynamic
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Table II.7
NATIONALLY WEIGHTED MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH IN PERIPHERAL
LESS DYNAMIC REGIONS 
(1980-1991)
REGION MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH OF GDP
EURI 2=100
Campania (I) 104.78
Extremadura (E) 103.27
Northern Ireland (UK) 99.00
Sicily (I) 98.69
Andalusia (E) 97.86
Calabria (I) 97.81
Castile-La Mancha (E) 97.58
Central Greece and the Peloponnese (Gr) 96.26
Algarve (P) 93.23
Basilicata (I) 91.97
Galicia (E) 88.52
Centre (P) 87.96
Castile and Leon (E) 87.17
Alentejo (P) 70.08
Azores (P) -
Source: derived from EUROSTAT data.
regions register a relative recovery, which allows them to reach again average levels of 
growth, coinciding with a downturn in the economic cycle, and the crisis of the beginning 
of the 1990s.
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Figure I I . l l .  Annual variation (in %) of the share of peripheral less dynamic regions in the total 
GDP of Italy and Spain. 135
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The socio-political bases of regional growth...
In Chapter I it was argued that social and political conditions today play a greater -or, 
at least, more visible- role in the determination of the growth potential of an area than they 
did during the high-point of the model of mass production. The flexibilization of the 
productive system has shaken the traditional bases of locational analysis, giving leeway for 
a greater decentralisation of the centres of production and a reduction of the initial costs of 
setting up industries. In this context, technological advances seem to have rendered physical 
distances and the dependency levels on raw materials and labour less important, and the 
organisational systems of most firms have been substantially transformed. A vertical 
organization is no longer an essential element in order to maximize benefits, neither are 
economies of scale, scope, nor the existence of externalities, really absolutely necessary. 
Instead, the creation of both productive and informational networks is sought after, as is a 
way in which different productive entities can be integrated with them. As a result, one can 
say that the spatial spectrum of the location of firms has expanded enormously, owing to the 
fact that the basic factors which determine the placement of production plants -capital, raw 
materials and labour- now possess greater mobility than ever before.
In this changing scene, one must supplement economic factors -which are still o f great 
importance when it comes to determining the location of productive units, and, hence, of 
growth itself- with other causes of a social or political nature, as factors influencing spatial 
development. In fact, in Chapter I it was maintained that certain social and political factors 
could be at the root of a great number of changes recently occurring in the productive 
structure, and thus, could ultimately determine future growth rates. Information and skills 
are indeed increasingly considered as basic elements for the genesis of innovation and, thus 
of new productive activity (Elam, 1993).
The main aim of this chapter, in fact, is to try to determine whether the claim that 
socio-economic restructuring has rendered the connection between social conditions and 
growth more visible is sustainable or not in the European regional context, and whether there
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is a significant association between certain sets of social circumstances and regional growth 
levels in the EU during the 1980s and early 1990s. For various reasons, the task is by no 
means an easy one. Firstly, as was argued in Chapter I, a direct and linear relationship 
between a set of specific social conditions and growth levels in a determined area does not 
always exist. Any given social situation tends to influence the socio-economic structure 
which, in turn, pushes or discourages economic actors to invest or create wealth in a certain 
area, the factor which ultimately determines the potential of growth in any given place. 
Furthermore, the influence of social conditions -as was already stated- is not measurable in 
the short-term, but rather in the medium and long-run. Whereas economic factors, such as 
capital and investment, and technological progress, have attained great mobility and have 
almost immediate effects on growth rates, shifts in social conditions are much slower and 
their influence on the growth rates of an area is exerted with certain time lags. One might 
expect, then, that inherited social conditions will bear a greater influence on spatial 
development than the variations derived from the interaction between innovation and the 
existing social fabric during our period of study. In this sense, the absence of data going back 
before 1980 may prove to be an obstacle for the definitive validity of the results obtained, 
which must, in any case, be taken with extreme caution.
Secondly, the relationship between social conditions and economic growth is not a 
simple one way cause-effect connection. The social setting alters growth trends, while, at the 
same time, economic growth exerts a certain influence on the social panorama. Furthermore, 
together with social conditions, many other independent factors intervene in the shaping of 
growth trends. Therefore, any direct link between growth and the prevailing social 
community in any given space, is an extremely risky one, and might turn out to be 
misleading.
Last but not least, we are faced with a problem of availability of statistics. Originally, 
my intention was to include subject matters such as demography, well-being, quality of life, 
the educational system and the composition of the labour market in the social analysis.
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Obtaining indicators o f this type at national level does not prove too difficult and, in fact, 
comparative sociological studies have blossomed at this scale. The problem arises when one 
descends to the regional dimension. In this context statistical deficiencies are multiplied. As 
stated in Chapter II, the European Union’s REGIO database only includes -and rather 
haphazardly at that- demographic structure, the make-up of the labour market and 
unemployment levels as social aspects. There is no or very partial information on issues like 
the educational attainment levels of the population, on migration, poverty, integration of 
immigrants and minorities, or on the general state of well-being. This shortage of regional 
data seriously hampers any attempts at developing a fuller social analysis of growth 
performance.
Due to these problems of data availability, the construction of the social data base 
used in this chapter has been a time-consuming and arduous task, since it involved -together 
with the use of EUROSTAT data- managing information furnished by national statistical 
offices following different (and not always comparable) criteria. The final database on social 
conditions includes 23 different variables touching aspects such as the make-up of the labour 
force, unemployment indicators, demographic structure and population change, educational 
enrolment, and urban structure (Table III. 1).
Nevertheless, a serious shortage of data was observed in the case of the Greek 
regions, for which no complete social data set could be gathered. The national average 
instead of regional data had to be used in many social variables for Danish regions, since the 
NUTS level does not correspond exactly to any of the internal administrative divisions 
appearing in the national statistical yearbooks. Total, female and youth activity rates for 
Denmark refer to 1989. Furthermore, certain data for Portugal could not be traced back to 
1980, and no complete social data set was compiled for the Portuguese region of Algarve. 
Labour structure and unemployment variables for Corsica start in 1982.
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Table III.l
Variables Used in the Cluster Analysis
V ariable Definition
Labour force variables 
A CTTO T83 
A C TFEM 83 
A C T YOU 83 
A A CTTO T 
AACTFEM  
AA CTY O U  
PA RW O R90 
APARW ORK 
Employment variables 
U N EM PL80 
U N EY O U 80 
U N EM LT90
Demographic structure 
PO PY O U 90 
PO PELD 90 
D EPR A T90
A PO PY O U
A PO PELD
A D EPR A T
Population change 
D EN SIT90 
APOP 
M IGRAT
Educational enrolment 
ED U SEC 90
ED U U N I90
Urban structure 
C IT PO P90
Active population rate (in %) in 1983.
Fem ale activity rate (in %) in 1983.
Youth activity rate ( <  than 25) (in %) in 1983.
M ean annual growth rate of total activity between 1983 and  1990. 
M ean annual growth rate of fem ale activity betw een 1983 and  1990. 
Mean annual growth rate of youth activity between 1983 and  1990. 
Percentage of part-time em ployment in 1990.
Mean annual growth rate of part-tim e work betw een 1980 and  1990.
Unemployment rate (in %) in april 1980.
Youth unemployment rate ( <  than 25) (in %) in april 1980. 
Long-term  unemployment (m ore than 1 year unem ployed) in april
1990.
Youth population (under 15 years o f age) (in %) in 1990.
Elderly population (65 and older) (in %) in 1990.
Demographic dependency ratio  (youth+ elderly population/adult 
population) in 1990
M ean annual growth rate o f youth population betw een 1980 and 
1990.
M ean annua) growth rate of elderly  population betw een 1980 and 
1990.
M ean annual growth rate o f the demographic dependency ratio 
between 1980 and 1990.
Population density (in inh./K m 2) in 1990.
Population change (in %) betw een 1980 and 1990.
M igration rate between 1980 and  1990.
Percentage o f total population enrolled in secondary education  in
1990.
Percentage of total population enrolled in university-level education 
in 1990.
Percentage of the regional population living in the m ain  city in 
1990.
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I I I .l .-  T H E  CO NNECTIO N BETW EEN SO C IA L C O N D ITIO N S AND  
REG IO NA L G RO W TH .
The European regional context is an extremely complex social reality. The problem, 
thus, is how to extract from this social web a set of factors which, combined in one territory, 
are capable of providing an adequate setting for prompting economic growth. Can social 
conditions favour growth? If so, what are the social elements which have done so in Europe 
during the 1980s? Can common denominators be found for all the EU in such a complicated 
social context as the European one?
The problem that arises at this point of the analysis is that of pinpointing the influence 
that certain sets of social conditions can exert on economic growth. The study of the 
geographical distribution of the various social indicators does not allow us to detect any clear 
connection between any of the variables included in the analysis and the regional economic 
growth rate. This impression is corroborated by the coefficients of correlation between the 
dependent and independent variables (Table III.2).
None of the social indicators included in this section correlate with the regional 
economic growth rate at levels which, in statistical terms, can be considered significant. The 
highest positive coefficients are obtained with the variables describing high activity rates -be 
it of women, of the young or as a whole- and in population change indicators. However, 
even this provides us with a very modest correlation. The correlation coefficient between the 
other indicators and economic growth is often close to zero. This obviously means that there 
is no individual association between the variables being studied.
In the light of these results, one might be tempted to conclude that the social 
dimension is not connected to the regional growth rate in the EC, and that any link between 
social indicators and regional growth rates must be nothing more than pure coincidence or 
the result of a spurious relationship. However, if we were to follow this strict line to the end, 142
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Table III.2
Correlation Coefficient of Independent Variables with Growth
Variable Correlation coefficient with growth
Labour force variables 
ACTTOT83 
ACTFEM83 
ACTYOU83 
AACTTOT 
AACTFEM 
AACTYOU 
PARWOR90 
APARWORK 
Employment variables 
UNEMPL80 
UNEYOU80 
UNEMLT90 
Demographic structure 
POPYOU90 
POPELD90 
DEPRAT90 
APOPYOU 
APOPELD 
ADEPRAT 
Population change 
DENSIT90 
APOP 
MIGRAT
Educational enrolment 
EDUSEC90 
EDUUNI90 
Urban structure 
CITPOP90
0.241
0.180
0.108
0.276
0.175
0.247
-0.024
0.024
-0.092
-0.001
-0.189
-0.069
-0.078
-0.122
-0.064
0.162
0.090
0.181
0.337
0.341
-0.312
0.041
0.081
143
■ ■ m m m m m m m m m m e r n r n r n r n r n m a t
The socio-political bases of regional growth...
it would not only mean having to deny any sort of association between the social dimension 
and regional economic growth, but it would also limit the possibility of undertaking similar 
analyses, which take as the independent variable the socio-economic structure, or even any 
of the classic economic indicators.
'. i
Nonetheless, the coefficient of a linear correlation only compares two variables 
individually. Therefore, the fact that two indicators possess a low correlation does not 
necessarily imply that a combination of various indicators with similar correlation indices is 
not connected to the variable we are attempting to explain. Hence, we cannot infer from the 
absence of significant correlation coefficients between a set of social variables and the 
regional growth rate taken individually that such a complex reality as is the social one exerts 
is not related to the levels of growth. We might therefore try a multivariate form of analysis 
so that we can better understand how the interaction of a series of social conditions can 
transform itself into the engine of or a brake on regional growth in a specific period.
III. 1 . 1 METHODOLOGY.
The fact that there is no direct and linear cause-effect relationship between a set of 
specific social conditions and growth rates, that most social indicators used in traditional 
linear regression analyses of growth have manifested a strong fragility (Levine and Renelt, 
1992, p. 942), and the lack of long time series of data, limits the choice o f econometric 
methods with which to tackle, from a cross-sectional and quantitative point of view, the 
social bases o f regional growth. This is the reason why methods which analyze cause-effect 
relationships (mainly multiple regression methods) should be applied with extreme care in 
order to avoid problems of simultaneous causation, multicollinearity, and even spatial 
autocorrelation. Furthermore, in linear regression methods, the risk of omitted variable bias 
is amplified by the quest for parsimony, and, in this case the use of time series analysis is 
ruled out by the lack of long time series of data. Therefore, in my opinion, the use of 
traditional probabilistic quantitative methods in the analysis of social causes and conditions
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of economic growth should be limited to a strict minimum, only when significant associations 
between social factors and growth are determined.
Cluster analysis provides a feasible way to elude problems generated by simultaneous 
causation, spatial autocorrelation, and the omitted variable bias, by means of grouping sundry 
social data into clusters or taxonomies. As Aldenderfer and Blashfield underline, the 
fundamental aim of clustering procedures is "to form clusters or groups of highly similar 
entities. More specifically, a clustering method is a multivariate statistical procedure that 
starts with a data set containing information about a sample of entities and attempts to 
reorganize these entities into relatively homogeneous groups" (1984, p. 7). Consequently, 
the formation of clusters might enlighten in someway the set of social circumstances 
connected to certain types of economic growth in a large number of cases.
III. 1.2.- THE SOCIAL BASES OF REGIONAL GROWTH IN WESTERN EUROPE.
111.1.2.1.' Main Hypothesis.
The aim of this section is to analyze the extent to which there is a connection between 
recent regional economic growth in Western Europe and local sets of social conditions, and 
to try to determine whether the territorial pattern associated with socio-economic 
restructuring is reproduced at a social level or not.
The main hypothesis is that, if the flexibi 1 ization and globalization of world economy 
has magnified the mobility of economic locational factors and shaken the bases o f traditional 
locational analysis, social factors may play today a greater -or, at least, more visible- role 
in conditioning growth trends than they did during the zenith of the mass production period. 
Therefore, if growth patterns are now more connected to social conditions and social 
circumstances, the theoretical and empirical typology of European regions described in the
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previous chapter1, which also indicated meaningful differences in growth rates, would be 
reproduced to a large extent when evaluating exclusively social variables. This method 
implies grouping European regions into different social clusters -with no resort to variables 
indicating economic growth- and to see whether there is a significant correlation between the 
resulting clusters and regional growth rates during the 1980s.
Consequently, regions in the European Community will be assembled into six groups 
or clusters using iterative partitioning methods (specifically k-means clustering), according 
to the social conditions represented in the 23 social variables included in the data set. This 
clustering technique will produce exactly six different clusters of greatest possible social 
distinction, by means of minimizing the variability within each cluster and maximizing the 
variability between clusters. If these clusters replicate the groups depicted in the previous 
chapter, then a fairly strong association between local social conditions and economic growth 
in the post-Fordist era could be established. If, on the contrary, social clusters have no 
relationship with the preestablished theoretical clusters, it would mean that the relationship 
between social conditions and growth is weak.
III. 1.2,2.- The national influence over regional social conditions.
As in the case of the analysis of growth levels, the problem of the national sway over 
regional social conditions biases any type of results. From a social point of view, Europe is 
by no means a homogenous entity. Significant contrasts are observed across regions and 
countries with respect to activity and unemployment rates, in population structure and 
population change, educational attainment, and standards of living.
1 The different groups of regions depicted in the previous chapter were:
- Capital regions and urban financial centres.
- Former mass production regions.
- Intermediate dynamic regions.
- Intermediate less dynamic regions.
- Peripheral dynamic regions.
- Peripheral less dynamic regions.
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Table III.3
Total Activity Rate in the EU 
by Country 
(1975-1991)
COUNTRIES 1975 1980 1985 1991
Eur 12 41.90 42.70 43.70 44.90
Belgium (B) 40.10 41.30 41.70 41.90
Denmark (Dk) 49.10 52.00 55.40 56.30
Germany (D) 44.00 45.40 47.40 48.00
Greece (Gr) 38.00 37.70 41.00 41.50
Spain (E) 38.70 36.10 36.30 39.40
France (F) 42.40 43.40 43.40 43.00
Ireland (Irl) 36.40 36.70 36.90 37.90
Italy (I) 38.30 39.80 41.10 42.50
Luxembourg (L) 41.70 41.80 42.30 43.80
Netherlands (Nl) 36.50 38.10 40.10 46.50
Portugal (P) 44.30 44.40 44.40 52.20
United Kingdom (UK) 46.10 47.60 49.00 49.60
Source: derived from EUROSTAT data.
National differences among member-states of the EU in terms o f total activity rate are 
enormous. In 1991, the total activity rate in Denmark -the state in the EU with the highest 
active population- represented 56.3% of the population, that is, 18.4 percentage points above 
the activity rate of Ireland (Table III.3). Portugal was also above the 50% mark, whereas 
neighbouring Spain lingered below 40%. All other EU member-states had activity rates 
between 40 and 50% of the population, but with differences that ranged from 49.6% in the 
United Kingdom to 41,9 in Belgium.
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Contrasts in activity rates across Western European countries have either remained 
more or less stable over a long period of time, or even increased slightly In 1975, the 
difference between Denmark and Ireland -again the countries with the highest and lowest 
rates- was of ‘only’ 12.7 percentage points. Several other countries were placed below the 
40% threshold (the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, and Spain). National divergence in growth 
of activity has resulted in a slight increase of disparities in activity rates. Most nations have 
experienced very slight increases in the rate of active population. Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom have witnessed slight 
increases in total activity. More significant rises are observed in Denmark, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands, countries that -with the exception of the Netherlands- started off from high 
levels of activity. Growth of active population in Ireland was, in contrast, extremely modest.
Greater differences are observed in female activity rates. Female activity in Denmark 
in 1991 reached levels of 51.5% of the total female population, while in Ireland it amounted 
only to 24.4%, less than one half of that registered in Denmark. Greece was also below the 
30% threshold, and most countries had rates ranging between 30 and 40% (Table III.4).
The national differences in female activity have increased in the last two decades and 
this has been the main cause for rising divergence in total activity. Women’s work has 
experienced a large expansion in recent years, growing by more than 5 percentage points 
from 1975 until 1991, and despite swift changes, national disparities have not only been 
particularly persistent, but have also tended to increase. Growth of female activity has been 
particularly fast in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Greece. In contrast, some o f the countries 
with lower rates of female activity at the beginning of the period have registered only 
moderate increases. This is basically the case of Ireland, and, to a lesser extent, o f France 
and Belgium. Descending to the regional level, female activity rates clearly cluster -with little 
deviation- around national means.
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Table III.4
Total Female Activity Rate in the EU 
by Country 
(1975-1991)
COUNTRIES 1975
Eur 12 29.70
Belgium (B) 26.90
Denmark (Dk) 40.00
Germany (D) 31.90
Greece (Gr) -
Spain (E) -
France (F) 31.10
Ireland (Irl) 20.00
Italy (I) 22.50
Luxembourg (L) 24.80
Netherlands (Nl) 20.20
Portugal (P) -
United Kingdom (UK) 33.70
1980 1985 1991
30.40 32.30 34.80
30.00 32.30 34.10
45.30 49.50 51.50
33.80 35.60 37.20
21.10 27.30 29.20
33.80 35.30 36.10
20.50 21.80 24.40
25.70 27.90 30.50
26.40 29.30 31.60
23.70 27.40 36.50
36.40 38.70 41.50
Source: derived from EUROSTAT data.
The analysis of unemployment rates in the EU brings about a similar panorama. The 
percentage of unemployed was much higher in Spain and in Ireland -precisely the two 
member-states with the lowest active population- than in any other country in the EU. The 
Spanish unemployment rate in 1993 was 8.4 times that of Luxembourg; 4.3 times that of 
Portugal; 3.9 times that of Germany; and 2.3 times higher than the EU's average. In Ireland, 
the unemployment rates also doubled that of the EU (Table III.5).
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Table III.5
Unemployment Rate in the EU 
by Country 
(1975-1991)
COUNTRIES 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993
Eur 12 4.10 6.00 10.80 8.30 9.40
Belgium (B) 5.10 7.90 11.80 7.60 9.40
Denmark (Dk) 5.20 6.90 7.20 8,10 10.30
Germany (D) 3.40 2.80 7.10 4.80 5.60
Greece (Gr) 2.30 2.80 7.70 7.20 0.00
Spain (E) 4.70 11.60 21.10 16.20 21.80
France (F) 4.00 6.20 10.10 9.00 10.80
Ireland (Irl) 8.00 8.00 18.20 14.50 18.40
Italy (I) 5.50 6.70 10.10 10.00 11.10
Luxembourg (L) 5.70 4.40 2.90 1.70 2.60
Netherlands (Nl) 5.00 5.90 10.50 7.50 8.80
Portugal (P) 4.60 7.80 8.60 4.60 5.10
United Kingdom (UK) 3.20 5.50 11.40 7.00 10.40
Source: derived from EUROSTAT data.
Between 1975 and 1985 unemployment rates more than doubled in the EU, and, since 
then, with ups and downs, they have remained at levels of around 10 percent. However, 
significant differences in the levels o f unemployment growth were registered across Europe. 
Unemployment rates in Spain and Ireland soared, reaching levels of more than 20% 
throughout the 1980s in most Spanish regions. Belgium, Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom also withstood significant increases in unemployment. In Germany, 
in the Netherlands, and in Portugal expansion of unemployment was kept within moderate
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rates, and only Luxembourg witnessed a contraction of relative unemployment. Similar 
divergent trajectories are noticed with regard to youth unemployment and long-term 
unemployment.
The sway of national conditions over regional behaviours is also clearly evident in the 
case of educational enrolment. As seen in Map III. 1, there are clearly distinctive national 
patterns in secondary' school enrolment rates. All Belgian, Dutch and British regions have 
levels of secondary school enrolment which are 6 percentage points above the EU average, 
whereas no Danish, German, or French region -together with Luxembourg and Ireland- reach 
that level. In Italy, only Campania and Sardinia achieve similar enrolment rates to the ones 
registered in Great Britain, Belgium or the Netherlands, while the North of the country 
endures the similar low levels of secondary school enrolment as French or German regions. 
The situation in the Iberian Peninsula is more complex, since both in Portugal and in Spain, 
there are notable interregional differences, with regions like Madrid, the Basque Country, 
Navarre -with enrolment levels ranking amongst the highest in Europe- and other with 
relatively modest secondary school enrolment levels, like the North and the Centre of 
Portugal, Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Castile-La Mancha, and Extremadura2.
National differences in university enrolment rates are less noticeable, and significant 
internal contrasts are observed. The reason for these differences lies primarily in two factors: 
first of all the openness of a country’s university system to admissions of secondary students, 
and, in second place, on the existence of universities at a regional level.
: T he use o f  secondary school enrolm ent rates, expressed as a  proportion o f  total popu la tion  rather 
than o f the relevant age group (as a result o f lack o f  data) lim its the com parability  o f  data. As a 
consequence, cross-regional d ifferences reflect not ju s t  the proportion  o f ch ildren  w ho a re  in school, 
but also  the size o f the school age population. T herefore  differences in dem ographic  s truc tu re  may 
to a large extent determ ine the variation  in secondary school enrolm ent rates betw een the South and 
the N orth  of Ita ly ; two areas with very  different levels o f dem ographic dynam ism . It does not, 
how ever, account for sharp contrasts am ong zones w ith fairly sim ilar dem ographic s truc tu res, such 
as Belgium  and the United K ingdom , on  the one hand, and N orthern  France, on  the o th e r; o r betw een 
Southern France and N orthers Spain (cf. M ap III. 1).
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The first factor determines different rates of enrolment between countries like Ireland, 
the United Kingdom, and Portugal on the one hand, and Denmark, Germany, Italy, France, 
or Spain, on the other. Numerus clausus procedures, low admission numbers, and in certain 
cases, a limited number of universities, restricts access to university in the first group of 
countries. Less selective selection procedures and greater capacity determine high enrolment 
rates in the other group (Map III.2).
The number and dimension of universities in each region is responsible for a great 
deal of intranational differences in university enrolment. Regions with no universities or 
universities of recent foundation are clearly handicapped in this respect with regard to 
neighbouring areas. This is the case of, for example, Calabria, Basilicata, and Molise in 
Italy, with few universities. Students from these regions often attend universities in other 
areas o f the country with well-established teaching centres and a long tradition of university- 
level studies, such as Emilia-Romagna. Tuscany, or Lazio. Similarly, in Germany students 
from Schleswig-Holstein often end up in universities in other Lander. In the French case, 
regions around Paris have to endure the attraction the numerous universities in the capital 
region exert on their students. And, in Spain, recently founded universities in Castile-La 
Mancha, Extremadura, Rioja, and the Balearic Islands have not yet succeeded in halting the 
migration of university students mainly to Madrid, Catalonia, and other neighbouring 
regions. A migration which, in the long run, leads to a shortage of qualified human resources 
in many of these issuing areas.
The influence national borders exercise on social conditions is also revealed when 
foreign population is considered. The percentage of foreign population is much higher in 
countries like Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany, or France, than in Ireland, Italy, or Spain. 
In regions like Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, Luxembourg, Brussels, Wallonia, Corsica, and 
the Ile de France, the percentage of foreigners exceeds 9%, whereas in most Spanish and 
Italian regions it does not even reach 1 % (Map III.3). Sharp contrasts are observed along the
153
U
N
IV
E
R
SI
T
Y
 
E
N
R
O
L
M
E
N
T
 
R
A
T
E
1
9
9
0
M l l i l i i i l
F
O
R
E
IG
N
 
P
O
P
U
L
A
T
IO
N
The socio-political bases of regional growth...
Spanish-French and Italo-French borders, and also across the English Channel, despite the 
fact that the highest contingent of foreign population in Great Britain is located in the South.
When demographic factors are taken into account, the sway of the national dimension 
is somewhat stifled. With respect to the structure the population, the considerable national 
differences observed in the population of age 15 and less, fade away when the population of 
65 and over is analyzed. The regional distribution of young population still follows more or 
less clearly defined national patterns. As seen in Map III.4, the border between France and 
its Northern neighbours, and between France and Italy, mark fundamental divides between 
two clearly disparate age structures. On the one hand, Northern France, with one of the 
highest birth rates in the EU and a considerable young contingent (of more that 20%), and, 
on the other, Germany and Belgium, which have witnessed for a long period of time very 
low birth rates, and with percentages of young population of only between 12 and 18%. A 
similar contrast is detected between France and Northern Italy, whose aged demographic 
structure is the result of several years of extremely low fertility rates, and between Ireland 
and Great Britain. Differences in shares of young population between Belgium and the 
Netherlands on the one hand, and Germany, on the other, are less conspicuous, but still 
evident.
Strong intranational differences are also noticeable. Italy is the most strong case. The 
aged North contrasts with a demographically dynamic South, still considered as one of the 
demographic reservoirs in Western Europe. The contrast between Northern and Southern 
France is less pronounced than in Italy, despite differences of more than 6 percentage points. 
In Spain, there is no clearly defined north-south divide as in France of Italy, but 
unmistakable differences in population of 15 and less are registered between coastal areas and 
Madrid, on the one hand, and inland regions, on the other.
Intranational variation becomes the rule in the levels o f elderly population (Map
III.5). Strong internal differences are observed in France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, while
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The social bases of regional growth
contrasts within Germany and the United Kingdom are also meaningful. Levels of more than 
18% ofpopulation of 65 and over are achieved in regions in four countries, and this number 
increases to 7 when the 16.5% threshold is adopted.
One of the consequences of strong intranational contrasts is the reduction of 
international ones. Nevertheless, in some cases national borders still mark significant 
differences in levels of elderly population. This is especially clear along the border between 
Germany and its Western neighbours. Population in Germany (with the exception of Baden- 
Württemberg) is older than in the Benelux, or in Northern France. Southern France and 
Northern Spain also display differences in age structure. The percentage of elderly population 
in Southern France is the highest in the country, while regions in North Eastern Spain -with 
the exception of Aragon- have fairly low rates of elderly population in the Spanish context.
Finally, the analysis of migration rates also shows -despite some exceptions in the 
cases of Germany, Spain, and Portugal- well-defined intranational, as well as international 
disparities (Map III.6). Migration differs across the French-German, the French-Spanish, and 
the French-Italian borders. In contrast to previous decades, the 1980s were a period of 
relatively low migration. Although in most European Regions the migration rate has been 
positive (with the exception of certain areas of the Italian Mezzogiomo, several regions in 
the Parisian Basin and isolated areas in Spain, Portugal, and the United Kingdom), positive 
migration rates have been almost negligible, in Spanish, Portuguese, Danish, and Belgian 
regions in particular, and, to a lesser extent, in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and most 
of the United Kingdom. Only a limited number of spaces have been capable of attracting 
population from other areas. And these areas have been restricted to either tourist resorts like 
Corsica, the Balearic Islands, the Alentejo, and the Southern French fringe. The South West 
of England and East Anglia have also benefited from population moving out of the crowded 
the London area and lured to these areas by their excellent living conditions and socio­
economic dynamism.
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The social bases o f regional growth
III. 1.2.3.- Getting rid of the national effect.
As a consequence of the strong influence of the national dimension on regional social 
conditions, the use of raw social data for European regions in the cluster analysis proposed 
in this section would lead to the formation of clusters that reproduce the existing national 
borders. This fact corroborates the idea that the national dimension still has a greater sway 
over the social sphere than local circumstances. As we have seen, from a social point of 
view, regional variation tends to be relatively weak within a country, and the most significant 
differences are to be found in the international, rather than in the intranational scale. 
Therefore, in order to obtain feasible cross-national clusters there is a need to adjust for 
national effect before performing the analysis.
The method used in the analysis repeats the procedures for nationally weighting the 
dependent variable in the previous chapter. It consists of studying the internal social variation 
between regions within their national context and to compare afterwards this variation with 
the internal social variation in other European countries. The method observes the following 
steps:
- a) The global social database is divided into national data sets.
b) National data sets are standardized in order to make them comparable. The 
mean of each variable equals 0 and the standard deviation represents a 
distance of one from the mean.
c) Standardized national data sets are merged into another European database.
This method has the advantage of being a simple way of comparing cross-national 
data and preserving intranational variation at the same time. However, it is disadvantaged 
by the fact that countries with no internal regional variation (the uniregional countries: 
Ireland and Luxembourg) cannot be included in the final analysis.
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III.1 .3 .- CLUSTER ANALYSIS.
The k-means analysis of data performed with the variables described in Table III. I3 
produces six regional clusters which reproduce in great measure the theoretical and empirical 
division of regions in the post-Fordist era outlined in the previous chapter. In spite of the fact 
that there are significant individual exceptions and that clusters often combine groups of low 
growth or high growth regions stemming from different regional typologies, the results of 
the analysis support the idea of the existence of a meaningful relationship between certain 
sets of social conditions and economic growth; the hypothesis that the strengthened mobility 
and the greater availability of traditional factors fostering growth promoting activities (mainly 
capital and technology), have made bonds between social conditions and growth more visible. 
Furthermore, there is a statistically significant correlation between the fact of belonging to 
a certain social cluster and the rate of economic growth experienced by those regions during 
the 1980s.
Nevertheless, the existence of a conspicuous association between certain sets of social 
conditions and growth behaviours in regions in the UE during the 1980s, does not allow us 
to infer that there is a relationship between the existing social setting and long-term growth. 
First of all, because lack of large and more satisfactory sets of data preclude the statement 
of any conclusive and undisputed results. Even though -given the considerable amount of 
variables used in the analysis- the risk o f omitted variable bias is less important than in 
traditional linear regression models of growth, there is no way to establish whether 
significant variables have been neglected. Despite the fact that the great majority o f regions 
tend to remain within a certain cluster even if variables in the analysis are omitted or *162
3 Only 21 out of the 23 variables included in the data set, have been employed in the cluster 
analysis. The two variables indicating part time employment (the percentage of part time employment 
and the mean annual growth rate of part time employment) had to be excluded, because in all 
preliminary attempts to set up clusters, very low F values for these two indicators provoked 
significant increases in the variance within clusters.
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changed4, the addition of other significant variables may provoke shifts of regions placed at 
the fringes of clusters, which would lead either to the reinforcement of the hypothesis or its 
rejection.
In second place, the lack of large time series of data is a serious handicap in order 
to demonstrate the existence of cause-effect links between social conditions and growth rates. 
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, social conditions by themselves neither provoke, nor restrain 
growth. They influence internal and external actors when adopting growth promoting 
decisions. And this process is not achieved automatically. It implies certain time lags in 
which actors first become aware of the social circumstances of a given place, analyze the 
pros and cons of initiating, continuing, or finishing growth promoting activities, make 
decisions and put this decisions in motion. The outcome is that the influence of the social 
setting on growth levels can only be discerned on a medium or long-term basis. Therefore, 
the use of regional data circumscribed to the 1980s indicates only a significant relationship 
between both factors, or even a simultaneous causation effect: as well as inherited social 
conditions might have wielded a meaningful effect of present growth levels, past growth rates 
might have influenced present levels of investment in education, improved or worsened living 
standards, attracted or repelled migration, or altered the labour market.
Last but not least, the use o f cluster analysis techniques permits us to determine 
significant associations of regions having similar social conditions. But they provide no 
information about the actual interconnections between social conditions in those areas and 
economic growth. 163
4 For example, capital and urban regions, on the one hand, and a large number of intermediate 
dynamic regions remain in well defined clusters even if certain variables are changed. Furthermore, 
certain former mass production regions always share the same cluster as regions in the Italian 
Mezzogiomo, and Spanish peripheral less dynamic regions consistently score together with some old 
Fordist havens.
163
wtntn!
The socio-political bases o f regional growth...
Table III.6
Average Growth Level and Standard Deviation (1980-91) 
of Regions Belonging to Each Cluster
CLUSTER Average growth o
EUR12—100
- High performing clusters.
• Capital regions and urban
financial centres (Cluster 5).
■ Intermediate dynamic and other
103.74 6.97
intermediate regions (Cluster 4). 
- Low performing clusters.
100.37 ' 5.25
■ Intermediate regions (Cluster 3).
• Peripheral less dynamic and other
98.73 7.12
non dynamic regions (Cluster 2). 
• Former core regions undergoing 
industrial decline and the Italian
97.66 8.13
Mezzogiorno (Cluster 1). 
- Undefined cluster.
95.10 9.38
* Corsica and Liguria (Cluster 6). 89.81 12.99
As could be expected, regional clusters identified in the analysis do not exactly 
reproduce the typology presented in the previous chapter, but five out of the six clusters 
identified make up relatively homogenous groups o f regions in terms o f the regional 
typology, and of their growth behaviours. Two of the six clusters fundamentally consist of 
regions with high relative levels of growth throughout the 1980s. One of these clusters 
corresponds to capital and urban regions, while the other comprises mainly intermediate 
dynamic areas (Table III.6). In the low performing section, the first cluster mainly includes 
both dynamic and less dynamic intermediate regions. The two other clusters in this category 
incorporate a large proportion of former mass production regions and peripheral areas (Table
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III.6). Lastly, the final cluster is reduced to two regions, whose social conditions differ 
greatly from those observed in all other social sets of regions.
Clusters stemming from the analysis could be identified as follows (Map III.7):
- High performing clusters.
a) Capital regions and urban financial centres (Cluster 5).
b) In term ediate dynam ic and other dynam ic reg ion s (C luster 4 ) .
- Low performing clusters.
a) Intermediate regions (Cluster 3).
b) Peripheral less dynamic and other less dynamic regions (Cluster 2).
c) Former core regions undergoing industrial decline and the Italian 
Mezzogiorno (Cluster 1).
- Undefined cluster.
a) Corsica and Liguria (Cluster 6).
III.1.3.1.- Capital regions and urban financial centres (Cluster 5).
The capital regions and urban financial centres cluster consists of 9 out of the 11 
regions included in the capital and large urban regions typology set in the previous chapter. 
The only exception is the region around Copenhagen5 (since there is no complete set of 
social data for Athens) (Table III.7).
According to the results, the initial social conditions which relate to high growth rates 
in capital regions and urban financial centres were identified by above average levels of total 
and female activity, and fairly low youth activity in comparison to other European regions 3
3 In the case of Denmark, the small internal regional variation, we have already remarked, is 
heightened by the use of national means in several variables included in the analysis. This is provoked 
by the fact that the regional division used by the EC does not match national administrative territorial 
entities.
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Table III.7
Members of the Capital Regions and 
Urban Financial Centres Cluster (Cluster 5)
REGION Mean annual rate of Distance to
' growth (Eurl2 = 100) Cluster Centre
Hamburg (D) 110.07 1.07
Lazio (1) 109.73 1.06
Madrid (E) 109.42 1.00
lie de France (F) 108.32 1.01
Lisbon and the Tagus Valley (P) 104.56 0.82
Brussels (B) 101.68 0.84
South East (UK) 101.20 0.83
Western Netherlands (Nl) 100.31 0.79
Berlin (D) 88.36 1.27
(Figure III. 1). During the 1980s capital and urban regions have experienced a significant 
stagnation in job creation. Both, global and female job creation are under the Community’s 
average, whereas the only relative expansion is observed in youth activity rates. These trends 
in the growth of active population have resulted in a levelling out of differences in activity 
rates with the rest of the European regions. In 1990, total activity and youth activity rates 
were slightly below the European regional mean, while female activity barely exceeded the 
average.
There is no distinctive feature which characterized initial unemployment rates in these 
regions. In 1980 unemployment rates fluctuated around the European mean, with below 
average levels for total unemployment, and slightly above average rates in the case of youth 
unemployment in 1980 and long-term unemployment in 1990. Part-time employment and 
part-time employment growth are still relatively humble when compared with their share in
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Capital regions and  urban  financia l cen tres  
Cluster contains 9 cases
Figure III.l. Descriptive Statistics for Cluster 5. 
certain intermediate and industrial declining regions.
With regard to their demographic structure, capital and urban regions have a greater 
proportion of adults than any other cluster. In this cluster the share of youth population is 
well below the EU’s average, whereas the proportion of elderly population is placed slightly
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above the mean. Consequently, the dependency ratio is below the European average. 
Moreover, capital and urban areas show a greater demographic dynamism than most other 
regions: the share of population of 15 and under increases at a higher pace than in any other 
set of regions, while growth of the elderly population is also the lowest in all clusters. 
Capital and urban regions have been, thus, scarcely affected by the ageing of population. 
Migration and population growth are both positive, as a consequence o f the fact that capital 
and urban areas have continued exerting a distinct attraction to the population of other areas 
in the post-Fordist era. In a general framework of low migration during the 1980s, this group 
of regions has attracted more population than most other clusters.
As could be expected, the population density of capital and urban regions is well 
above the European mean and the urban structure of the region is completely dominated by 
the main métropoles. Paris, London, Madrid, Rome, Lisbon, and Brussels could be clearly 
identified with their regions, since changes in these métropoles affect a large area of 
influence, which, in some cases, expands considerably further than the limits of the 
administrative region. The Làndersîàdte of Hamburg and Berlin clearly comply to this rule. 
The only exception is the Western Netherlands, where neither Amsterdam nor Rotterdam 
have either the size, or the economic power to influence the rest of the region. Here the role 
of the métropoles is filled by a conurbation of cities which includes Utrecht, Amsterdam, the 
Hague, and Rotterdam: the Randstad Holland. The Randstad Holland fulfils a similar 
function to the one played by other European métropoles (Sachar, 1994).
Finally, although the percentage of population enrolled in secondary education is 
around the European mean, university education is well above the Community’s average. 
Such a sharp contrast can only be explained by the attraction of University centres in capital 
areas for students from neighbouring, as well as, far away zones. This implies a higher level 
of qualification of the inhabitants o f core regions, since a large percentage of the population 
moving from other regions to study does not return to their zones of origin.
169
The socio-political bases of regional growth...
In brief, capital regions display a fairly dynamic social panorama characterized by a 
high level of qualification of the population, positive rates o f population growth and high 
population attraction, low demographic dependency and unemployment, and a fuller 
integration of females in the labour market. Regions included in this cluster experienced the 
highest rate of growth during the 1980s.
III. 1.3.2.- Intermediate dynamic and other dynamic regions (Cluster 4).
Cluster 4 contains 17 regional cases, which include a large proportion o f the 
intermediate dynamic regions, several intermediate less dynamic, and isolated cases of 
peripheral (Castile and León in Spain, and the North of Portugal), and industrial declining 
regions (Piedmont in Italy, and Yorkshire and Humberside in the United Kingdom). Regions 
in this cluster comprise some of the most economically dynamic areas in the European 
Community, such as the North o f Portugal, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Catalonia, Veneto, and 
Flanders. This economic dynamism is reflected in an average rate of growth second only to 
capital and urban regions (Table III.8). • •
The economic dynamism of these regions is matched by a similarly dynamic social 
panorama (Figure III.2). Total, female and youth activity in 1983 were well above the 
European average, reaching levels comparable to those attained in other intermediate dynamic 
regions, and only second in terms of total and female activity rates to those found in capital 
regions and urban financial centres. Nevertheless, these ideal initial conditions in labour 
activity have not been matched by a favourable relative evolution in terms of growth of 
activity rates. Whereas total and female activity rates have experienced moderate increases, 
the growth o f youth activity is well below the European average.
Initial unemployment indicators also displayed an advantageous panorama. Total, 
youth and long-term unemployment rates are low in comparison to other clusters. These high 
levels of employment throughout the period o f analysis can only be compared to those of the
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Table III.8
Members of the Intermediate Dynamic and 
other Intermediate Regions Cluster (Cluster 4)
REGION Mean annual rate of Distance to
growth (Eurl2=100) Cluster Centre
North of Portugal (P) 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia (I) 
Catalonia (E)
Veneto (I)
Flanders (B)
Trentino-Alto Adige (I) 
Auvergne (F)
Scotland (UK)
Valle d ’Aosta (I)
East Midlands (UK)
Piedmont (I)
Alsace (F)
Lombardy (I)
Yorkshire and Humberside (UK) 
Emilia-Romagna (I) 
Schleswig-Holstein (D)
Castile and Leon (E)
108.56 0.61
105.89 0.71
105.58 0.50
104.78 0.58
103.96 0.61
102.29 0.68
102.22 0.63
101.19 0.90
100.96 0.98
100.79 0.52
99.72 0.57
99.54 1.05
99.40 0.56
96.33 0.50
94.76 0.62
93.22 0.63
87.17 0.73
other intermediate regions of cluster 3.
The demographic scene is characterised by the prevalence of adult population. The 
share of population of 15 and under is significantly below the European average* whereas the 
proportion o f elderly population close to the levels found in other parts o f Europe. The 
dependency ratio is thus the lowest in all clusters. During the 1980s* the relative growth of 
elderly population has clearly outstripped that of the young, resulting in a considerable
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In te rm ed ia te  dynam ic and o th e r dynam ic reg ions 
Cluster contains 17 cases
Figure III.2. Descriptive Statistics for Cluster 4.
increase o f the adult population, and a relative decline in the dependency ratio. As a 
consequence, the regions included in this cluster show almost no signs of an ageing of the 
population.
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These intermediate dynamic and other dynamic regions have experienced no 
significant deviation from the mean in terms of inward migration, although total population 
growth has remained below the European average.
Lastly, and contrary to what might be expected given the relatively high growth levels 
of these areas, educational conditions in this group are not advantageous. University and, 
above all, secondary school enrolment are neatly below the European average. This fact 
represents a clear contrast with levels of educational enrolment in other well-off regions, 
namely with the cluster of capital and urban financial centres. Nevertheless, as in the case 
of the regions in the previous cluster, universities included in this group exert a fairly strong 
attraction on students from other areas.
III. 1.3.3.- Interm ediate regions (Cluster 3).
Cluster 3, with 28 cases, is the largest cluster stemming from the analysis. More than 
three fourths of the regions included in the cluster are intermediate dynamic and less dynamic 
areas. The other fourth is made up of two peripheral less dynamic regions (Galicia, and the 
Centre of Portugal), one peripheral dynamic (Abruzzi), one capital area (the region around 
Copenhagen), and one industrial declining region (Asturias).
The mean average annual growth rate of regions included in this cluster is slightly 
lower that the mean growth rate of regions in the previous cluster (vid. Table III.6). This fact 
is mainly the result of the prevalence of intermediate less dynamic over intermediate dynamic 
regions within the cluster (Table III.9). Moreover, social conditions display a fairly different 
profile with respect to the conditions observed in the cluster of intermediate dynamic and 
other dynamic regions.
The only social aspects that regions encompassed in this cluster and regions in the 
previous cluster share in common are labour activity indicators and unemployment indicators 173
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Table III.9
Members of the Intermediate Regions Cluster (Cluster 3)
REGION Mean annual rate of Distance to
growth (E u rl2 = 100) Cluster Centre
Hesse (D)
Midi-Pyrenées (F)
Balearic Is. (E)
Bavaria (D)
East Anglia (UK)
Aragon (E)
South West (UK)
Abruzzi (I)
Valencia (E)
Hovedstadsregionen (Dk) 
Lower Saxony (D) 
Baden-Württemberg (D) 
Navarre (E)
West Midlands (UK) 
Centre (F)
Rhône-Alpes (F)
Burgundy (F) 
Franche-Comté (F)
Marche (I)
Tuscany (I)
East of the Great Belt (Dk) 
Champagne-Ardenne (F) 
Rhineland-Palatinate (D) 
Umbria (I)
Galicia (E)
Centro (P)
Rioja (E)
Asturias (A)
112.34 0.48
109.54 0.51
109.16 1.08
108.81 0.60
106.85 1.00
105.03 0.75
104.71 0.80
104.24 0.66
100.38 0.47
100.36 0.41
100.07 0.61
100.01 0.69
98.90 0.75
98.27 0.53
98.22 0.40
97.99 0.70
97.26 0.57
96.99 0.61
96.85 0.52
96.37 0.70
95.68 0.46
93.51 0.88
92.22 0.61
91.56 0.56
88.52 1.09
87.96 0.51
87.44 0.68
85.25 1.10
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(Figure III.3). In both cases, initial labour activity rates are clearly above the European 
regional average. However the expansion of the labour market in this cluster during the 
1980s has been less evident that in intermediate dynamic regions. Activity rates, in general, 
and youth activity rates, in particular, experience below average growth levels.
The unemployment panorama in these areas at the beginning of the period was the 
most favourable of all clusters. Total and youth unemployment rates in 1980 were, in most 
cases, several points below the European average. The same happened with long term 
unemployment levels at the end of the decade. Regions included in this cluster thus had a 
large employed population.
Demographic dynamism is clearly the social factor which separates one cluster from 
the other. Whereas in the cluster of intermediate dynamic and other dynamic regions, there 
was no sign of an ageing of the population, high dependency rates and ageing have become 
the most significant features in the demographic panorama of regions within this cluster. 
Youth contingents were in 1990 below the European average, and the percentage of people 
of 65 and over was clearly above that of the rest of Western Europe. Moreover, youth 
population had stagnated during the 1980s, while the segment of elderly population registered 
a clear expansion; young cohorts are losing ground to older ones, and inverted demographic 
pyramids are increasingly becoming a common feature.
In addition, ageing in several of the regions included in this cluster, such as East 
Anglia, the South West of England, the Balearic Islands and Valencia is not only a 
consequence of natural demographic reasons (an unbalanced demographic structure, or very 
low regional fertility rates). It is, in fact, closely related to the capacity of these areas to 
attract pensioners and elderly population from other regions.
Regions in this cluster have experienced relatively moderate population increases; a 
result of inward migration during the 1980s. A large percentage of the demographic
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In term ediate  regions
Cluster contains 28 cases
Figure III.3. Descriptive statistics for cluster 3.
expansion is caused by the migration of elderly people, but also of young adults and 
professionals, who increasingly chose these areas either according to the quality of living 
standards and closeness to large urban areas, in the cases of East Anglia, the South West of 
England, and the East of the Great Belt; for their economic dynamism, as in Hesse, or
176
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Bavaria; or for the quality of the environment and job opportunities in an expanding tourist 
sector, as in the case of the Balearic Islands (vid. Map III.6).
Educational enrolment levels are slightly below the European average. There is a 
relative shortage of university students, with respect to both capital regions and urban 
financial centres, on the one hand, and intermediate dynamic regions, on the other. This 
implies that a certain percentage of the student population stemming from these regions 
enrols in universities of more developed areas.
III. 1.3.4.- Peripheral less dynamic and other less dynamic regions (Cluster 2).
The main common feature of the 19 regions included in this cluster is their scarce 
economic dynamism throughout the 1980s. Alongside with several peripheral less dynamic 
regions (Calabria and Sicily, in Italy. Alentejo and Azores in Portugal, and Andalusia, 
Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, in Spain), this group comprises industrial declining regions 
(WalIonia, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland, and Wales), four intermediate less dynamic 
regions located mainly in the Southern France (Poitou-Charentes, Limousin, Languedoc- 
Rousillon, and Provence-Alpes-Côte d ’Azur), and a few dynamic regions (Aquitaine, the 
Eastern Netherlands, Molise, and Murcia). Average growth is this cluster is 2.5 points below 
the European regional mean, but important internal differences are observed within the 
cluster (Table III. 10). Almost half of the regions display above average or average growth 
rates during the 1980s, whereas very low levels of growth characterize other regions like 
Wallonia, North Rhine-Westphalia, Provence-Alpes-Côte d ’Azur, and Alentejo. Nevertheless, 
growth rates in most regions encompassed in this cluster oscillate within the limits of ±5 
percentage points around the mean.
Global social conditions depict a fairly dissimilar panorama to the ones observed in 
the capital regions and urban financial centres cluster, and in the two intermediate regions 
clusters. These differences are observed in most social realms (Figure III.4).
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Table 111.10
Members of the Peripheral Less Dynamic and 
Other non Dynamic Regions Cluster (Cluster 2)
REGION Mean annual rate of Distance to
growth (Euri2 =  100) Cluster Centre
Murcia (E)
Aquitaine (F)
Eastern Netherlands (Nl) 
Extremadura (E)
Wales (UK)
Molise (I)
Limousin (F)
Poitou-Charentes (F)
Saarland (D)
Languedoc-Roussillon (F)
Sicily (I)
Andalusia (E)
Calabria (I)
Castile-La Mancha (E)
Wallonia (B)
North Rhine-Westphalia (D) 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (F) 
Alentejo (P)
Azores (P)
104.82 0.82
103.92 0.64
103.74 0.71
103.27 0.72
102.67 0.51
101.91 0.66
100.91 0.86
100.57 0.51
100.50 0.92
99.73 0.98
98.69 0.68
97.86 0.61
97.81 1.00
97.58 0.85
92.68 0.54
91.12 0.52
89.91 0.73
70.08 0.98
0.80
The labour market realm was characterized by very negative conditions at the 
beginning of the decade. Total and female activity rates were the lowest in all clusters (bar 
the undefined cluster of Corsica and Liguria), and the share of active population o f 25 and 
less was in these regions also among the lowest in Europe. Sharp increases in all groups of 
active population during the 1980s have not sufficed to fill in the gap.
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P eripheral less dynamic and o ther less dynamic regions 
Cluster contains 19 cases
Figure III .4 . Descriptive statistics for cluster 2.
Low levels of active population did not imply lower unemployment rates than in other 
European regions. Total and youth unemployment were not only high at the beginning of the 
period, but they have also remained well above the European average throughout the whole 
decade. Long term unemployment is also fairly high in comparison with other European 
areas. Low activity rates and high unemployment result in extremely weak employment 179
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levels. The share o f the total population engaged in productive activities is thus the lowest 
in all groups of regions.
The demographic realm shows a greater dynamism than the make-up of the labour 
market. High dependency ratios in 1990 are the consequence of above average relative rates 
of young and elderly population. There is, however, little sign of ageing in these regions. 
In the 1980s there has been a relative decrease in the share of the population of 65 and over 
with respect to the 1960s and 1970s. In the previous decade, outward migration by young 
adults had provoked imbalances in the age structure. Return migration and fertility rates 
among the highest in Europe during the 1980s have brought about a certain degree of 
rejuvenation of the age structure of the population. The youngest population cohorts have 
expanded, while there has been a relative reduction of the share of elderly population.
This natural demographic dynamism, together with return migration and increasing 
numbers of immigrants seeking milder all year round climates and better environmental 
conditions in certain regions in the cluster (Andalusia, Alentejo, Azores, Languedoc- 
Rousillon, Provence-Alpes-Côte d ’Azur, and, to a lesser extent, Sicily), are the reasons for 
the relatively high population growth in a period of demographic stagnation.
Educational enrolment levels are poor. Both secondary school and university 
enrolment rates are very low in comparison to those found in the capital regions and urban 
areas cluster, and even in some industrial declining regions. They resemble more closely 
those observed in intermediate regions.
III. 1.3.5.- Former core regions undergoing industrial decline and the Italian 
Mezzogiorno (Cluster 1).
Although, economically speaking, the former core regions undergoing industrial 
decline and the Italian Mezzogiorno share little in common aside from declining growth rates,
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their social structures are similar, when considered within their national context. Cluster 1 
contains 22 cases which include several of the mass production havens, such as Bremen, the 
Basque Country, Cantabria, Picardy, Upper Normandy, Lower Normandy, Nord-Pas de 
Calais, Lorraine, the Northern Netherlands, and the North and the North West of England, 
four out of the eight regions of the Italian Mezzogiomo6. Alongside with these two groups, 
we find isolated cases of regions belonging to other groups but sharing a similar social 
structure and moderate and low growth rates in recent years (Pays de la Loire, Brittany, and 
Northern Ireland), and a few well performing areas (the Canary Is., the Southern 
Netherlands, and the West of the Great Belt) (Table III. II).
The labour realm in this cluster is dominated by average total and female activity rates 
at the beginning of the period, and relatively low initial youth unemployment rates (Figure
III.5). Industrial and agricultural crises have prevented social groups from entering the labour 
market, and total, female and youth activity have suffered a steep decline. As a consequence, 
the labour market panorama is now gloomier than it was at the beginning of the 1980s. The 
percentage of female and youth active population at the beginning of the 1990s was, in most 
cases, among the lowest in the EC.
As a consequence of the aforementioned crises, the percentage of jobless reaches its 
peak in this cluster, with a strong incidence of problems like youth and long-term 
unemployment, which have remained consistently high since the beginning of the crisis of 
the model of mass production. Part-time work is at the European mean and has increased 
slightly above the average in the past decade.
The population structure o f these areas is dominated by the young and adult groups. 
The percentage of elderly population is still very low in the European context. This structure 
results in an above average demographic dependency ratio. Changes in population structure
6 The Italian Mezzogiomo traditionally includes the regions of Abruzzi, Calabria, Campania, 
Molise, Puglia, Sardinia, and Sicily.
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Table III. 11
Members of the Former Core Regions Undergoing Industrial Decline 
and the Italian Mezzogiorno Cluster (Cluster 3)
REGION Mean annual rate of 
growth (Euri 2 =  100)
Distance to 
Cluster Centre
Canary Is. (E) 120.02 0.87
Southern Netherlands (NI) 118.50 0.79
Campania (I) 104.78 0.96
West of the Great Belt (Dk) 102.90 0.49
Bremen (D) 102.65 0.89
Puglia (1) 100.62 0.66
Sardinia (I) 100.48 0.84
Pays de la Loire (F) 99.33 0.51
Northern Ireland (UK) 99.00 1.30
Brittany (F) 98.50 0.70
Lower Normandy (F) 98.05 0.91
North (UK) 94.12 0.81
North West (UK) 93.74 0.69
Basilicata (I) 91.97 0.71
Upper Normandy (F) 91.49 0.64
Basque Country (E) 90.83 0.76
Nord-Pas de Calais (F) 87.80 0.61
Cantabria (E) 85.65 0.76 ,
Picardy (F) 82.81 0.55
Lorraine (F) 81.74 0.80
Northern Netherlands (Nl) 64.67 0.85
Madeira (P) 0.75
during the 1980s have been favourable to these regions. Youth population has grown above 
average, and the problem of ageing is still relatively modest, primarily in the Italian 
Mezzogiomo, the area of the Western Europe which -despite the decline in fertility in recent 
years- shows, together with the Republic of Ireland, less signs of a demographic crisis.
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1.2
Industria l declining regions and th e  Italian  Mezzogiorno 
Cluster contains 22 cases
Figure III.5. Descriptive statistics for cluster 1.
However, this favourable demographic structure might become an additional burden in times 
of recession. Youngsters trying to enter the labour market find no other outlet than to become 
unemployed or to migrate to neighbouring zones. Migration rates during the 1980s, although 
moderate in absolute numbers, reach the highest levels in the regions included in this cluster. 
As a consequence, population growth -in spite of a very favourable age structure and 183
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relatively high fertility and birth rates- is slightly below the European average. Outward 
migration from these areas is mainly two directional: on the one hand, an outflow of labour 
towards intermediate and, to a lesser extent, capital regions and, on the other, students 
enroling in universities in capital regions.
The outflow of college students towards central areas is clearly exemplified by the 
situation o f the educational sector. The extremely high levels o f secondary school enrolment 
in these regions are not matched by equal numbers of university students. This reflects the 
scarcity and lack of appeal of local universities in contrast with other educational centres 
located in central and even some intermediate regions. University students from regions 
undergoing industrial decline and the Mezzogiomo find an outlet in other universities. Or, 
what is even worse, well prepared secondary school and university graduates, finding no jobs 
in the former Fordist havens and in the Mezzogiomo, decide to begin their working life in 
other areas. Hence, many regions in this cluster bear the costs of a large segment of the 
education o f the individuals and obtain almost no returns in productive activity. This fact is 
curtailing local capabilities of growth in the long-run.
In brief, former Fordist core areas and the Mezzogiomo display negative social 
conditions in all fields, with the exception of demographic structure. Under these 
circumstances growth potential is weakened both on the medium and long-run, and, 
therefore, average growth rates in the regions included in this cluster during the 1980s are 
well below the mean of the EU.
III.1 .3.6.- The undefined cluster: Corsica and Liguria (Cluster 6).
Extreme social conditions in Corsica and Liguria with respect to the European 
context, isolate these two areas from all other regions included in the analysis.
The social bases o f regional growth
Table III.12
Members of Corsica and Liguria Cluster (Cluster 6)
REGION Mean annual rate of Distance to 
growth (Eurl2 =  100) Cluster Centre
Liguria (I) 
Corsica (F)
99.00
80.62
0.86
0.86
Low growth levels in these two regions during the 1980s and early 1990s are 
associated with unfavourable circumstances in almost all social Fields (Table III. 12). The 
start-up situation in terms of labour activity was characterized by extremely low rates of total 
and female active population, which greatly contrasted with high youth activity. Rapid 
relative growth of total, female and, to a lesser extent, youth active population has 
nevertheless been insufficient to Fill in the activity gap, which separates these two regions 
from regions included in the other clusters (Figure III.6).
In contrast to what was observed in cluster 2, initial low rates of active population 
were not paralleled by similar high unemployment levels. Total and youth unemployment in 
1980 ranked amongst the lowest in Europe, although the evolution of unemployment during 
the 1980s in both regions was divergent: low growth in Liguria, and high in Corsica.
From a demographic point of view, these two regions are affected by a deep process 
of ageing. Not only the share of population of 15 and less is the lowest in all clusters, but 
also the percentage of the elderly population is clearly above that found in any other cluster. 
During the last decade the process of ageing has been aggravated by a marked decline in the 
share of young population and an considerable increase of the elderly. The ageing of the 
population, together with declining fertility and birth rates has contributed to a significant
185
The socio-political bases of regional growth
Corsica and L iguria 
Cluster contains 2 cases
3,5 j----1---1— ----- 1----1---- 1---- 1---- 1---- 1---- 1---- 1---- 1---- «-----1
Figure III.6 . Descriptive statistics for cluster 6.
relative loss of population with respect to other European regions. Positive balances in 
migration, provoked mainly by pensioners attracted by the appeal o f some of the tourist 
resoits in these regions as ideal centres to spend their old age, has not sufficed to curb this 
declining trend.
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Educational enrolment and attainment conditions portray a similarly adverse picture. 
Secondary school and university enrolment levels are well below the European average, a 
factor which in the medium and long run represents a shortage of qualified human resources 
with respect to neighbouring regions.
III.1.4.- TH E LINK BETWEEN SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND ECONOMIC 
GROW TH.
The preceding cluster analysis has revealed a strong connection between sets of social 
conditions and economic growth trends in different areas of the EC. Generally speaking and 
in spite of significant exceptions, regions with similar growth rates since the beginning of the 
process of socio-economic restructuring tend to share a similar social make-up. This fact 
serves to confirm the hypothesis of the important connection between sets of social conditions 
and economic growth.
But, as was mentioned in Chapter I, not all social factors have an equal correlation 
with growth, and more importantly, the time influence of social factors on growth differs 
greatly. It is logical to think that the association between labour market conditions and 
unemployment levels will be revealed in a shoner span of time than that of demographic 
circumstances or educational attainment. The link between labour market structure and 
growth thus could be noticed in the early medium-term. How the labour market in a given 
area reacts to changes and adapts to new situations may result in higher or lower rates of 
growth within a few years.
The relationship between educational attainment and growth comes next. Investment 
in education, greater school enrolment, and the reinforcement of the skills and capacities of 
the population would only imply returns in terms of growth on a medium-run basis. Training 
present and future workers is a task which will only result in enhanced productivity, and thus 
in greater growth when the acquired skills can be usefully applied in the labour market. And 187
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this might happen, in the best case, within a year time, but the whole process of education, 
entering the labour market, and application of skills might be prolonged for several years or 
even decades.
Finally, the association between demographic structure and growth levels can only be 
unveiled on the long medium and long-terms. Changes in the age structure of population only 
have noticeable effects on the economy from one generation to the other.
If the association of different social factors with growth rates is not homogenous in 
time, and the analysis described above was conditioned by the lack of long series of regional 
data, which of the groups of social variables is more responsible for the formation of regional 
social clusters which relate to growth levels?
In the way it is structured, the foregoing analysis denotes a significant association 
between certain sets of social conditions and growth during the 1980s. However, it provides 
little information on the nature of the relationship between the groups of social factors 
included in the analysis (activity rates, unemployment, demography, population change, and 
educational enrolment) and growth, or how social conditions influence growth. Nevertheless, 
the analysis of variance confirms that certain sets of social factors have a greater sway in the 
formation of clusters. In first place, the structure of the labour market (activity rates and 
unemployment rates) has the greatest influence in the formation of clusters. Education and 
the urban structure occupy the second spot. The influence of the demographic structure and 
population change is less evident in this time scale. F values confirm this relation and the 
theoretical construction outlined above (Table III. 13). F values concerning the structure of 
the labour market are, in general, slightly higher than in variables regarding demographic 
structure, educational enrolment rates or population change. In turn, F values of educational 
enrolment are higher than those of demographic structure, and these exceed those of 
population change.
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Table III .13
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
crossprd
Variable
Between
SS df
Within
SS df F
signi f. 
P
ACTTOT83 44.155 5 41.946 91 19.158 .0000
ACTFEM83 40.187 5 46.270 91 15.807 .0000
ACTYOU83 22.909 5 63.090 91 6.608 .0000
AACTTOT 33.911 5 47.372 91 13.028 .0000
AACTFEM 36.343 5 52.836 91 12.518 .0000
AACTYOU 21.456 5 68.799 91 5.676 .0001
UNEMPL80 44.926 5 43.658 91 18.728 .0000
UNEYOU80 34.630 5 54.025 91 11.666 .0000
UNEMLT90 31.429 5 52.395 91 10.917 .0000
POPYOU90 28.843 5 58.001 91 9.050 .0000
POPELD90 27.566 5 60.952 91 8.231 .0000
DEPRAT90 29.326 5 56.139 91 9.507 .0000
APOPYOU 32.694 5 53.367 91 11.149 .0000
APOPELD 18.012 5 70.647 91 4.640 .0008
ADEPRAT 26.576 5 61.326 91 7.887 .0000
DENSIT90 42.551 5 43.953 91 17.619 .0000
APOP 6.065 5 79.131 91 1.395 .2335
MIGRAT 11.832 5 71.740 91 3.001 .0148
EDUSEC90 30.726 5 56.079 91 9.971 .0000
EDUUNI90 30.853 5 55.499 91 10.117 .0000
CIUDPOBL 47.413 5 41.374 91 20.856 .0000
This implies that, for relatively short periods of time such as the one we are 
analyzing, the social bases of economic growth have to be searched for mainly in the 
interplay between labour market conditions and educational attainment. The influence of the 
demographic structure and its changes is perceived on a longer time scale, whereas the 
relationship between population change and economic growth is relatively limited7 in the *189
7 With the exception of the percentage of youth and elderly population.
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short and early medium terms. In the following pages, I will try to determine more in detail, 
using a linear regression analysis (to the extent to which existing data allows), what is the 
connections between two of the aforementioned factors (labour market structure and 
conditions, and educational attainment) and regional growth during the 1980s.
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111.2. - LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS AND GROWTH.
One o f the most significant features highlighted in the cluster analysis is the 
uncommon relationship between labour activity and labour activity growth, on the one hand, 
and economic growth, on the other. In the light of the results of the cluster analysis, it 
becomes difficult to associate activity and changes in activity with growth performance, 
despite the fact that F values concede activity indicators a prominent significance in the 
formation of clusters. Capital and urban regions grow fast in the European context, in spite 
of moderate levels of activity growth. Industrial declining regions and the Italian 
Mezzogiomo exhibit low activity rates and below average economic growth. Intermediate 
regions fare better in terms of labour activity, but this fact is not translated into higher 
growth rates than in capital areas. Therefore, this evidence suggests that job creation in a 
period of high unemployment and restricted inlets into the labour market represent different 
things in core and in declining areas. Consequently, only an in depth analysis o f the labour 
market and its sectoral structure -and mainly of the evolution of the tertiary sector, since 
employment in agriculture and traditional industry is undergoing a deep crisis- is likely to 
shed some light on the complex question of the relationship between job creation and 
economic growth.
111.2. L - CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE LABOUR M ARKET AND 
GROW TH.
Several recent theories have embraced the idea that sectoral change linked to the 
process of socio-economic restructuring has brought the service sector to the fore as the 
motor of growth and that, in the light of the recession of job creation in the primary and 
secondary economies, newly performing economies are those distinguished by an expanding 
service sector. Many authors have claimed that, in recent years, the service sector is playing 
a much more active and dynamic role, and becoming, thus, the main basis for economic
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growth (Riddle, 1986; Ochel and Wegner, 1987; Nusbaumer, 1987a and 1987b; Grubel and 
Walker, 1989; Marshall and Wood, 1992),
However, even if it is true that the service sector has experienced the greatest 
expansion in terms of employment growth and is, thus, the main catalyst for increases in 
activity during the 1980s, this expansion -where is has been achieved- has not been 
parallelled by similar rates of economic growth (Rodriguez-Pose, 1994). Therefore, a more 
sceptical attitude towards the role played by the service sector in economic growth, in 
particular, and by shifts in economic activity, in general, should be adopted.
A possible explanation of the lack of association between the growth in employment 
in the service sector and economic growth in economically advanced societies, can be found 
in the following argument: even if there is a clear relationship between a certain type of 
advanced services (e.g. services to industries, financial and real estate services, services of 
credit and insurance institutions) and increases in productivity, territorially speaking, these 
highly performing subsectors are the exception and not the rule. They have mainly made 
progress in key capital and financial areas: the South East of England, lie de France, Hesse, 
Hamburg, Brussels, Madrid or the Lazio, most of them located in the cluster of capital 
regions and urban financial centres. These are regions which in the early stages of the 
transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial society, already enjoyed an advanced 
service sector (Maps III.8 and III.9). Nevertheless, it is precisely in these areas where the 
lowest job creation in the service sector has been achieved during the last decade. In all o f 
them the employment in services has grown below the European average. In the area of 
Copenhagen, the Western Netherlands, the South East of England, and Brussels the annual 
rate of growth of employment in services is not in excess of 0.5%. In the cases o f Hesse, 
Hamburg, Madrid or the lie de France, the limit is placed at 1 %. Only Lazio and the region 
around Lisbon exceed this barrier, since they are both placed in national settings of high 
growth of the participation of the tertiary sector in employment. Other fast growing regions 
like East Anglia, the South West of England, the West of the Great Belt, and the Southern
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and Eastern Netherlands register very low levels of employment growth in the service sector 
(Map III. 10).
Table IIL14
Regional Employment Rates in the 
Service Sector in 1980
Lowest rates Highest rates
Region % Région %
Central Portugal (P) 27,07 Brussels (B) 83,02
Alentejo (P) 29,26 Hovedstadsregionen (Dk) 75,65
North o f Portugal (P) 29,46 Ceuta y Melilla (E) 75,00
Galicia (E) 33,86 Hamburg (D) 70,27
Rioja (E) 35,87 South East (UK) 70,08
Castile-La Mancha (E) 38,83 Western Netherlands (NI) 69,46
Asturias (E) 38,96 île de France (F) 68,54
Castile and Leon (E) 40,33 Lazio (I) 67,15
Cantabria (E) 41,40 Berlin (D) 66,93
Basilicata (I) 41,51 Provence-Alpes-Côte d ’Azur (F) 66,20
Source: Interna! based on EUROSTAT data.
Regions with an advanced service sector are, indeed, a minority. The highest job 
creation in services has been attained in areas which had a relatively modest tertiary sector 
at the beginning of the restructuring process, and mainly in the traditional agricultural regions 
of the Italian Mezzogiorno, Central (with the exception of Madrid) and Western Spain, most 
Portuguese regions (and especially in Alentejo) and Western France. In the vast majority of 
these areas the tertiary sector employed in 1980 less than 45% of the active population and 
amounted (with the exceptions of Sicily, Calabria or Brittany) to less than 55% of the total 
gross value added or the region (Table 111.14).
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The tertiary sector has also experienced a significant expansion in traditional Fordist 
industrial regions, such as Yorkshire and Humberside, Nord-Pas de Calais, or Asturias. Even 
in national settings characterized by a low annual increase of the degree of employment 
provided by the service sector (such as the German and Belgian context), regions 
experiencing the greatest enlargement of the service sector are precisely the industrial 
strongholds o f North Rhine-Westphaiia, the Saar region, Lower Saxony and Wallonia.
Consequently, there is a negative association between growth of employment in the 
service sector and economic growth during the post-Fordist era. The present tertiarization 
of the socio-economic environment in stagnating industrial and peripheral areas, therefore, 
does not imply either a significant increase in productivity, or economic growth. In recent 
years there has been a significant growth of employment in the public sector and especially 
in full- and part-time public sector oriented employment in day care and other related 
activities, not only in countries with a long tradition of welfarism, such as Denmark, but also 
in countries like Spain (Cuadrado Roura and Del Rio, 1993).
The rising precariousness in the labour market does not only affect the service sector, 
but is expanding to the whole economy. This phenomenon is characterized by a considerable 
incidence of non-wage labour in total employment and disguised employment in Italy (Bettio 
and Villa, 1989), the rise of non-standard forms of employment in Germany (Buchtemann 
and Quack, 1989), significant increases of temporary, self and clandestine employment in 
France (Caire, 1989); and by the increase in homeworking, self-employment and the black 
economy in the United Kingdom (Rubery, 1989).
III.2 .2 .- M ARKET-ORIENTED VERSUS NON-MARKET-ORIENTED SERVICE 
SECTOR: TH E SOCIAL BASES OF ECONOMIC ‘TERTIARIZATION’.
Two hypothesis have been suggested in the previous section as possible explanations 
of the meagre sway of the development of the ‘service economy’ on economic growth:
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a) the rise of a different ‘service economy’ in peripheral less dynamic and in former 
mass production areas, where precarious services predominate, in contrast to the 
advanced tertiary sector of capital regions and urban financial centres, and of a few
intermediate areas;
b) the expansion in lagging regions of employment in the service sector, as a practice 
to counter the unemployment problems created by the crises in the industrial and 
agricultural sectors.
In order to test these hypotheses, we must resort to an analysis in detail of the service 
sector and its relationship to other activity indicators and growth. The division between 
market-oriented and non-market-oriented services allows us to establish a clear cut separation 
between two types of labour activity linked with different social phenomena. Whereas the 
expansion of market services depends mainly on the economic cycle and on the availability 
of labour, public services are more related to socio-political conditions and are, thus, more 
inflexible to change and fluctuations in the economic cycle. The services which have 
experienced the greatest expansion, in economic terms, during the flexibilization of mass 
production (finance, services to industry, real estate, communication, and credit and 
insurance services) are included in the first category. We also find in this group some low 
productivity services, concentrated around the recovery and repair, wholesales and retail 
service sectors.
Non-market services -mainly those related to public administration- have long relied 
on national and local socio-political conditions and decision-making and, therefore, economic 
globalization and the establishment of socio-economic networks as such has had little 
influence on altering job creation trends in this field.
Traditionally market-oriented services represented -and in most areas still represent- 
a larger share of the socio-economic structure than the public sector. In the EC in 1980,
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market services employed twice as much workers as public sectors, and their value added 
was three times higher than that of non-market-oriented services. As a consequence, the 
average productivity of market services was about 50% higher than that of the non-market- 
oriented sector.
Economic growth, consequently, depends more on the circumstances and 
transformations in market-oriented services than in public services. The following table 
highlights the existence of statistically significant correlations between the conditions in gross 
value added and employment in the market oriented service sector in 1980 and economic 
growth rates. It also manifests a negative association between growth in employment and 
value added in the non-market-oriented sector and economic growth (Table III. 15).
From the table we can deduce that the regions which already had a strong market- 
oriented service sector at the beginning of the process of socio-economic restructuring have 
experienced the greatest growth rates during the last decade. The association of the subsector 
with growth is stronger in the case of the share of GVA than in the case of employment. 
These statement is confirmed by regressing growth rates during the 1980s on the share of 
GVA held by market-oriented services in 1980s (Table III. 16).
The main conclusion to be taken from this type of analysis is that growth has been 
mainly concentrated in areas which already enjoyed a dynamic and well-endowed service 
sector in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These were mainly urban areas, and thus it could 
be stated that the process of socio-economic restructuring and the flexiblization of the 
economy, far from provoking the crises in urban zones -which, in theory, were associated 
with the uprooting of industries from central locations and their transferral to other areas-
8 Although the low R3 implies that the variation of the independent variable explains only 32.61 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable -what, at first sight, might seem a very low 
percentage-, we must not forget that the results of the F tests are significant and that the regression 
is run with 93 degrees of freedom. Such a high number of degrees of freedom causes a sharp fall in 
the R2 statistic, and therefore the F test alone can be considered as a good indicator of the goodness 
of fit.
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Table III.15
Correlation Coefficients between Economic Growth and 
the Evolution of the Service Sector
Growth
Employment in the market-oriented sector (1 9 8 0 ) ...................................  . . . .  0,43
Employment in the non-market oriented sec. (1980) ............................................  0,25
Changes in employment in the market-oriented services (1 9 8 0 -8 9 )..................  -0,03
Changes in employment in the non market-oriented services (1980-89) ...............-0,29
Share of GVA in market-oriented sector (1980) .....................................................  0,61
Share of GVA in non-market oriented sector (1980) ............................................  0,11
Changes in the share of GVA of market oriented services (1980-89)..................  0,06
Changes in the share of GVA of non market-oriented services (1980-89) . . . .  -0,30
Source: Internal using the EUROSTAT Database.
has in fact fostered the development of urban spaces, especially large metropoles. As Kràtke 
argues, it could be said that the urban polarisation of growth trends has been the major 
consequence of the current phase of social transformation (1991, 272). New development 
poles appear mainly in urban areas which had already developed a strong market-oriented 
service sector at the beginning of the process of socio-economic restructuring. Thus, the ideal 
type socio-economic example of a post-Fordist growth pole is made up of an urban region, 
dominated by a strong metropolis, and with developed financial and real estate markets. 
These areas also feature a strong link between services and modem and decentralized 
industries integrated into world economic circuits. The concentration of political power is 
another requisite; capital regions in each country have tended to grow well above their
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Table III.16
Regional Growth Rates (1980-91) Regressed on the Share of GVA
of the Market Oriented Service Sector in 1980
Variable ß
St. Err. 
of ß B
St. Err.
of B t(93) p-level
GVAMA80 .571 .085 .612 .091 6.709 .000
R: = 32.61
adjusted R: =31.89 
F ( 1.93)=45.01
respective national mean, regardless of the pre-existence of a well structured and modem 
industrial fabric or of a very dynamic tertiary sector. Finally, these areas have witnessed in 
recent years a significant accumulation of capital and profound transformations in their social 
structure, associated with improvements in the educational and training levels of their human 
resources and the attraction of qualified personnel from neighbouring zones (Noyelle, 1987; 
Ochel and Wegner, 1987; Ileris, 1989). Capital regions in the EU and a few other financial 
centres like Frankfurt or Hamburg fulfil all these conditions, and, thus, constitute the post- 
Ford ist development hubs par excellence.
III.2.3,- CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC AND IN THE PRIVATE SERVICE SECTOR 
AND ECONOMIC GROW TH.
Although, as we have seen, initial conditions in the market-oriented service sector had 
a stronger connection with growth rates than start-up conditions in the public service sector, 
the influence of both sectors is reversed when changes in both subsectors during the 1980s 
are considered.
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At first sight, a greater relationship between transformations in market-oriented 
services and economic growth could be expected on the short term, since this subsector is 
more closely linked to global socio-economic restructuring than public services. However, 
the correlation coefficient between changes in employment and in the share o f GVA of 
market-oriented services and growth is not statistically significant {vid. Table III. 15).
On the contrary, the negative association between the expansion in the public service 
sector and economic growth is fairly strong. This could imply that either employment 
creation in administration and a growth of the share of the public sector in GVA have tended 
to slow down economic growth in the 1980s, or that public sector employment expansion is 
a response to low growth.
The main expansion of employment in public administration has taken place in 
peripheral regions of Portugal and Spain. In Spain, employment in the public sector increases 
by more than 2% annually in all regions (but for Madrid and Navarre). Growth in Spanish 
public employment is closely related to the devolution of powers to regions and to the 
creation o f sizable regional administrations, especially in regions enjoying the greatest level 
of political autonomy like Catalonia, Galicia, the Basque Country, or Andalusia, and in other 
areas undergoing strong agricultural and industrial crises such as Castile and León or 
Asturias. In Portugal, the expansion of public employment is related to low levels of 
employment in the sector in 1980.
In France, employment growth in the public sector is mainly concentrated on former 
mass production regions of the Parisian periphery. Partly, the expansion of the public sector 
responds to similar circumstances as in the Spanish case: during the 1980s the Socialist 
government has given way to a moderate regionalization process, which has entailed the 
creation of new administrative bodies at the regional level, However, the bulk of the 
expansion o f employment in the public sector has occurred precisely in the regions 
undergoing strong industrial decline. Rhône-Alpes, Pays de la Loire and Alsace are the only
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three French industrial regions where growth of employment in the public sector can be 
considered as relatively moderate. On the other side of the scale, four of the peak French 
industrial regions in 1980 (Franche-Comté, Nord-Pas de Calais, Picardy, and Upper 
Normandy) attain the highest levels in employment growth (Map III. 11).
Employment in public administration thus becomes an outlet in declining areas. 
Furthermore, the fact that patterns of annual increase in public employment adapt to the 
national borders of countries governed by Socialist parties, implies that these governments 
have resorted rationally to public expenditure and public employment as a weapon to fight 
high unemployment, albeit at the risk of engendering a swollen tertiary sector. However, in 
most cases, this effort has not been accompanied by high growth rates. In France, for 
example, high growth is achieved in intermediate regions like Aquitaine or Midi-Pyrénées 
which saw a relatively low expansion of public services. In Spain, high growth occurs also 
in regions with a low development of the public sector (Madrid and Murcia), as well as in 
those with high increases in the sector (Catalonia or the Balearic Islands).
In the light of the results, it might be considered that Italy has been spared from the 
conception of employment in the public service sector as a security valve. Italy witnesses a 
relatively moderate expansion of the public sector (aside from Umbria, Basilicata, Puglia and 
Sicily). Nevertheless, the phenomenon observed in the cases of France, Portugal, and Spain 
is reproduced when the whole service sector -and not just the public sector- is contemplated. 
Growth of employment in services reaches its peak in regions bearing high unemployment 
rates and is associated with low levels of economic growth. In depressed areas, is similar to 
the one operating in France or Spain, with the distinctive feature that the growth of 
employment in the tertiary sector is concentrated in small retail services. This might be due 
to the existence of a traditionally swollen public sector, especially in the South. However, 
in the Italian case, the growth of employment in the small retail service sector is also closely 
connected to administrative decision making in order to prevent social unrest, since licenses
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to open tobacconists and a large number of small shops, depend on administrative approval 
(Trigilia, 1992b).
In sum, it could be stated that the expansion of the service sector is far from being 
the panacea for regional growth. Socio-economic restructuring has brought a model of service 
development dominated by the enlargement of precarious services which has had little 
influence on economic growth. Multiple regression analyses with sectoral indicators 
representing sectoral employment and gross value added come to reinforce this idea. After 
conducting several preliminary regressions with all sectoral variables and t-tests and a joint 
F test on the redundant variables, an empirical model was accepted at 95 percent level of 
significance. Three variables are included in the model, which adopts the following form:
y = a + G V AM A80x+ AEMPNMx+ AEMPINDx+e (1)
where:
- y equals the mean annual rate of regional growth between 1980 and 1989.
- GVAMA80 denotes the share of market-oriented services in the total GVA of the 
region in 1980.
- AEMPNM denotes the mean annual growth of employment in non-market-oriented 
services, between 1980 and 1990.
- AEMPIND denotes the mean annual growth of employment in the secondary sector 
between 1980 and 1990.
The results of the regression are reproduced in the following table (Table III. 17):
The model discloses the existence of opposite tendencies in labour growth in the 
industrial and public service sectors. Whereas a strong market-oriented service sector at the 
beginning of the decade and increases -or, as is more likely with the global situation in 
Europe, modest declines- in employment in the secondary sector are positively associated 205
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Table 111.17
Annual Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Independent 
Variables of the Empirical Model
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable ß of ß B of B t(75) p-level
GVAMA80 .637 .086 .750 .101 7.430 .000
AEMPNM -.281 .084 -1.057 .316 -3.349 .001
AEMPIND .177 .086 4.678 2.264 2.065 .042
R: =47.32 
adjusted R: =45.21 
F (3,75>=22.45
with economic growth, the expansion of employment in the non market oriented service 
sector during the 1980s is negatively connected to growth rates. The results, thus, 
corroborate the idea of the public service sector as a shield against social unrest in declining 
areas. Governments have resorted to job creation in non-market-oriented sectors as a means 
to temper severe crises in former mass production and agricultural areas.
Conversely, in a period identified with a strong contraction of industrial jobs, the 
creation of jobs in industry is associated with high rates of growth. And, geographically 
speaking, the expansion of industrial employment has occurred outside the traditional Fordist 
havens in intermediate regions with little industrial traditions. This is the case of Molise in 
Italy, the Canary Islands, Aragon, Extremadura, and Navarre in Spain, the West and the East 
of the Great Belt in Denmark, or East Anglia in the United Kingdom. In capital areas and 
financial centres, the destruction o f industrial employment has outstripped job creation in the 
field.
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Similar results are obtained when variables reflecting inherited labour market 
conditions and unemployment levels as well as their respective changes throughout the 1980s 
are included in the analysis9. The performance of /-tests and a joint F  test on the redundant 
variables gave an empirical model, accepted at 95 percent level of significance. The model 
is depicted in the following equation:
y = a + G V AM A80x+ AEMPNMx+ ACTTOT80x+ AACTFEMx+ UNEYOU80x+ e (2)
where y, GVAMA80, and AEMPNM represent the same variables as in the previous model 
and:
- ACTTOT80 denotes the active population rate in 1980.
- AACTFEM represents the mean annual growth rate of female activity between 1980
and 1990.
- UNEYOU80 denotes the youth unemployment rate (<  than 25) in 1980.
Table III. 18 reports the outcomes of the regression of the mean annual regional 
growth rates on the five variables included in the model. According to the model, initial 
gross value added in the market oriented service sector and increases in employment in the 
institutional service sector still have, respectively, a positive and negative sway on regional 
growth rates during the period of socio-economic restructuring. The other three variables 
depicting the initial labour market conditions and their change all have a positive connection 
with economic growth.
The labour market conditions more closely related to high growth in the EU during 
the 1980s, revolve around the need to involve as large a social spectrum as possible in the 
economic activity. This identification of society with economy is achieved thanks to the
9 All the indicators reflecting labour market initial conditions and change used in this regression 
analysis were already employed in the cluster analysis.
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Table III.18
Annua] Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Independent 
Variables of the Empirical Model
Variable ß
St. Err. 
of ß B
St. Err. 
of B t(67) p-level
AEMPNM -.339 .091 -1.107 .298 -3.710 .000
GVAMA80 .589 .086 .649 .095 6.833 .000
ACTTOT80 .487 .135 .748 .208 3.605 .000
AACTFEM .414 .115 .655 .182 3.590 .001
UNEYOU80 .271 .110 .153 .062 2.460 .016
R: =51.77 
adjusted R: =48.18 
F (5,67) =  14.39
presence of high initial levels of active population. It is also facilitated through the 
progressive incorporation of women into the labour market.
On the one hand, the rapid integration of women in the economic structure during the 
1980s positively associated with growth in the areas in which this process has been achieved 
with the greatest success: some southern and eastern regions of the Iberian peninsula, the 
eastern part of the Netherlands, and certain regions in southern England (the South West, or 
East Anglia). In other areas, the incorporation of women has served more to cushion the 
relative decline of the region as a consequence of structural crises. This has been the case 
in the Länder o f North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate or the Saar region in 
Germany. Moreover, there is a close connection between increases in female employment 
and regional growth in France. The few French regions where the activity o f women has not 
decreased during the 1980s (Languedoc-Rousillon, Auvergne, or Poitou-Charentes) have
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experienced growth rates above those for the rest of the country. On the other hand, the 
areas which have witnessed the greatest reductions in women’s participation in the labour 
market during the 1980s, have endured the lowest growth rates. These regions are the ones 
that had been the centre of the mass-production industry in France (Nord-Pas de Calais, 
Picardy, Lorraine and Champagne-Ardennes). Also in Great Britain there is a close tie 
between the increase of female activity during the 1980s and regional growth. East Anglia, 
Wales and the South West of England are the regions where the levels of incorporation of 
women into the labour market are at their highest.
Finally, the positive correlation between initial activity rates and regional growth, 
corroborates the evidence that the larger the participation of social agents in the economy, 
the greater the chances of spurring growth. Regions with high levels of initial activity tend 
to grow above the European average. These include most capital regions and Financial centres 
and large number of intermediate dynamic regions such as Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, 
Alsace, East Anglia, the South West of England, or -in national contexts of low activity- 
Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands, or Veneto, Lombardy, and Emilia-Romagna. 
On the contrary, most of the regions with a low percentage of total activity at the beginning 
of the 1980s also tended to have high levels of unemployment, and experienced low levels 
of growth. Combinations of these factors are observed in regions such as Basilicata, 
Campania, Sicily, Andalusia, Cantabria, Extremadura, or the Basque Country.
Hence, the ‘tertiarization’ of the socio-economic structure and the divorce between 
the social and economic spheres in European regions emerge as two of the main factors 
which are closely related with the birth of a dependent economy with a low dynamic 
potential. It is dependent because, in order to survive, it must rely on economic transfers 
from national or Community funds, in order to foster ‘social’ employment which, in turn, 
helps to avoid social unrest to the detriment of economic growth. It is immobile or little 
dynamic because the existence of a dependent economy over a long period o f time ultimately
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entails the creation of vicious circles that restrict -and can eventually destroy- entrepreneurial 
activity in large zones (Banti, 1989, p. 85).
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III.3.- EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE POST- 
FORDIST ERA.
The cluster analysis showed a fairly meaningful connection between education and 
regional growth rates. However, this argument was based on only two partial indicators and 
which in no way referred to the level of educational achievement. Lack of educational data 
at a regional level in the European Community precludes almost any kind o f cross-national 
analysis in order to check the influence of educational attainment on regional growth. 
Therefore we must resort to a national case study in order to verify what is the type of 
relationship established between regional growth and education. In the following pages such 
a study will be conducted for Spain, where rich regional databases on education are available.
III.3.1.- EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SPAIN.
It has been generally accepted that the educational system contributes to the general 
and specific training of every individual in order to insert each person in society generally, 
and the labour market, in particular. Consequently, the educational system fulfils the role of 
providing individuals knowledge, abilities and capacities which will be translated into 
productive activities once each individual enters the labour market. Education supplies skills 
which "must be considered the most vital components which are built into every innovation 
as a new combination" (Elam, 1993, p. 34). Furthermore, educational attainment constitutes 
one of the generally accepted criteria for measuring the capacity of any candidate for a 
certain post and, hence, select the best person for each job. The educational system thus 
becomes the main vehicle for the diffusion of knowledge which, once applied in the labour 
market, will enable significant increases in productivity, spur technological renovation, and 
optimize the use of resources. In this sense, educational attainment could be considered as 
an economically dynamizing factor, which fosters growth.
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16000
Educational attainment in 1991
(Measured in years of schooling)
Figure III.7. Relationship between educational attainment and GDP per head in Spanish regions.
Based on these arguments, the human capital school has tried to determine the 
relationship between educational attainment and growth. From this point of view, the greater 
the educational level of the population of any space, the greater the possibilities of achieving 
high economic growth. In the Spanish context, this hypothesis seems to be confirmed by 
empirical data. Figure III.7 demonstrates the existence of a substantial positive association
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between the average educational level of the population (measured by the number of years 
spent in education) and GDP per capita. Almost all Spanish regions are located within the 
ellipse representing the normal distribution around the linear function. The Balearic Islands 
are the only exception. This region ranks second in per capita income, despite the low level 
of educational attainment of its population.
The poorest regions (Extremadura, Andalusia, Galicia, the Canary Islands, Castile-La 
Mancha, Murcia, and Valencia) are precisely those with the lowest educational level. Several 
lagging regions have levels of per capita income below the educational attainment of their 
inhabitants. Extremadura, Andalusia, the Canary Islands, and, above all, the Northern 
regions of Castile and León, Asturias and Cantabria belong to this group. On the contrary, 
Castile-La Mancha, Murcia and Valencia, enjoy income levels above their educational 
potential. In general, the richest Spanish regions belong to the group whose income per capita 
is higher than their educational level. This is the case of the Balearic Islands, Catalonia. 
Navarre, Madrid and Aragón. Rioja and the Basque Country are the only advanced regions 
lying close to the function line.
When the Figure III.7 is divided into four sections, taking the Spanish average in the 
number of years of schooling and the average GDP per capita, the deficiencies of the 
economically lagging regions in educational attainment become more evident. 7 out of the 
10 poorest Spanish regions are included in section A of the graph, and thus, are characterised 
by substantial shortages in terms of educational attainment of their inhabitants with respect 
to the Spanish average. The educational level of the four poorest Spanish regions 
(Extremadura, Andalusia, Galicia and Castile-La Mancha) is the lowest in Spain. Murcia, 
despite the fact of enjoying a relatively high level of GDP per capita, also stands out for the 
low educational attainment of its population. Valencia and the Canary Islands -two of the 
regions with highest level of economic growth throughout the 1980s-, even not reaching the 
Spanish average, are far better off than the rest of the Spanish lagging regions. 213
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In section B, we find those regions that despite the fact of having population cohorts 
with higher educational levels than the Spanish average, have not been capable of translating 
this relative advantage into higher growth levels. This groups includes most regions in 
Northwestern Spain, with the exception of Galicia.
The Spanish Autonomous Communities with the highest per capita income levels are 
all -with the exception of the Balearic Islands- in section C of the graph; the section which 
depicts levels of GDP per capita and educational attainments above the Spanish average.
The high association between education and regional economic development is 
sanctioned by the strong positive correlation between regional GDP per capita and other 
indicators of the educational level such as the percentage of adults with a university degree, 
the educational attainment (measured in years of education) of the working population, and 
the percentage of university graduates in the working population. On the contrary a strong 
negative correlation between GDP per capita and illiteracy rates is observed (Table III. 19).
Table 111,19
Correlation Coefficients between GDP per Capita (1990) 
and Some Educational Indicators (1991)
GDP per capita - Mean educational level of the population ...........................  0,71
GDP per capita - % of university graduates   0,75
GDP per capita - Mean educational level of the working population . . . .  0,76
GDP per capita - % of university graduates in the working population . . . .  0,70
GDP per capita - illiteracy rates ......................................................................... -0,64
2 1 4
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However, the sheer existence of statistically meaningful correlations between income 
and indicators of the educational level does not yet clarify the nature of the relationship 
between education and growth. Firstly, we cannot state whether this relationship is univocal 
or reciprocal, and in the case of the former, if high educational levels trigger economic 
growth or vice versa. Secondly, since the influence of education on growth is not produced 
immediately, but on the medium and long-run, any association between contemporary' 
variables in both Fields can only be indicative and not causal. And finally, educated 
individuals are not immobile: growing areas are likely to exert a considerable attraction on 
educated people living in lagging zones.
In order to resolve these problems, we must resort to comparing present development 
levels with past educational attainment. Figure III.8 represents the percentage of population 
of 16 and over with a secondary degree in 1980 in the X axis, and GDP per capita ten years 
later, in the Y axis.
Here again there is a strong level of association between educational attainment and 
GDP per capita. The Balearic Islands and Madrid are the only regions outside the normal 
distribution ellipse. The rest of the pattern is similar to the one described before. In the 
regions included in Section A (Extremadura, Castile-La Mancha, Galicia, Andalusia and 
Murcia), low educational attainment in 1980 has become a serious handicap for economic 
growth.
The Canary Islands and Cantabria -both placed in section B- represent those regions 
that, in spite of having a higher educational basis than the Spanish average have not been 
able to translate this relative advantage into high levels of income. Nevertheless, growth rates 
in both regions during the 1980s diverge completely. On the one hand, Cantabria has plunged 
into a deep depression, while the Canary Islands have experienced the highest growth rate 
in the whole of the Community.
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Figure III.8. Relationship between educational attainment in 1981 and regional GDP in 1990,
The causal relationship between educational attainment and growth is corroborated 
when regressing the latter between 1980 and 1990 on the former in 1980. The model adopts 
the following form:
Growth of GDP 1980-90 = a +  educational attainment in 1980 +  e (3)
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We reach the following results (Table III.20):
Table II I .2 0
Average Annual Regional Growth (1980-90) 
Regressed on Educational 
Attainment of the Adult Population in 1980
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable ß o f ß B o fB  t(16) p-level
EDUCATT .739 .168 326.69 74.437 4.388 . 004
R: =54.62 
adjusted R: =51.79 
F (1 ,16) = 19.26
These results indicate that the regional percentage of adult population having 
completed secondary or university education in 1980 has a strong explanatory value 
concerning the territorial distribution of economic growth during the 1980s.
As a consequence, it could be stated that, in the Spanish case, low levels of schooling 
and low educational attainment of the active population constitute a severe handicap for 
regional growth. This handicap is strongest in those regions where the educational shortage 
is manifest, and less important as the level of educational attainment rises.
In sum, education, of course, cannot be considered as the only factor (or even as the 
fundamental factor) determining growth, however, it can be stated that in Spain, deficiencies
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in educational attainment of the population in general, and of the active population in 
particular, narrow the possibilities of economic growth.
III.3.2.- INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION AND ECONOM IC GROW TH IN SPAIN.
As we have seen, in Spain, the lack of qualified human resources deters economic 
growth of any given region. However, does investment in education suffice to improve the 
capacity of economic growth to the same extent as progress in other fields such as technology 
and the accumulation of capital?
The answer to this question is not simple. In contrast to the visibility of the 
correlation between investment in technology or in infrastructure and economic growth, 
investment in human capital tends to be considered as a risky bet in terms of fostering 
growth. There is no clearly established linear relationship between educational attainment and 
economic growth. This fact and the propensity of highly qualified and skilled personnel from 
lagging to migrate to prosperous areas in search of better job opportunities -the famous ‘brain 
drain’- has often been given as a justification to disregard the educational level of local 
human resources as one of the main constituents of economic growth.
However, in the Spanish case, there is certain evidence which contradicts these 
arguments, at least in the short and medium term. If migration patterns in the last three 
decades are analyzed, we observe that, whereas in the period 1961-70 -the high point of the 
‘rural exodus’- all lagging Spanish regions had strongly negative migration rates, in the 1980s 
there is a clear inversion of this process. Firstly, there is a neat reduction in absolute 
migration and a greater balance between inward and outward migration. Secondly, only the 
Northern regions o f Galicia and Asturias, as well as the Northern African enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla (for obvious political reasons) have slightly negative migration rates. In the rest 
of Spain inward migration exceeds outward migration. This phenomenon can be partly
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explained as a result of ‘return’ migration of Spaniards from other countries o f the EU, as 
a consequence of increasing unemployment in receiving areas (Table III.21)
Table III.2 1
Migration Rates in Spanish Lagging Regions
Region Migration rate
1961-70 1981-91
Andalusia -146,4 5,8
Asturias -30,4 -1,3
Canary Islands -48,2 12,4
Cantabria -28,7 3,6
Castile-La Mancha -234,2 5,8
Castile and León -167,7 1,7
Valencia 166,0 4,8
Extremadura -271,4 18,1
Galicia -93,7 -7,8
Murcia -129,6 4,0
Ceuta and Melilla - -34,4
Source: ÏNE
The present conditions of the labour market do not favour radical changes in 
migration rates. The greater mobility of highly qualified and skilled labour only happens 
when there are receiving areas capable of offering employment and high wages. However, 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s central areas in Spain have been more severely hit by 
unemployment than lagging regions. The average educational attainment level (measured in 
years of schooling) of the unemployed population in central regions in 1991, was 1.1 years 
higher that of the unemployed in peripheral regions (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1994), 
and therefore, unemployed population in lagging regions is disadvantaged with respect to the
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mass of autochthonous unemployed when looking for a job in central areas. As a 
consequence, it is highly unlikely that under the present labour market conditions there will 
be a flow of skilled population from lagging towards central areas. Excess of skilled labour 
in central regions, together with factors such as lower cost and better quality of living in 
certain lagging areas are reversing the traditional flow of qualified labour. It is therefore 
more probable that either there will be a deepening of the process of migratory stagnation, 
or we will witness flows of skilled population from central zones towards peripheral regions 
(Cuadrado Roura and Del Rio, 1993).
III.3.2.1.- Educational attainm ent and growth in Spanish lagging regions.
In the last fifteen years there has been a significant closing in the educational gap 
between Spain and the rest of the EU. A great leap in secondary school enrolment has been 
achieved from the starting levels of 29.6% in 1975 to 85.7% in 1991. These improvements 
in secondary and university education have resulted in a meaningful increase in the level of 
education of the Spanish population, as depicted in Table III.22, where the educational 
attainment of Spanish adults is compared in 1981, 1986 and 1991.
While the illiterate adult population or the percentage of adults without primary 
studies remain more or less stable, the most significant reduction is observed in the group 
of population with only primary studies, which fell by 15.2% in a decade. On the contrary, 
the percentage o f adult population with secondary studies almost doubled. There is also an 
important advance in the percentage of the population with a university degree.
Nevertheless, this significant breakthrough in educational attainment did not suffice 
to fill the gap between central and peripheral regions in Spain. As we have already seen, the 
shortage o f qualified and skilled labour is one of the main causes of the lower capacity to 
grow of peripheral regions in Spain. Among the ten poorest regions, only Cantabria, Asturias 
and Castile and Leon exceed the national average in terms of years of schooling of the
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Table III.22
Spanish Adult Population (16 and Older) 
According to the Level of Educational Achievem ent
Illiterates and Pop. with Pop. with Pop. with Total
population without primary secondary university
primary studies education education education
1981 22.9 53.2 18.8 5.1 100
1986 21.1 45.8 26.7 6.4 100
1991 21.4 38.0 32.8 7.8 100
Source: Population Census.
population. Extremadura, Castile-La Mancha, Murcia, Andalusia, and Galicia, in contrast, 
display levels well below the Spanish average. Among the central Spanish regions, only the 
Balearic Islands are placed below the national mean, whereas in Navarre, the Basque Country 
and Madrid, the average school enrolment of the population is more than one year higher 
than the Spanish average (Table III.23).
This core-periphery structure in terms of education is reproduced when the illiteracy 
rate is taken into account. Once again Cantabria, Asturias, and Castile and León are the only 
lagging regions to have illiteracy rates well below the Spanish average. In Cantabria the 
percentage o f illiterates is even the lowest in Spain. On the contrary, the illiteracy rate is 
very high in all other lagging regions, and specially in Extremadura, Ceuta and Melilla, 
Andalusia, and Castile-La Mancha (Table III.23).
More important in terms o f the capacity to grow of peripheral regions in Spain, is the 
enrolment rate in secondary education. Whereas in all central regions, with the exception of
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the Balearic Islands and Catalonia, almost 100% of the population in the age group between 
14 and 18 is at school, in peripheral regions such a circumstance is only observed -once 
again- in Asturias, Cantabria, and Castile and León. Ceuta and Melilla, Extremadura, 
Castile-La Mancha, as well as the Canary islands and Andalusia are characterised by low 
enrolment rates.
Within secondary education, the greatest differences between central and peripheral 
regions are detected in enrolment in vocational training. Traditionally vocational training in 
Spain has been looked down upon as the Cinderella of secondary education, and consequently 
as a shelter for less talented teenagers. However, recent data shows that students who follow 
this branch of the secondary education find jobs more easily than secondary school graduates. 
This is mainly due to the fact that vocational training is furnishing experts in fields where 
there was a traditional shortage in the Spanish labour market: technical personnel and skilled 
labour. There are strong deficits in vocational training in numerous lagging regions like 
Asturias, Extremadura, Galicia, Valencia and Ceuta and Melilla. Andalusia, the Canary 
Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha and Murcia fluctuate around the Spanish average 
(Table III.23).
Clear disparities are also evident among central and peripheral regions when 
university education is analyzed. Cantabria and Castile and León are the only two regions 
with levels of GDP per capita below the Spanish average, which have an above average 
percentage of adults with university degrees. This contrasts with central regions, which all 
have -with the exception of the Balearic Islands- a higher percentage of university graduates 
than the national average. The shortage of university graduates is especially evident in 
Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura (Table III.23).
The lack o f university graduates in lagging Spanish regions is being countered by the 
creation of new Universities. Since 1979 ten Universities have been created in peripheral 
areas. This measure has contributed to the reduction o f the gap between lagging and
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Table III.23
Main Regional Educational Indicators
EDAT ILRA SCEN VTEN UNDE UNEN TECH UNTR
Spain 6.51 3.91 85.7 35.7 7.7 33.0 0.23 34.8
Peripheral regions
Andalusia 5.76 5.93 77.3 39.1 5.9 25.3 0.21 33.0
Asturias 6.93 0.99 101.9 34.4 7.3 39.7 0.19 31.9
Canary Is. 6.37 4.54 71.3 41.0 7.1 26.8 0.20 33.1
Cantabria 7.26 0.68 98.3 39.6 8.5 31.4 0.37 25.9
Castile and Leon 6.84 1.24 96.7 34.3 8.0 39.7 0.20 30.8
Castile-La Mancha 5.44 5.76 69.1 36.6 5.2 23.5 0.36 36.8
Extremadura 5.36 6.30 68.8 31.8 5.4 24.0 0.28 34.1
Galicia 5.96 3.01 85.5 33.5 6.0 30.5 0.21 34.9
Murcia 5.69 4.43 81.7 40.8 6.1 24.4 0.09 31.8
Valencia 6.21 3.09 80.1 35.4 6.2 28.1 0.23 36.7
Cerna and Melilla - 6.01 67.2 30.6 - 33.8 - 34.4
C entral regions
Aragón 6.70 1.61 99.6 37.6 8.5 41.3 0.23 42.7
Balearic Is. 6.26 2.77 76.3 33.1 6.8 20.6 - 37.1
Basque Country 7.64 1.28 102.2 39.6 10.0 39.7 0.20 29.3
Catalonia 6.75 2.27 88.0 41.6 8.1 33.0 0.30 37.3
Madrid 7.56 1.99 100.7 45.0 12.1 50.0 0.33 36.6
Navarre 7.67 0.96 95.0 26.6 11.0 36.7 0.52 33.6
Rioja 7.20 1.06 99.6 37.5 9.8 34.5 - 43.7
ED AT - Educational attainment of the population in 1991 (measured in years of schooling)
ILRA • Illiteracy rate of adult population in 1991.
SCEN - Secondary school enrolment rate in the academic year 1990-1991.
VTEN - Percentage of students in vocational training with respect to students in secondary education. 
UNDE - Percentage of the population with University degrees in 1991.
UNEN - University enrolment rate (1991).
TECH - Ratio of students in technical careers with respect to those in humanities and social sciences 
(1988-89).
UNTR - Percentage of unemployed following training courses (1991).
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advanced areas in terms of university enrolment. Nevertheless -as shown in Table III.24- 
many of these new universities lack the budget and the qualified personnel to become 
effective in contributing to fill up the knowledge gap between the centre and the periphery. 
On the contrary, some of the newly created universities in central regions -and mainly in 
Catalonia and Madrid- have been conceived and designed as elite research centres, and 
therefore, have greater budgets than new universities in peripheral areas.
III.3 .2 .2 .- The relationship between educational supply and the labour m arket in 
peripheral regions.
Together with the shortage of qualified and skilled labour, there is another important 
educational factor which thwarts an adequate transformation of knowledge and the skills of 
local human resources into growth producing activities in peripheral regions: the imbalance 
between educational supply and the demands of the labour market. Training in lagging 
Spanish regions has always been -and still is- excessively oriented towards theoretical fields 
and humanities, both at the secondary and university levels.
Figures III.9 and III. 10 report the educational attainment of employed and 
unemployed population -measured in years of schooling- in all Spanish regions, in 1988 and
1991. In numerous regions the educational attainment of the unemployed population is higher 
than that of the employed population. This factor is partly explained by resorting to the age 
structure of the unemployed. The highest levels of unemployment are found among the 
youngest cohorts o f the active population, precisely the group which has mostly benefited 
from the diffusion of education to large sectors of the Spanish population. However, this 
structural fact does not hide the existence of significant imbalances between the educational 
and training offer and the labour market demand which affects all Spanish regions, but 
mainly those peripheral regions in North Western Spain -Asturias, Cantabria, Castile and 
León, and Galicia- which have had to face the greatest economic stagnation during the 1980s 
and early 1990s.
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Table III.2 4
M ean Annual Cost per Student in  Universities 
Founded Since 1979
New Universities Annual budget per student
in 1992 (in pts.)
La Coruña’ 239473
Alicante* 251000
Vigo* 284060
Girona 310000
La Rioja 359210
Castilla-La Mancha* 383990
Cádiz’ 387790
Tarragona 422823
Carlos III de Madrid 444833
León* 459818
Las Palmas* 481099
Jaume I de Castellón* 488253
LLeida 498750
Pública de Navarra 508800
Pompeu Fabra de Barcelona 1659000
M ean of all Spanish Universities 373579
Universities created in lagging regions.
Source: Consejo de Universidades.
The origin of this imbalance lies in the theoretical nature of most education provided 
in these regions, both at the secondary and university levels. As mentioned before, vocational 
training is often rejected as being considered a second class road to educational attainment, 
and university enrolment is mainly directed towards humanities and law. Among the ten 
lagging Spanish regions only Extremadura, Castile-La Mancha and Cantabria have ratios of
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Figure III .9 . Educational attainment o f working and unemployed population in 1988.
students in technical careers with respect to those in humanities and social sciences which 
exceed the Spanish average (Figure III. 11). Technical schools, faculties, careers and, 
therefore students, are fundamentally concentrated in Madrid, Catalonia and Navarre. 
Andalusia, Asturias, the Canary Islands, Castile and León, Galicia, and, above all, Murcia, 
are the regions with the highest deficit of technical careers. Hence, students from lagging 
regions aspiring to become engineers are often forced to migrate to Madrid or Catalonia. And 
the risk o f no return to their places of origin is, thus, very high.
One must add to these factors, the lack of possibilities o f completing and 
complementing theoretical education with on-the-job training in companies and enterprises. 
The whole system of combining theoretical training in universities or in vocational training 
centres, with on-the-job practices in companies is scarcely developed everywhere in Spain, 
but the offer of this type of complementary training is considerably higher in central regions - 
mainly in Madrid and Catalonia- and in tourist areas -the Balearic and the Canary Islands-,
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Figure III.10. Educational attainment of working and unemployed populations in 1991. 
that in the rest of Spain.
In short, lagging Spanish regions all have strong deficiencies in the educational 
attainment o f their population, which highly limit the genesis of an internal economic 
dynamism, the attraction of foreign capital and the transformation of knowledge into 
productive activities. These regions could be divided into three groups with respect to the 
problems which affect the education of their human resources:
a) Regions with serious shortages in all educational fields: These regions stand out 
by the poor levels of qualification of their human resources in all educational fields -low 
school enrolment rates, high illiteracy rates, and lower educational level of the active 
population-. All these factors constitute a serious handicap for the development of 
economically productive activities. Shortages in skilled labour and qualified personnel, 
despite low salaries with respect to the rest of Spain circumscribe the possibility of installing
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production plants and companies which are increasingly dependent on flexible and highly 
adaptable labour in order to face changes in the demand and to remain competitive. 
Furthermore, lack o f educational and training skills, together with no or little entrepreneurial
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tradition thwart most possibilities of endogenous development. Regions included in this 
category are Andalusia, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, and Galicia.
b) Regions with educational attainment levels around the Spanish average, but with 
strong imbalances between educational offer and labour market demand: Low educational 
attainment in Asturias, Cantabria, and Castile and León is not as much a problem, as the 
imbalance between the orientation of secondary and university education and the demand of 
the labour market. Secondary school graduates with no specific technical training, and an 
excess of university students in humanities and law careers make up armies of future 
unemployed with little possibilities of entering the labour market in the fields for which they 
have been trained.
c) Regions which combine low educational attainment and imbalances between 
educational offer and labour market demand: The Canary Islands, Murcia, Murcia and 
Valencia are regions which are slightly better off than the regions included in the first group, 
but which share the same problems in lack of technical trainees and skilled labour as the 
regions in the second group.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICAL BASES OF REGIONAL GROWTH
The socio-politica l bases o f  regional grow th ...
rv .l.- DOES POLITICS MATTER TO GROWTH?
Measuring the relationship between politics and political conditions, and economic 
growth is a chronic problem. The question of how political outcomes and political structures 
might influence economic growth -and vice versa- has attracted social scientists for several 
decades. From the analyses of political participation of Verba and Nie (1972) and Alford and 
Friedland (1974 and 1975), to Olson’s studies of interests groups (1982), the interrelationship 
between politics and growth has been object of constant attention, both for political scientists 
and economists. In recent years, political scientists and sociologists have been increasingly 
concerned with the intertwining of political phenomena and economic conditions. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, numerous studies have been devoted to the influence of the 
political orientation of parties in office, trade union membership, welfare state size, 
government spending and processes of supranational integration on growth trends (Garrett 
and Lange, 1986; Lange and Garrett, 1987; Lane and Ersonn, 1987; Castles and Dowrick, 
1990). Institutions and institutional change have also attracted considerable attention. Works 
by Williamson (1985 and 1993), North (1990,1991, and 1992), and Frey (1993) have greatly 
contributed to increase our understanding of the complex interrelationship between 
institutions, institutional change and economic growth.
Economists, as well, have begun to direct their attention to other fields of social 
science in their quest for the sources of economic growth. There has been a renewal of 
interest in the impact on growth of politics and policy; for instance, endogenous growth 
economists are starting to include policy implementation (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin, 1992a; Rebelo, 1991; Pack, 1994) and political indicators (Barro, 1990; Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1991 and 1993; Edwards and Tabellini, 1991; Alesina and Perotti, 1993) as 
independent variables in their economic growth models.
Researchers working on party systems have not been an exception. According to the 
two-party models developed by Hibbs (1975) and Tufte (1978) for the United States, the
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existence of a left-right alterative leads to the application of different macroeconomic policies 
depending on the orientation of the party in office. Theoretically, right-wing and liberal 
options put more effort in controlling inflation to the detriment of unemployment, whereas 
left-wing parties prefer to pursue lower unemployment levels above curbing inflation1.
The basic idea behind this hypothesis is that constant patterns of voting in favour of 
a certain political option (which is then translated into the formation of stable majorities) will 
give parties in office a greater chance to put their policies in motion. On the contrary, the 
propensity to changes in the executive is associated with political uncertainty and thus 
influences the implementation of long-term economic policies (Alesina and Perotti, 1993, p. 
3). As Hibbs points out for the American case, there are partisan-based differences in 
economic priorities. Democratic administrations typically aim for more ambitious 
unemployment and real output targets than do Republican administrations. Consequently, 
"unemployment and output (relative to natural, benchmark levels) tend to cycle across 
partisan regimes" (Hibbs, 1987a, pp. 278). Cycles in partisan control of the presidency in 
the US and cycles in unemployment and inflation outcomes seem thus to be intimately 
connected (Hibbs, 1987a, pp. 279). And in his analysis of macroeconomic policies pursued 
by left- and right-wing governments in twelve Western countries he concludes that these 
policies "are broadly in accordance with the objective economic interests and subjective 
preferences of their class-defined core political constituencies" (1987b, p. 291). Hence from 
this point o f view, it could be stated -at least for the American case- that politics matters to
1 From this point o f  v iew , i f  we consider, as Nordhaus (1975) and M cRae (1977) do, the 
elector to be an irrational voter the influence o f  vote on the macroeconomic p o lic ies pursued by 
political parties can be regarded as either negligible, or as strongly determined by luck. Parties w ill 
try to convince the irrational voter with the electoral promises they regard as most successful during 
the electoral campaign in order to obtain the highest possible electoral results, and then apply 
whatever policy they consider m ost useful -or closest to their interests- when in office. On the 
contrary, if  the elector is perceived as a rational voter by parties (Meltzer, 1986; R ogoff and Sibert, 
1987; R ogoff, 1987; Alesina, 1988), well informed about the political programmes o f  the parties 
competing at the elections and about the policies they will implement when in o ffice , vote and the 
com position o f  parliaments become key issues for the implementation o f  policies the voter considers 
will improve his or her wealth and welfare.
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growth. V. .
However, even if we admit that the political orientation of the party in office has a 
fundamental influence on macroeconomic policy, and that right-wing parties prefer the 
control o f inflation, while left-wing parties tend to favour policies aimed at keeping 
unemployment low, the relationship between politics in general, and vote in particular, with 
growth remains unclear. And it remains unclear because evidence in recent years 
demonstrates that the neat left-right divide in the implementation of macroeconomic policies 
is no longer manifest. Firstly, because (due to the greater globalization o f the economy and 
to the problems of pursuing one nation economic solutions) governments across Europe have 
tended to apply fairly similar economic policies in terms of unemployment and inflation, 
regardless of their ideological orientation. In a period of greater economic interdependence 
there seems to be little room for clear cut partisan economic policies. Global markets and 
global competition are greatly limiting the capacity of governments to implement their own 
autonomous policies if they want their countries to remain competitive.
Polity and politics have thus not been spared by socio-economic restructuring, and the 
transformation in voting behaviours is blurring what was considered to be a direct line 
between the ideological choice of the electorate and the macroeconomic policies applied by 
governments (Frankie, Mackie and Valen, 1992). In recent years, voting patterns have 
become more and more unpredictable, electoral politics are becoming increasingly volatile 
and new parties disrupting the traditional party structure have risen to the fore since the early 
1970s. These changes have affected policies adopted by national and regional governments. 
Contrasts between left and right-wing policies are thus less and less evident. Furthermore, 
in the last two decades swift institutional changes have swept across Europe. Greater political 
integration at the European level has been parallelled by regionalization processes in several 
European countries. Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have faced significant 
territorial and administrative changes which have converted highly centralized states into 
federal, regional or ‘regionalized* states.
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Moreover, it is highly disputable that the left-right divide on which the models were 
inspired, is reproduced at the European level. As van Kersbergen points out (1992), the 
social bent of Christian Democratic parties in Western Continental Europe leads them to 
implement socially oriented policies which differ less from those applied by Social 
Democratic parties, than those of the Republican party in the United States or the 
Conservative party in the United Kingdom.
And finally, there is no long-term evidence to support that either inflation curbing, 
or unemployment policies provoke high or low growth. In fact, the results of left and right- 
wing policies on economic growth largely depend on the historical circumstances. High 
growth has been achieved both with more socially oriented, as well as with socially 
restrictive policies. In contrast, the same socially-oriented policies that were once successful 
in spurring growth, failed to encourage economic activity under different circumstances. In 
a similar way, restrictive policies have been successful under certain conditions in determined 
areas and unsuccessful under different conditions in other areas. Therefore, it is almost 
impossible to establish a direct link between politics and economic growth. Voting patterns, 
parliamentary majorities, majority or coalitions governments may lead to the implementation 
of diverse economic policies. However, diverse economic policies do not clearly lead to 
different economic outcomes (Nordhaus, 1975; McRae, 1977; Mancha, 1993).
IV. 1,1.- Does regional politics matter to regional growth?
If the association of national politics with national growth levels is, at least, difficult 
to determine, what can we say about the interrelationship between regional politics and 
regional growth?
Despite the fact that the substantial drift towards regionalization and power devolution 
to meso levels of government can be considered as perhaps the most significant institutional 
change that Western Europe has witnessed in the last three decades, the political power and 235
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the relevance of regions as units in cross-sectional political analysis is still far below that of 
the nation-state. The development and, in some cases, the completion of devolution processes 
of diverse range and scope, in Italy, Belgium, Spain, France, and Portugal has attracted 
many researchers to the field of the study of regionalism. However, the great majority of 
studies on this phenomenon has been limited to traditional subjects in sociology, political 
science and law. Aspects such as regional identity and regionalism, the assignment of 
administrative competences and financial resources, the changes in social and cultural 
structures and even :ne democratic impulse of devolution have been thoroughly scrutinized. 
On the contrary, researchers have been somewhat wary of examining the economic 
implications of the devolution of power to the regions. As Zimmermann points out, the 
specific role of public institutions and public finance has hardly been directly dealt with on 
a cross-sectional basis, and then only indirectly included via the analysis of publicly provided 
goods, such as infrastructure (1990). In most cases, the economic effect of regionalization 
processes and of regional politics is just mentioned in passing. For instance, Mény (1982, 
pp. 18-19) acknowledges that regionalization processes in Spain and Italy were conceived as 
a means to foster economic growth in advanced regions, and to fight underdevelopment in 
lagging ones. Moreover, in the book The Rise o f Meso Government in Europe (Ed. Sharpe, 
1993), most contributors deal with the issue of the impact of regionalization on growth trends 
only tangentially. Economists dealing with regional growth have also been reluctant to follow 
the path of the association between regional politics and growth trends.
Several reasons might be behind this reluctance to tackle the economic implications 
of politics at a regional cross-sectional level. First o f all, lies the limited autonomy of 
regional administrations to fulfil their own independent economic policies. Secondly, lack of 
relevant cross-sectional data at a regional level is a severe handicap for comparative policy 
analysis at a regional level. And last but not least, the lack of a direct and linear relationship 
between politics and economic growth is magnified in the case o f regions.
Nevertheless, some interesting attempts to comprehend and analyze the connection
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between institutional decentralization and growth have been carried out in recent years. Some 
of these contributions are linked to the theory of subsidiarity, which asserts that a greater 
economic efficiency can be accomplished by means of granting political and economic 
competences to the most suitable administrative level. Bennett (1990) for example, studies, 
from a theoretical perspective, the role of different levels of territorial administrations and 
governments as actors in the genesis of economic growth. He reaches the conclusion that 
local government activism can be important in fostering development (1990, p. 241). 
Zimmermann (1990, pp. 254-263), in a comparative study of fiscal federalism and regional 
growth in Germany and the United States, argues that regional autonomy might have a 
detrimental effect on national growth, which is compensated for by benefits in terms of 
equity.
More specifically the links between political conditions and economic growth have 
developed in three discrete strands. Two of these strands have dealt with the question from 
a national and cross-sectional perspective, while the other has adopted a regional and case 
study approach. Interesting hypotheses in order to study the connection between politics and 
growth can be extracted from all three strands of literature.
The first strand is the endogenous growth literature, which was discussed extensively 
in the first chapter, and therefore will not be developed in the following pages.
The second approach to the relationship between politics and growth is the corporatist 
and neo-corporatist literature. Corporatist authors have used first cross-sectional regressions, 
and later pooled cross-sectional and pooled time-series methods, in order to untangle the 
influence of national political conditions on growth rates.
Finally, researchers working on the Italian industrial districts or on Baden- 
Württemberg have constantly highlighted the close association between political and 
institutional conditions and economic growth on a case study basis. According to these 237
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authors, factors such as the identification of the electorate with a party, the capacity of 
parties in office to favour the establishment of industrial networks and the ability of 
intermediate levels of government to set the adequate institutional framework, play a non 
negligible role in fostering production and thus economic growth.
However, and in spite of the rich literature on the association of politics and 
institutions with growth based on national-cross sections and on case studies, little has been 
published about the actual connection between regional politics, policies, and growth at a 
cross-sectional level. In light of this shortage of scientific literature, some questions arise. 
Is there any connection between regional politics and growth levels at the European level? 
Or is it just a place specific phenomenon, limited to industrial districts in Italy and other 
dynamic areas? And, if this association exists, is it robust? Do active and efficient regional 
governments contribute to generate greater growth than inefficient or passive ones? Or are 
regional politics fully unrelated to economic outcomes at a regional level? These are some 
of the questions which I will address in this chapter. Therefore, I will first review how the 
scientific literature has dealt with the relationship between politics and growth, in order to 
extract the main postulates which relate political conditions to economic growth. And then 
(following a similar logic to the one presented in the empirical analysis in the previous 
chapter), I will try to determine whether the main postulates of these strands of literature 
hold in the case of regions in Western Europe.
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IV .2 .- T H E  CORPORATIST APPRO ACH  TO P O L IT IC S AND  
G RO W TH .
The relationship between growth and economic outcomes has been one of the main 
focus of the literature on corporatism. Most authors working on the field coincide that in 
economies where "organized interests participate directly in the formulation of government 
policy" (Pontusson, 1991, p. 163), there seems to be an indirect but. nevertheless close, 
relationship between how the political interests are structured and how are they translated into 
political arrangements, and the orientation of economic and industrial policy, which, in mm, 
influences economic outcomes. Bruno and Sachs (1985), Lange and Garrett (1985 and 1987), 
Korpi (1985), Garrett and Lange (1986 and 1991), Calmfors and Drifill (1988), Freeman 
(1988) Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991), Castles and Dowrick (1990), and Castles (1994) 
have all highlighted this close relationship using different approaches to the question. Several 
factors constantly pop up in the analysis of the association between political organization and 
economic outcomes.
The power, structure and dimension of interest groups is frequently associated to 
economic policies and outputs. Following Olson’s (1982) hypothesis, it has been argued that 
the proliferation of non-encompassing interest groups is likely to slow down economic 
growth, whereas the presence of large encompassing interest groups has a positive effect on 
economic outcomes. Under these premises, the dimension and capacity to negotiate of trade 
unions has been the main target of this type of analysis. Extensive research has been carried 
out fundamentally on Scandinavian trade union movements, and on their capacity to 
participate in and influence on "corporate investment decisions through corporatist 
arrangements and, specifically, through its participation in the formulation of selective 
industrial policy measures’ (Pontusson, 1991, p. 163). It has been stated that "where unions 
are encompassing [...] the pursuit of welfarist policies by leftist governments is likely to 
generate voluntary labor restraint, which in turn should promote an environment conducive 
to capitalist investment. Furthermore, such restraint can also be expected to increase the
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efficacy of leftist policies designed to stimulate business investment that might otherwise have 
inflationary consequences; macroeconomic expansion and more targeted supply side 
measures" (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange, 1991, p. 542-543). Hence, encompassing trade 
unions and other large interests groups are regarded as capable o f pursuing "a collective gain 
strategy by reducing the attractiveness of organizational ‘free-riding’ in the form of 
organizational redistribution" (Lange and Garrett, 1985, p. 798). This collective gain strategy 
might ultimately lead to improved economic performance (Summers, Gruber, Vergara, 1991, 
p. 386).
Another factor underlined by the corporatist literature has been institutional sclerosis. 
It is argued that institutions in countries which have gone through long periods of stability, 
and have been able to avoid turmoil and upheaval, experience a certain tendency to languish 
and to become less performant than institutions in countries affected by recent periods of 
unrest. This is basically due to the fact that in the more stable countries non-encompassing 
interest groups have had more time and power to develop close ties with the administration 
which might ultimately lead to the adoption of measures which could ultimately restrain 
economic performance. This has been checked empirically by Lane and Ersonn who 
determine that institutional sclerosis is strongly associated with economic growth, particularly 
in large countries (1987, p. 13).
A third factor which has attracted significant attention is the orientation of political 
parties in office, either alone or in combination with the organization of labour. Lang and 
Garrett (1985 and 1987), Garrett and Lange (1986 and 1991), and Alvarez, Garrett and 
Lange (1991) have thoroughly analyzed the relationship between the political power of the 
left -and, to a lesser extent, that o f the right- and economic performance. They argue that 
governments in corporatist political economies "may be able to intervene in capital-labor 
interactions so as to transform what might otherwise be conflictual zero-sum or even 
negative-sum games into situations from which all societal actors may benefit" (Garrett and 
Lange, 1991, p. 545). Corporatist governments can thus "be expected to pursue active labor
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market policies that facilitate rapid and positive adjustment to changes in international market 
conditions by the work force" and to "intervene actively in the process of capital 
accumulation so as to promote productive investment in the national economy" (Garrett and 
Lange, 1991, p. 546). This can only be successfully accomplished in the presence of 
encompassing, densely and centrally organized trade unions (Lange and Garrett, 1985 and
1987). In the absence of strong labour organizations, leftist policies would have "deleterious 
macroeconomic consequences" (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange, 1991, p. 543), and only 
rightists policies might succeed. Hence, "countries with symmetrical or coherent political 
structures -in which labor was strong both organizationally and politically (corporatist cases), 
or in which labor was very weak on both dimensions (approximating market economies)- 
should have been able to adjust [...] better than the mixed cases in which the political 
economies were less coherent (politically strong and organizationally weak, or vice versa)" 
(Garrett and Lange, 1986, p. 531).
The amount and dimension of public expenditure and of taxation have also been 
thoroughly scrutinized. Public expenditure and taxation have often been regarded as the best 
way to measure the capacity of governments to generate public policy and to redistribute the 
national wealth across the population, contributing to greater equality. And "to the extent that 
it could be established that redistribution does not undermine, or, better still, actually 
promotes, economic activity, the traditional case for progressive reform, that redistribution, 
economic growth and efficiency can be considered as a set of mutually reinforcing positive- 
sum outcomes" (Castles and Dowrick, 1990, p. 174). Most authors working on corporatism 
tend to agree that public expenditure and taxation seem to have a positive effect on economic 
outputs, and that the analogy linking public expenditure to a leaky bucket does not hold in 
most cases2. However, it has been claimed that an exclusive focus on expenditure "distorts
2 Summers, Gruber and Vergara have, however, recently adopted a more cautious attitude with 
regard to the influence of taxation in economic outcomes. They argue that "while it is tempting to 
draw the inference from our results and some of Olson’s discussion that corporatism is in some sense 
good, because it reduces the cost of raising taxes, this would be premature without a firmer 
understanding of what lies behind differences in the extent of corporatism. Part of the logic of 
socialism was the idea that a wise government could internalize everything and so generate efficient
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our picture of reality because it diverts our attention away from the full range of means to 
a given policy objective and biases cross-national comparison in favour (or against - 
depending on our evaluation of public expenditure for a particular purpose) countries which 
utilise the expenditure instrument in preference to others" (Castles, 1994, p. 356).
In sum, corporatist literature has stressed that, under certain circumstances and 
particularly in corporatist societies, there is a significant association between the national 
political structure and conditions, and the economy. Most emphasis is put in economic 
outputs (policy issues and the policies adopted), than in economic outcomes (i.e.: economic 
performance), since the path between politics and economic performance meanders more than 
the one between politics and policy implementation. Nevertheless, in spite of the difference 
between economic outputs and outcomes* 3, it can be stated that the presence of encompassing 
labour unions, of left wing social-democratic governments, of high levels of governments 
expenditure and of progressive and highly redistributive taxation systems are frequently 
regarded as factors that are positively associated with economic results. And that despite the 
fact that the globalization of the economy has reduced the capacity of governments to 
implement their own autonomous policies, the influence of domestic political and 
organizational characteristics on the economy as a whole remains strong (Garrett and Lange, 
1986 and 1991). The outcomes of different cross-sectional regressions and pooled time-series 
analyses are fairly consistent in supporting this hypothesis.
However, the analysis on the relationship between corporatism and economic policies 
and performance has been fundamentally conducted on a national setting. Cross-sectional
economic outcomes. This has proved wrong, and should give pause about excessively benign views 
of negotiated alternatives to market resolutions" (1993, p. 407).
3 Putnam puts the emphasis on the idea that political analysis has been more concerned with 
economic outputs (specific intervention) than the outcomes (the ultimate results). That is, most 
attention has been centred on health and social security schemes, than on mortality rates, or on 
environmental policy than on the quality of the air and water, or on economic development 
programmes, rather than on growth rates. This attitude is a consequence of the enormous amount of 
factors which impinge on final results and which cannot be controlled (1993, pp. 76-77).
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analysis have generally included a set of advanced capitalist economies, with special attention 
focused on the Scandinavian countries. Almost no attention has been devoted to the impact 
of corporatism at a regional level, and to the association between organized interests, 
regional politics, governments and institutions and economic performance, a fact which might 
severely restrict the application of the corporatist and neo-corporatist postulates to the 
European regional context.
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IV.3.- THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS, POLICY AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE LITERATURE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RESTRUCTURING.
The strands of literature which have more rigorously dealt with the relationship 
between politics and economic performance at a regional level -although on a case study 
basis- have been the different theoretical approaches to the process of socio-economic 
restructuring and its spatial consequences. Researchers on the emergence o f the so-called 
‘new growth spaces* often highlight that the processes of socio-economic restructuring and 
structural change seem to have opened new opportunities for an increasing association 
between "the resurgence of specialized and self-contained regional economies and localized 
subsystems of governance and economic regulation that will replace the era of mass 
production and mass consumption" (Amin and Thrift, 1994, p. 7). The ‘thickening’ of 
institutions (Granovetter, 1985), the ‘thickening’ of the intertwining of industries and social 
institutions (Becattini, 1991), the existence of institutionally rich environments (Streeck, 
1991), or the increasing importance of ‘intermediate government’ of economic development 
at the regional level (Trigilia, 1991) and of ‘intermediate’ forms of governance (Amin and 
Thirft, 1995, p. 52) are features which constantly pop up in the literature on this new and 
successful regional economies in Western Europe. Institutionally rich areas are being 
increasingly regarded as competitive economies, in contrast to the traditional view that 
institutions profoundly interfered with the market. The German case is one of the basic 
examples of this new approach to politics, institutions and growth. As Matzner and Streeck 
point out, Germany is and has been "a political economy rich in ‘rigid’ non-market 
institutions such as strong trade unions, industry-wide collective bargaining, compulsory trade 
associations like Chambers of Commerce o r Chambers of Artisans, a heavily and centrally 
regulated vocational training system, strong employment protection, statutory participation 
o f  workers, etc [...] and Germany is one of the most competitive and prosperous modem 
economies" (1991, p. 10).
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From this perspective, explanations about the economic success stories of 
institutionally rich regional economies like Baden-Württemberg, the industrial districts in the 
Third Italy, Rhône-Alpes, or even (the less institutionalized) Western Jutland share in 
common the strong emphasis on the role played by 'intermediate' politics and policy in order 
to spur growth in these areas. Similarly, political and institutional arguments are increasingly 
being used in order to interpret why certain regions have been incapable of superseding 
traditional economic bottlenecks and have continued to lag behind in the European context. 
Lack of political autonomy, an excessive dependence on national funding and nationally 
designed policies, and the incapability of intermediate administrations to provide the adequate 
public goods and to generate endogenous economic activity, frequently pop up as 
explanations for the lack of dynamism of the lagging regions of the Italian Mezzogiomo or 
South Western Spain.
The following sections will review some of the scientific literature which has recently 
stressed the interaction between economic growth rates and politics, policies and institutions 
at the regional level. The first section will concentrate on the success stories: that is, those 
European regions where meso-Ievels of governance have been associated with other factors 
to foster growth. Special attention will be focused on the most successful regional cases, and 
mainly the region of Baden-Württemberg in Germany, and the industrials districts of the 
Terza Italia, and Denmark and Norway. The second section will review the causes of why 
long-term institutional and political interventions have not been successful in fostering 
economic growth in the lagging areas of the Italian Mezzogiomo and the Spanish Western 
and Southern fringes.
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ÏV .3.1.- THE ROLE O F POLITICS, GOVERNMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
‘NEW GROW TH SPACES’4.
The scientific literature on socio-economic restructuring has underscored that the shift 
from a mass production ‘Fordist’ structure, to a flexible production organization in the ‘post- 
Fordist' era, has not only been accompanied by substantial changes in the whole organization 
of society, but has also brought about new territorial patterns of economic development. As 
Harvey (1989), Leborgne and Lipietz (1992), Scott and Storper (1992) or Swyngendouw
(1992) point out, the globalization of the world economy, the changes in consumer demands, 
and the flexibilization of production seem to have granted enterprises in local areas a greater 
room of manoeuvre to set in motion their own production strategies. The blurring of national 
borders and the integration of the economies would have thus provoked enhanced competition 
between regions and cities, which up to now had been relatively protected from international 
competition by trade barriers. Under these new circumstances, local areas with the largest 
competitive advantages enjoy the best conditions to compete with neighbouring and far away 
regions. Factors such as human resources, entrepreneurship, the existence of a dynamic 
industrial and entrepreneurial fabric, as well as the political and institutional conditions and 
networks become important issues in determining the capacity o f any given area to adapt to 
the new circumstances and, thus, to attain high growth levels.
Regions enjoying the greatest comparative advantages under these conditions become 
the ‘new growth spaces’. In Europe, several of these ‘new growth spaces’ have concentrated 
the greatest attention in the last two decades. Much has been written about the economic 
miracles of the Terza Italia, Baden-Württemberg, and the Rhône-Alpes region. And despite 
the significant differences in the processes which have determined the recent development 
of these areas, several common features constantly pop up in the explanations of why these
41 use the term ‘new growth spaces’ to gather under one expression the economically successful 
phenomena such as the industrial districts, technologically based centres, the ‘diversified quality 
production* areas, and financial urban regions.
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‘new growth spaces’ are growing at a greater pace than neighbouring areas. The 
concentration o f widespread and articulated networks of small firms, often in the same sector 
or in related sectors, which via flexible specialization and subcontracting are capable of 
adapting to the new consumer demands; the combination of economies of scale with those 
of scope and with external economies; a high degree of innovation in the production 
structure; and a close association between economic activities and social conditions, are 
ingredients which are a constant reference when analyzing the economic success of these 
areas. But perhaps the most significant factor which delimits the formation of the ‘new 
growth spaces’ is the institutional factor. Institutions, local and regional governments and 
governance, and local organization are frequently pointed out as basic features which separate 
the post-Fordist growth spaces from other territories. As Sengenberger and Pyke stress in the 
case of the industrial districts "economic success [...] has come not so much through 
advantageous access to low cost factors of production -cheap labour, land or capital- as from 
particularly effective social and economic organisation based on small firm" (1992, p. 3). 
The basic characteristic of the ‘new growth spaces’ is that local small firms become 
integrated with business associations, trade unions, the local and regional government and 
other local actors in networks that contribute to a better use of local resources. Local 
community and government play, via the promotion of regionally and locally based agencies, 
a significant role in the formation of this organizational structure based on the small firm 
(Pyke and Sengenberger, 1991, pp. 17-18). The existence of systems of institutions among 
which we find the public administration, the local organization of political parties, trade 
unions and other public and private economic, political, cultural and religious bodies 
guarantee the functioning of the necessary organizational structure to foster economic growth 
(Becattini, 1991, p. 53).
Similarly, in areas where systems of ‘diversified quality production’ have been 
established, the institutional and political environments play a substantial part in the 
development of economic activity (Sorge and Streeck, 1988). As Streeck states, in spite of 
the drive towards de-regulation which became common in the last decade especially in the
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United States and the United Kingdom, rates of growth during the 1980s illustrate that 
"institutionally impoverished economies that rely solely on markets and hierarchies for the 
governance of economic activities do not necessarily perform better than societies where 
economic behaviour is more socially regulated" (1991, p. 23). Indeed "a repertory of social 
institutions that exceeds the neoclassical minimum may in specific conditions make a positive 
contribution to competitive market performance" and thus "strong non-market institutions that 
modify and partly suspend individual market rationality and unilateral managerial control [...] 
make for higher efficiency” (Streeck, 1991, p. 24).
In a world which seems to be affected by increasing economic competition among 
subnational spaces, neither private interests nor national administrations are any longer 
capable of supplying the needed collective goods at the local levels to insure the constant 
production of competitive economic output (Streeck, 1991). The creation of collective goods 
requires thus the intervention of intermediate institutions and regional organizations, since 
"it is not profitable for the individual actors concerned contribute to their production" 
(Trigilia, 1991, p. 314). Following Streeck, intermediate and regional institutions are in the 
best position to supply the three basic collective goods to insure the most efficient use of 
resources by local firms operating in the market (Streeck, 1991). First of all, there is a need 
to achieve a congenial organizational ecology, that is, the "institutional mechanisms that 
overcome the suspicion among competitors, insure firms against opportunistic defection of 
partners from implicit contractual understanding, and enable firms to invest not only in their 
own performance but also in that of other firms in their environment, thereby contributing 
to the collective good of a dense organisational ecology of potential strategic allies" (p. 35). 
Secondly, local and regional governments should provide for the necessary redundant 
capacities to insure the re-adaptation of local firms to the new and more competitive market 
conditions. Private interest alone is incapable of supplying the broad and high skills, the 
polyvalent organizational structure, the decentralized structure o f decision-making, and the 
social peace, which are needed in the market conditions in a post-Fordist environment 
(Streeck, 1991, pp. 39-42). The pursuit o f maximum profit strategies by firms in a more
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competitive world leads, in contrast, to an impoverishment of the skills of the workforce and 
is likely -at least in theory- to increase social conflict. Only via the institutional intervention 
can this tendency of the market be effectively countered, assuring thus a more efficient use 
of local resources. Finally, local and regional institutions have greater chances of 
guaranteeing the collective production inputs incompetence, ecological synergies, knowledge 
and skills that facilitate the adjustment of firms to the new production environment. In sum, 
the efficient integration of any sub-national space in the new economic conditions greatly 
depends on how successful is the institutional exoskeleton in providing a steady output of the 
collective goods needed by firms to compete in the market; and the institutional exoskeleton 
"constitutes an open door for political regulation and intervention. In this sense, politics 
forms an integral part of the rich social dimension" which determines the economic success 
of any area in a post-Fordist world (Streeck, 1991, pp. 46).
However, why should we look to intermediate levels of governance and regional 
institutions, and not national ones in order to provide the most adequate institutional 
exoskeleton? Traditionally, national politics, policy and institutions have supplied the needed 
collective goods for economic output. Nevertheless, it has been stated that the process of 
socio-economic restructuring and the supposed blurring of national borders are making 
institutional intervention at a national level less and less operational. From this perspective, 
national institutions are often considered as too remote to be able to respond effectively and 
rapidly to local and regional needs of collective goods, and as too rigid and distant to be 
capable of articulating the negotiating bodies or agencies through which the interaction of 
local economic and social actors is achieved and networks are set. Regional institutions and 
the local political and collective organization appear to be the most adequate level of 
governance to secure the provision of collective goods. Several reasons have been advanced 
as to why this intermediate level of government becomes a significant element in the process 
of the building up of the consensus needed to involve all the economic, social and political 
actors in the process of development. The economic spectrum of firms and companies 
working in a certain area is territorially embedded in the social and political relations
249
The socio-political bases of regional growth...
dominating that area (Grabher, 1993). Hence the intertwining between political and economic 
actors, with a large number of other conditions, such as the family and bourgeois traditions, 
the social and economic community practices and the local trade and industrial traditions, 
determine to a large extent the growth potential of any given space. The success of networks 
of small industries and of associative processes should therefore be largely based on the 
capacity of local institutions and local government bodies to promote these types of 
association and to stimulate the establishment of links based on the common interests of all 
the actors in the local arena. Therefore, "the creation of intermediate level structures that 
would facilitate economic restructuring is the top priority to industrial policy and the goal of 
the economic strategy" (Hausner, 1994, p. 22).
Nevertheless, the functions adopted by regional and local politics, policies and 
institutions in the success of the ‘new growth' areas is far from being homogenous. In spite 
of the above-mentioned common features which characterize the relationship between politics 
and growth in certain European regions, the specific models of interaction between 
intermediate levels of government and governance and the economic arena differ across 
regions. The intertwining between political, institutional and economic agents is achieved 
differently in the Italian industrial districts, than in similar formations in Denmark and 
Norway or in the German Land o f Baden-Württemberg. In the following pages, I briefly 
review how this interaction is achieved in these three types of ‘new growth spaces’.
IV.3.1.1.- Politics, institutions and growth in the Italian industrial districts.
Although there is a growing chorus of voices which tends to see the economic-boom 
of the Italian industrial districts more as an interlude than as "the emerging successful form 
of economic organisation" (Trigilia, 1992a, p. 33), Italian industrial districts are still the 
most studied form o f post-Fordist economic organization. These socio-territorial entities, 
characterized by the presence -in a naturally and historically determined area- of a social 
community which constantly interacts with a network o f industrial enterprises (Becattini,
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1991, pp. 52-53), are perhaps the paramount example of how certain areas have been capable 
of adapting to the new socio-economic conditions of the post-Fordist era, and of giving a 
local response to the increasing competition in the globalized markets. As Brusco (1986) and 
Trigilia (1986) mention, the basis of the Italian industrial districts, located fundamentally in 
the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Marche and Veneto, lies in the formation of 
networks of small firms with a highly specialized division of labour in traditional 
manufacturing sectors. Thanks to the high level of specialization of these small firms, the 
whole production process is achieved within the industrial sector, which replaces the function 
of the large company, with the advantage that in these areas external economies and 
economies of scope are added to the traditional economies of scale (Becattini, 1991). In 
addition, Italian industrial districts are identified by their technological dynamism and by an 
apparently paradoxical combination of competition and co-operation among firms (Piore, 
1991, p. 69).
Explanations of the relative success of the Italian industrial districts have tended to 
highlight the capacity of these enterprises to adopt original and ingenious solutions to respond 
to changes in market conditions, and to introduce relatively simple technological innovations 
in the production process (Storper and Scott, 1989; Porter, 1990). Yet, as Trigilia points out, 
technology and product innovation are not the only feature which leads to the formation of 
industrial districts. If they were based only on technology and product innovation, the 
phenomenon of industrial districts would have been widespread across large parts o f Europe. 
The emergence of industrial districts depends "less on technological constraints that on the 
overall institutional context and past experiences" (Trigilia, 1992a, p. 35).
Trigilia (1986 and 1990) and Bagnasco (1988) argue that the influence of the 
institutional and political settings in the area known as the Term Italici5 -or the Third Italy- 
in the formation of industrial district is closely related with the existence of political practices 3
3 The Central and North-Eastern Italian regions o f Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 
Marche, Toscana, and Veneto.
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and institutions connected with Catholic traditions in the North East, and the strong 
Communist and Socialist movements in the Centre of Italy. Constant patterns of vote in 
national and regional elections have been the norm in these areas. The Christian Democratic 
party has outscored left wing parties in the plains of the Veneto, while the strongholds of the 
Communist party have always been located in the regions o f Emilia-Romagna, Marche, 
Tuscany, and Umbria. Regional governments in the Veneto have been dominated since 1970 
by the Christian Democrats, whereas the Communist party -with absolute majorities or in 
coalition with other parties- has remained in office in the Central regions. The presence of 
pervading, albeit distinct, political cultures, has helped to mould a strong regional identity 
which has been one of the main contributions of politics to the phenomenon o f the industrial 
districts. The strong identification of the political bodies with their electorate, and of the 
electorate with a regional identity has been the basis for the formation of political subcultures 
which, in turn, have been fundamental in the involvement of large interests around industrial 
networks. Local and regional level alliances among regional governments, employer 
associations, labour groups and political parties have been the norm and the basis for the 
construction of common interests (Benton, 1992, p. 50-51). In this context o f close 
interaction between politics and the civil society, regional administrations and personnel are 
"keen to learn from others and to apply the lessons" (Cooke and Morgan, 1994, p. 91), in 
order to achieve the maximum benefit for the region. Moreover, and in contrast to the 
evolution in the Italian Mezzogiorno, the emancipation of politics from civil society has made 
politics more independent from the family and private interests, and more strongly tied to the 
defence of collective interest. The market has thus become institutionalized (Trigilia, 1992a, 
p. 37).
One o f the aspects of the institutionalization of markets is the participation of 
institutions and regional and local administrations in promoting inter-firm co-operation. 
Under conditions of normal free markets, it could be supposed that the firms which make up 
the industrial districts would compete with each other rather than co-operate. Under these 
conditions, the normal business strategy would be to achieve a larger market share or try to
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outproduce competitors (Porter, 1990). However, in industrial districts both inter-firm co­
operation and competition become the most significant features (Kristensen, 1992, p. 124). 
Although this co-operation is largely to the benefit of firms, it is not only achieved via their 
sole interaction. As in the case of the provision of collective goods, the attainment of co­
operation becomes a time and resource consuming task, which generates increased costs. In 
addition, free riders could benefit from efforts by other firms to achieve this co-operation. 
As a consequence, "many small (and even medium-sized) firms are not only reluctant to 
engage in such an endeavour but are, in fact, inhibited to join in due to their restricted 
organizational capacity" (Semlinger, 1993, p. 452). It could thus be envisaged that the 
private interest of a group of small firms with little resources would not suffice to accomplish 
the level of co-operation needed to be successful in a more competitive market. In regions 
where there is a strong regional identity and a solid link between social, political and 
economic agents, the task of attaining inter-firm co-operation is fostered by the intervention 
of intermediate levels of government. Regional political bodies and business associations and 
chambers of commerce consciously encourage this type of co-operation between firms in 
order to organize and structure the local economic realm. This has been one of the main 
features of the Italian industrial districts, where serious attention has been paid to the 
development of a strong and decentralized system of institutional support to industries (Best, 
1990).
Two possible methods are the most used by regional governments in the Third Italy 
to attain stable inter-firm co-operation and to provide institutional support to SMEs. In first 
place, local and regional governments can promote negotiations and encourage the formation 
of associations of entrepreneurs, and chambers of commerce at the local level which become 
fora o f active collaboration between firms and also the basic links between the firms and the 
environment. The second and perhaps most usual way is to create regional agencies that 
provide a support system tailored to the needs o f its SMEs (Cooke and Morgan, 1994, p. 
109).
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The practice in Italian industrial districts suggests that the active intervention of 
regional agencies can be very effective in the promotion of production, and thus in the 
genesis of growth (Pyke and Sengeriberger, 1992, p. 25). The region of Emilia-Romagna is 
a paradigmatic example of how this support to SMEs is achieved. A network of regional 
agencies has been created in order to assist SMEs and to help them to adapt to the changing 
market conditions. At the heart of this institutional structure lies the ERVET (Ente Regionale 
per la Valorizzazione Economica del Territorio). The ERVET tries to integrate the potential 
of public and private sectors, of credit and financial institutions, entrepreneurial associations, 
and chambers of commerce, and has become the primary interface between the region’s 
SMEs and national and international sources of investment capital (Cooke and Morgan, 1994, 
p. 109-112). Other type of support and services are supplied by agencies related to the 
ERVET decentralized network. These include sectoral and functional agencies. Among the 
sectoral agencies, there are textile information centres (CITER in Carpi), service centres for 
farm machinery (CESMA in Reggio-Emilia), centres for the upgrading of the shoe industry 
(CERCAL in San Mauro Pascoli) and service centres for the upgrading and development of 
the building industry (QUASCO in Bologna). Functional agencies include the centre for the 
technological development of Emilia-Romagna (ASTER in Bologna), the regional centre for 
research, technological consultancy, products quality assurance, quality systems processes 
and certification (CERMET in San Lazzaro Savena), the centre for the upgrading of 
subcontracting (RESFOR in Parma) and the service centre for export development (SVEZ 
in Bologna). The institutional network of support to SMEs also involves financial tools, 
training agencies, promoting and service companies, and university consortiums (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1994).
Similar networks of development agencies have become a powerful tool not only for 
the improvement of co-operation between SMEs and the reinforcement of networks o f firms, 
but also for the creation of important synergies by means of technological transfers, export 
assistance contributing to the creation of high quality and export oriented industry in the 
regions of the Terza Italia. In addition, the institutional networks have contributed to the
254
iminwniiPUPg
The political bases o f regional growth
establishment of closer links between industries and other institutions and social and political 
agents, becoming thus one of the key elements in setting up the basic conditions for the 
formation of industrial districts.
IV.3.1.2.- The role of politics and institutions in the development of industrial districts 
in West Jutland and Southern Norway.
Western Denmark and Southern Norway have also witnessed the development of ‘new 
growth spaces’ in the last two decades. Agglomerations and networks of fairly specialized 
small firms have experienced an important economic boom in recent years. These networks 
tend to be spatially concentrated in former rural areas of Western Jutland and Southern 
Norway in which the strong local craft and entrepreneurial traditions, as well as practice in 
self-employment have played a crucial role in the rise and development of these industrial 
networks. The most significant cases of this type of industrial districts are the knitwear and 
garment district of Heming-Ikast and the furniture industry of Sailing, both in West Jutland 
(Kristensen, 1992), and the areas of the ‘Engineering Valley’ to the southwest of Oslo 
(producer services); Horten (electronics industries); and Arendal (leisure boat-building 
industry) in Southern Norway (Isaksen, 1994).
These concentrations of small industries in Western Scandinavia share numerous 
common features with the Italian industrial districts. As Kristensen argues, in both cases the 
structure of districts is "oriented towards small, family-owned firms, organised on a 
decentralised, specialised basis, with the individual units and the networks to which they 
belong exhibiting great flexibility" (1992, p. 169). With the exception of the Norwegian 
‘Engineering Valley', the Scandinavian industrial districts have progressed not near 
traditional Fordist mass-production havens, but in small and medium-sized towns which used 
to service rural environments, and in which traditions o f local entrepreneurship were deeply 
rooted. A long heritage of rural co-operatives has been recycled and adapted to the crisis in 
agriculture and has been the seed for co-operation among small and medium-sized industrial
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firms in the area. Knowledge of the local environment and personal contacts have further 
encouraged co-operation between firms. Hence, co-operation is often not the consequence 
of pre-established strategies by local enterprises, but the result of personal ties and 
relationships between entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, co-operation does not thwart competition 
among firms. Most firms have one or several products on the market, while subcontracting 
to other firms is also a usual practice. This double strategy is a consequence of the fact that 
most firms consider that relying solely on subcontracting implies too high a level of 
dependency.
Competition is not based upon cutting down costs by wage cutting and engaging low 
paid workers. Under the conditions of almost universal unionization of workers in 
Scandinavia6, such strategies would be impossible to follow. Instead competition is based 
on factors such as quality production and design. As in the case of the Italian industrial 
districts, local networks of SMEs in West Jutland and Southern Norway have also 
"deliberately pursued strategies aimed at the high quality, design-conscious, export market 
(Kristensen, 1992, p. 146).
Several other factors common to Italian industrial districts like the maintenance of 
craft tradition and capability, the presence of well-developed service infrastructures, or the 
existence of close family ties within and across firms are also discovered in these areas. The 
result is a very high embeddedness of small firm networks in local social communities which 
provides to these areas with a clear character of industrial districts.
It is in the political and institutional realm, where some of the greatest differences 
between the Scandinavian and Italian model of industrial districts are observed. Similarly to 
the Italian case, industrial districts in West Jutland and in Southern Norway have grown in 
what can be considered as an institutionally rich environment. The presence of strong trade
6 The level of trade union membership in West Jutland, as Kristensen points out, despite being 
one of the lowest in Denmark is not far below the 80% threshold (1992, p. 156).
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unions is possibly the most significant institutional feature. High trade union membership has 
however not impeded a strong co-operation between employers and employees, and vice 
versa. On the contrary, it has fostered it. The result of this co-operation are lower strikes 
than in neighbouring areas. Nation-wide institutions are also present in determining aspects 
such as the establishment of technical schools and apprenticeships. Nevertheless, the absence 
of intermediate or regional levels of governance and government in Denmark and in Norway 
implies that industrial districts in these countries lack one of the basic pillars which 
contributed to the development of industrial districts in the Third Italy.
One of the consequences of the absence of intermediate governments is the "lack of 
political consensus that exists in the Red Belt in Italy, which is reinforced by the strong 
representation of regional interest by trade unions, associations of artisans and other 
organisations" (Kristensen, 1992, p. 127). There is no political, institutional or administrative 
body which can fulfil the role played in the Terza Italia by parties, regional agencies and 
regional governments. The main consequence of this is that co-operation between firms is 
achieved in a much more informal way. Close links which are established at the local level 
rely more on close personal relationships that on well structured networks co-established by 
local institutions. Contact with firms outside the industrial district is in general not the result 
of active institutional intervention but of the personal links and the experience of local 
entrepreneurs.
Another consequence of the lack of the institutional structure provided intermediate 
levels of government is that the size of industrial districts tends to be much smaller than in 
Italy. The role o f regional institutions and agencies is fulfilled, to a larger or a lesser extent 
by local administrations whose scope, budget, and competences are limited. Most industrial 
districts are thus either circumscribed to one municipality, or to two or three municipalities 
working together. Nevertheless, common industrial interests and close co-operation between 
municipal bodies have resulted in demands to create regional bodies capable o f organizing 
and formulating local industrial strategies in areas such as the industrial district of Heming- 257
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Ikast.
Consequently, the lack of political intervention at a regional level has resulted in 
unsatisfactory levels of association between enterprises. In contrast with the Italian case, 
there are almost no organizations of small firms at a local level and no agencies to act as 
links between firms, local and regional politics, and national institutions. Hence, the capacity 
of these industrial districts to generate long term industrial strategies is curtailed by the 
absence of intermediate levels of government in Scandinavia.
This absence however does not mean that the role of politics, policy, and institutions 
at the national and local level in the formation of industrial districts is to be disregarded. 
National political events had a crucial influence in the early stages of the economic success 
of this area. As Kristensen recalls, the 1973 Danish general elections were one of the turning 
points which determined the entry of small enterprises and entrepreneurs into the arena of 
national politics. Resentment against what was considered excessive taxing on SMEs by the 
national government in order to finance the welfare state was translated into high electoral 
results in Western Jutland for the Glistrup’s tax revolt party. Social Democratic governments 
received the message that was sent from these areas and started looking for a new 
compromise between the industrial districts and the welfare state. "New programmes to help 
small enterprises with finance and technical assistance were introduced; technology centres 
were created in every county; and rules changed so that entrepreneurs could claim 
unemployment insurance; even programmes to help the unemployed start their own business 
emerged" (Kristensen, 1992, p. 161). Other national programmes have also contributed to 
the supply of the skilled workers needed by the SMEs engaged in flexible production. 
Regional technical schools have been established, and local governments have been actively 
engaged in attracting those branches more adapted to the needs o f local firms.
In sum, although the association between clusters of SMEs and politics is less 
developed in industrial districts in Scandinavia than in the Third Italy, it can be said that
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political conditions have played a non negligible role in the economic success of these areas 
during the late 1970s and 1980s. Whether this economic success will continue will largely 
depend on how the interaction between political and economic conditions will be conducted 
in the future.
IV.3.1.3.- Growth in an institutionally rich environment: the case of Baden- 
Württemberg.
The German Land  of Baden-Württemberg has been regarded by most scientists 
working on the processes of socio-economic restructuring as one of the most successful 
examples of high growth in an institutionally rich environment. Despite a recent slowdown 
in growth levels, Baden-Württemberg is -together with Hesse and Bavaria- one of the three 
fastest growing L änder  in Germany. High levels of growth in Baden-Württemberg have been 
closely associated with the expansion of the manufacturing sector during the last three 
decades, and the economy of the region has undergone a major structural change since the 
end of world war II. From being a fundamentally rural and craft-oriented region, in the span 
of four decades Baden-Württemberg has succeeded in articulating a very large and complex 
network of manufacturing firms, which constitutes the basis for the economic progress of the 
region. Automobile production, mechanical and electrical engineering are the leading sectors 
within this network. Local large firms like Daimler-Benz, Porsche, Bosch, Standard Elektrik, 
together with foreign firms such as IBM, Sony or Hewlett-Packard make up the pillars of the 
industrial structure of the region. This industrial backbone is surrounded by a large network 
of large, medium and small-sized enterprises, making the region one of the major 
manufacturing states in Germany.
The manufacturing system in Baden-Württemberg shares several common 
characteristics with industrial districts in Central Italy and other parts of Europe. Alongside 
a strong competition based mainly on high quality production and not on low wages, firms
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in the region have developed strong links through co-operation. Complex subcontracting 
chains which involve large firms and SMEs, or just networks o f SMEs, are the most usual 
way of co-operation. These subcontracting chains generate large external economies and 
economies of scope, which are especially evident in the area around Stuttgart, where the co­
existence of large companies with networks of SMEs attains its peak (Breschi, 1993, p. 129). 
It is precisely in this combination and co-operation of an oligopolistic core of large 
companies, with a dynamic population of SMEs where lies the key of the relative success of 
the economic model of Baden-Württemberg (Breschi, 1993, p. 129).
Furthermore, in Baden-Württemberg there is a strong identification of firms with the 
traditions and the surrounding environment. As Semlinger indicates "industry in this south­
western part of Germany has its roots in a system of commercial cottage industry and artisan 
production, which in turn emerged from the specific character of inheritance on the land 
(partible inheritance), rested on the people’s (protestant) work ethic and -not least of all- was 
supported by a correspondingly targeted public policy" (Semlinger, 1993, p. 447).
As in the case o f Italian industrial districts, the regional government and institutions 
have played a significant role in the development of inter-firm co-operation and in the 
creation of industrial networks. Active support by regional politicians and institutions for the 
development of industry has been a constant since the formation of the L and  Baden- 
Württemberg in 1952. However, the development of industrial policies reached its climax 
during the 1980s, when the Minister President of the region -the Christian Democrat Lothar 
Späth- and his cabinet started leading a very active policy of support for local SMEs, which 
led critics of his government to consider that the region was leading a ‘neo-mercantilist' 
policy (Kloten, 1987). Indeed, technological and industrial policy became the centrepieces 
of the modernisation strategy of the Christian Democratic government of the region (Schmitz, 
1992, p. 101). This political support has been translated into an industrial policy which, in 
spite of having maintained "the traditional maxim that public support of private business 
should restrict itself to improve the ability o f self-help" (Semlinger, 1993, p. 450), has led
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to the creation o f an advanced and effective institutional infrastructure of firm patronage and 
promotion. The main objective of this industrial policy has been "to help SMEs to help 
themselves in adjusting to new technologies" (Cooke and Morgan, 1992b, p. 3). The result 
is that Baden-Württemberg "has a dense network of intermediary institutions that functions 
as an industry-support architecture which mobilizes to seek out ways of assisting business" 
(Cooke and Morgan, 1994, p. 99).
However, as Schmitz (1991) and Semlinger (1993) point out, the support provided 
to SMEs by local and regional governments in the region is nothing new. It is the 
continuation of a long tradition which can be traced back to the mid 19th century, when 
institutions like the Central Bureau of Trade and Commerce were set up by the Kingdom of 
Württemberg in order to promote private business. This secular tradition was continued 
throughout this century and started to reap its fruits since the end of the second world war.
In recent years, support for companies by regional governments and institutions has 
adopted several models. In first place, industrial policy in Baden-Württemberg has focused 
on technological development and innovation, especially in small and medium-sized firms 
(Jürgens and Krumbein, 1991). It is in this field where the Land  is pursuing its own 
autonomous agenda, with few links to the rest of Germany (Cooke and Morgan, 1992b, p. 
3). A Venture Capital Fund (Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaft) has thus been created 
which subsidizes investment in technology. The appointment of a Commissioner for 
Technology Transfer in 1982, who is directly responsible to the Minister President of the 
Region has been a further step in this direction. In addition, a network of Technology 
Transfer Centres has been established. This network, mainly attached to the polytechnics, 
helps industries and firms directly with R&D support (Semlinger, 1993, p. 449), Other forms 
of technological assistance to SMEs are provided by the Steinbeis Foundation, whose main 
objective is to support SMEs in the regions through consulting services and technological 
transfer. 261
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Another form of intervention by regional institutions in order to support networks of 
industries has been the Regional Trade Bureau (Landesgewertbeam t). Since its foundation in 
1952 this institution has provided consulting services, information and on the job training for 
SMEs in the regions. It has also encouraged the establishment of direct links between 
companies and the transfer of technology.
Education and vocational training have been another major path for co-operation 
between institutions and firms. The fact that Baden-Württemberg’s manufacturing system 
heavily relies on highly skilled labour has created a need for institutions to supply the broad 
and wide redundant skills needed for an adequate functioning of the economy (Streeck, 
1991). Regional institutions have adopted an active role in this sense. The regional 
government has long been supporting apprenticeship training. This aid was particularly 
evident during the period 1986-1989 when it "spent about 150 million DM to support the 
start-up and modernization as well as the running costs of Joint Training Centres" 
(Semlinger, 1993, p. 37). As a whole, the vocational training system has acted in Baden- 
Württemberg -as in other parts of Germany- as a means to enhance further co-operation 
between institutions and industries.
The goal of the regional government of adapting the skills of local human resources 
to the industrial environment is further reflected in the creation in 1974 of the Vocational 
Academy of Baden-Württemberg (the Berufsakademie). This Vocational Academy provides 
vocational education to "university-level students who seek a shorter, more practical training 
rather than a more theoretical one" (Semlinger, 1993, p. 449).
However, the field in which institutional intervention has been most successful has 
been that of the promotion of inter-firm co-operation. The Regional Trade Bureau has played 
an active part in substituting market deficiencies for the achievement of co-operation. This 
regional government agency has provided subsidies for consulting tasks regarding the 
promotion of networks of firms, has funded travelling expenses to network meetings and up
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to 50% of the costs of the development of a network or of a concrete joint project. In 
addition, it has provided personal assistance which has proven to be essential to the 
development of inter-firm co-operation.
The creation of associations of SMEs has become another successful way to promote 
inter-firm co-operation. The Regional Trade Bureau, for example, actively collaborated in 
the setting up of the Committee of Suppliers Baden-Württemberg, an association whose goal 
is to promote the participation of SMEs in important fairs. Apart from organizing a meeting 
for all the SMEs with problems to participate in fairs, the Regional Trade Bureau has ever 
since constantly encouraged the meeting of the suppliers and the exchange of information and 
experiences among enterprises within the group. The Steinbeis Centre for Quality 
Management is another initiative of an agency promoted through co-operation of industries. 
The goal of this centre is to help SMEs "to cope with the increasing pressure from large 
customers to modernize the quality control system of the enterprise" (Semlinger, 1993, p. 
453). These associations, together with the chamber of commerce, not only act as permanent 
forums of dialogue and co-operation between firms, but also play -as government institutions 
also do- an active role in compiling and spreading essential technological and commercial 
information. They are as well powerful lobbies representing the interests of SMEs in front 
of the regional political bodies and institutions (Breschi, 1993, p. 137). And most of these 
associations and the Chambers of Commerce are not only organized at the regional level, but 
also at the district and local levels.
In short, the regional government and the institutions of Baden-Württemberg have 
worked together with industries and firms in order to supply what Streeck defined as the 
necessary redundant capacities, the congenial organizational ecology, the polyvalent 
organizational structure, the social peace, and fundamentally, the necessary co-operation 
needed for a better use of local economic resources under the new market conditions. This 
does not mean, as Schmitz underlines, that the political drive by the regional government is 
solely responsible for the high growth levels experienced in Baden-Württemberg during the
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last two decades. The industrial model of the region was already present before the political 
initiatives of the 1980s were set in motion (1992* p, 101). However, it must be 
acknowledged that the institutional environment and the networks set up by the regional level 
have validly contributed to the genesis of growth in Baden-Württemberg in the last two 
decades. j:
IV.3.2.- POLITICS, POLICY AND GROWTH IN LAGGING REGIONS.
Not always politics, policies and institutional intervention favour economic efficiency, 
as has been the case in the'new growth spaces’. In other areas it has been argued that the 
combination of politics, institutions and the economy has either not had any significant effects 
on economic growth trends or, in certain cases, has even rendered difficult the pursuit of 
autonomous economic activity and, thus, of economic growth. Numerous authors studying 
lagging regions in Europe have reached the conclusion that the origins of the persistence of 
backwardness should not be searched for in strict economic barriers, but in social and 
political conditions (Trigilia, 1992b, p. 7). From this point of view, political conditions and 
long traditions of political intervention in the areas of the Italian Mezzogiomo, the Spanish 
South West, Portugal, or Greece, have not only been incapable of encouraging the 
development o f economic activity in those areas, but also have had pernicious effects on local 
entrepreneurship. Transfers of industrial complexes, the endowment of infrastructure, or the 
investment in human resources have not sufficed to overcome the barriers which limited 
growth potential in those areas (Cafiero, 1991). Hence, when most traditional development 
bottlenecks are slowly surmounted, the influence of politics and policy in the lack of 
economic dynamism becomes more evident.
The following pages make up a review about why long-term political conditions and 
institutional intervention have not been able to promote the necessary autonomous economic 
activity to guarantee economic progress. The analysis will focus on those two groups of
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regions that have attracted the most attention: the lagging regions of Southern and Western 
Spain, and, above all, the Italian Mezzogiorno.
IV.3.2.1.- Public intervention, development policy, and growth in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno.
Whenever the terms economic growth and Italian Mezzogiorno come together, they 
generally describe what has been considered an exceptional situation. Several decades of 
robust institutional intervention, by means of the implementation of an active development 
policy, have not succeeded in setting the bases for an autonomous economic development and 
for the maturation of civil society. In contrast to what was experienced in the ‘new growth 
areas’, political and institutional intervention in the Mezzogiorno has been accompanied by 
a strong dependency of Southern Italian society on the public sphere and by old and new 
conditions of social degradation (Trigilia, 1992b, p. 7). This evidence has lead to the 
development of a whole body of scientific literature on the Problem m a del M ezzogiorno, 
which has flourished in the last thirty years not only in Italy but also abroad. Thousands of 
pages have been written on the causes of the persistent backwardness of this area with respect 
to the rest of Italy and hundreds of alternative policies have been proposed in order to tackle 
the chronic underdevelopment of the region.
The exceptional consideration of the Mezzogiorno is by no means constrained to 
academic circles. It also reflects the reputation the regions of the Mezzogiorno ‘enjoy’ in the 
rest of the country and abroad. In fact the sole name of Mezzogiorno is immediately 
associated with criminality, backwardness, political clientelism and assisted economy7. The 
image of the Mezzogiorno has, thus, been radicalized and therefore the problems of the *265
7 A study conducted by the CENSIS on the external image of Sicily, one of the emblematic 
regions of the Mezzogiorno, through the analysis of articles alluding to the region during 1991 in 
national newspapers came to disheartening results. References to Sicily related to criminality (39%), 
institutional relations (25%) and politics (20%). The economy and every day life in the island were 
almost absent from the newspapers (CENSIS, 1992, p. 80).
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Italian South are to a certain extent considered to be isolated from those of the rest of the 
country. ,
Institutions and the administration have also fostered this picture of exceptionalism.
The problems of the Mezzogiorno have for long been treated separately from those of the !
rest of the country. The regions in the Italian South have long benefited from an ;
extraordinary intervention -in addition to ‘ordinary’ sectoral interventions- which was Ì
conceived to overcome the structural and territorial constraints of the area and nurture !it
development. j
Ii
r
j
And indeed the Mezzogiorno differs from the rest of Italy. The average GDP per j
capita in 1990 was just 56.6% that of the Central and Northern regions, practically at the )
è
same level it was in the early 1950s (Trigilia, 1992b, p. 38). Public expenditure in the last \fI
four decades has contributed to a noticeable rise in personal income in terms of purchasing
i
power. However, the growth of personal income has not been paralleled by a similar increase '
in production capacity. As Trigilia underlines, public intervention has not been capable of '
• 1
triggering -with the exception of some areas where a certain dynamism has been observed- j
an autonomous development, or, at least, experiences of local dynamism (1992b, p. 71). j
Public expenditure is more oriented in the South of Italy towards the maintenance of income l
levels than towards the development of production structures (Trigilia, 1992b, p. 71-72). <
And, in spite o f certain improvements in some social areas like education and health, the gap j
between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of Italy in the social arena is still enormous. Crime 
rates have increased dramatically in the last decades; birth rates are much higher than in the 
rest of Italy; global, and especially female, activity is much lower than in most European 
regions, and unemployment and youth unemployment rates are only paralleled by those in 
the South of Spain. The special circumstances of the Mezzogiorno become thus an enormous 
handicap which reduces its potentialities of economic development. Problems like criminality, 
unemployment, clientelism and the lack of infrastructure and equipment curtail the
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IV.3.2.1.1.- The ‘exceptionalism’ of the initial economic conditions of the Italian
Mezzogiomo.
Since its incorporation in the Kingdom of Italy, the Mezzogiomo has remained the 
most underdeveloped area in the Italian context. Its relatively isolated position with respect 
to the main communication axes, the weakness of its markets and of a solid industrial fabric 
and the lack of basic infrastructure became almost unsurmountable obstacles for the South.
Internal contrasts within the Mezzogiomo are nevertheless evident. Botazzi (1990) and 
Trigilia (1992b) delimit two areas showing opposite signs of economic dynamism: on the one 
hand, the Adriatic coast (Abruzzo, Molise and Puglia) witnessing the appearance of what 
appear to be the first stages of a flexible industry, and, on the other hand, the Tyrrhenian 
coast (Campania, Calabria, Sicily) which had an already frail industrial structure developed 
with the aid of the extraordinary intervention during the 1960s and early 1970s, and which 
is falling apart without signs of any type of recovery ahead (Botazzi, 1990, p. 145-6). In the 
less dynamic areas of the Thyrrenian regions there is a huge increase in the service sector. 
Nevertheless, this increase is not paralleled by a similar enlargement in productivity and 
income, since it occurs in unskilled service jobs and administrative occupations.
The South of Italy does not differ strongly from other regions of the South and West 
of Spain, Portugal and Greece in terms of income levels. This is basically the result of a 
series of negative conditions which have affected peripheral areas in Europe for a long time. 
In the period immediately after the second world war, economic conditions were similar 
everywhere in the periphery of Europe. Bad accessibility to lagging regions -frequently 
located in the periphery- was accentuated by the existence of an inadequate infrastructural 
network. Capital accumulation was almost non existent and, therefore, endogenous 
investment extremely rare. And most of the lagging regions lacked the raw materials and 267
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energy sources around which the great Fordist industrial complexes were generated. The 
Mezzogiorno was by no means an exception.
Moreover, the socio-economic structure in the Mezzogiorno was also almost identical 
to that of lagging regions in Spain, Portugal, Ireland or Greece. In the early post-war stages 
the great majority of the active population was employed in the primary sector, while the rest 
was mainly concentrated in small wholesale and retail and administrative services. Industrial 
employment was remarkably weak since most industries were related to craftsmanship and 
still had a family structure. The Mezzogiorno and other lagging areas in Western Europe 
remained apart from the development of Fordist industrial complexes.
In this economic and social context, it is not strange to imagine why the Mezzogiorno 
had remained apart from major economic trends. The market was extremely reduced and 
isolated: personal income was modest and self-production in rural areas a common practice. 
Trade with other regions or other countries was very low in comparison with the North of 
Italy. However, the backwardness of the Italian South cannot only be related to economic and 
social conditions. The political sphere has also played a significant role both in the genesis 
of economic backwardness, as well as in the incapability of the correcting policies set in 
motion to fight it.
IV.3.2.1.2.- Forty years of regional development policy in the Mezzogiorno: the fight
against development constraints.
The development of the South has always been one of the main goals in Italy since 
the reunification. The permanence of strong territorial disequilibria within the country had 
a negative influence on the Italian economy as a whole, and threatened in several periods the 
social and political stability of the country.
Since the late 1940s different development policies have been put into operation in
268
The political bases of regional growth
the Mezzogiorno, aiming at setting the bases to reduce the gap between rich and poor 
regions. This intervention took fundamentally two different forms: ordinary intervention 
executed by public administrations and, above all, the extraordinary intervention set up in 
the 1950s under De Gasperi. The extraordinary intervention was performed by a new agency, 
the Cassa p e r  il M ezzogiorno , which had at its disposal large economic resources to 
accomplish the task of setting the bases for autonomous development8. Indicative planning 
was the strategy used for the Mezzogiorno. Development objectives were designed in ten 
year plans.
The purpose of the first ten year plans was to set the basic environment to encourage 
the birth of new industries. An enormous effort in the building of infrastructure was achieved 
during the fifties and sixties (Cafiero, 1991). The extension of these efforts during the 70s 
and 80s has led to a significant reduction of the deficit in infrastructure of the Mezzogiorno.
In the 1960s a great percentage of the extraordinary funding was devoted to the 
establishment of large industrial complexes in Sicily and in other areas in the South. 
Industries benefited from lofty incentives if they established in Southern Regions and leading 
public and private groups rushed towards the Mezzogiorno. Nevertheless, according to 
Giannola, this process was double-faced, because while large industrial consortia were 
settling in the South, local industrial sectors were unable to cope with competition from small 
and medium-sized firms located in the North and Centre of Italy (1982, p. 69). This 
industrial frenzy of the ten year plans was cut short by the economic crisis of 1973, and in 
the second half of the seventies public intervention began slowly to decline.
The net result of forty years of development policies in the Mezzogiorno have not 
been significant increases in growth rates. In the last 30 years, GDP has grown in the
8 The funds allocated to the Cassa per il Mezzogiomo amounted to 0.70% of GDP between 1950 
and 1970; rose to 0.90% in the seventies and fell to 0.50% in the eighties (Salvatore Cafiero, 1991, 
p. 339).
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Mezzogiorno at the same rate than in the whole of Italy. That is, growth in the Mezzogiorno 
has exceeded that of the declining industrial areas of the North East of the country, but has 
been below that of the Terza Italia. During the 1980s, the Mezzogiorno has even experienced 
a slight decline of GDP per inhabitant in relative terms.
In sum, huge investments directed towards infrastructure and the attraction of large 
industrial plants have not set the preconditions for economic growth. Indeed, as Trigilia 
points out, those areas of the Mezzogiorno which have fared better are precisely those which 
have been capable o f reducing their dependency on public intervention (1992b, p. 8-9). 
Money transfers to the Mezzogiorno have only fostered a partial integration of the economy 
of the area into world economic circuits (D ’Antonio, 1990, p. 548). On the one hand, the 
traditional productive structure has been destroyed. Agriculture has undergone an important 
crisis and industry has never gained a significant share in the economy. The Italian 
Mezzogiorno -as many other peripheral economies- has indeed made a structural transition 
from an agricultural to a service economy in a very short period of time, without even 
reproducing the conventional process which involves an intermediate stage of industrial 
supremacy (Botazzi, 1990). And, in contrast to what has happened in other areas, the 
disruption of the agricultural structures has not generated forms of collective mobilization of 
peasants (Trigilia, 1992b, p. 88). Unemployment rates and employment in the tertiary 
unskilled sector have soared, as well as illegal activities, which make up for a significant 
percentage of the total economy.
x
Running parallel to the disruption of the traditional production fabric without the 
generation of alternatives, the demand side of the economic sphere has achieved a full 
integration into world markets. Global consumption has increased in the last decades, 
representing since 1975 almost 100% of GDP. This high rate of consumption is placed some 
20 points higher than in the rest of Italy. In absolute terms consumption levels in the 
Mezzogiorno attain the Italian average, even though the income per person is still 
significantly lower. At first sight, it could be thought that high levels of consumption could
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have had a harmful effect on investment. However* fixed investment in the Mezzogiorno has 
been since 1963 higher than the Italian average* by 2 or 3 percentage points. This modest 
but constant surplus in investment can only be financed by budgetary transfers from the rest 
of Italy to the Mezzogiorno.
The result of these trends is a very unbalanced economy as in most peripheral areas 
in the EU. The Southern Italian market has shattered its isolation on only one dimension. As 
D’Antonio indicates, "insufficient economic growth has rendered the South economically 
dependent on the rest of the country. Regional output cannot satisfy local consumer and 
investment demand. In the eighties consumer growth was higher than output and in the last 
year consumer spending outstripped production" (1991* p. 402). Southern Italians spend as 
much as other Italians and as other Europeans in consumption. However, an alternative 
production structure has not yet laid its foundations. Industry in the Mezzogiorno is 
extremely weak in comparison with other regions in the country and the dimensions of plants 
are extremely reduced.
These conditions have led to a great dependence on imports from other regions and 
countries. While Italy has a balance of trade in almost permanent equilibrium* the 
Mezzogiorno has a deficit in its balance of trade which averages around 20% of the annual 
GDP. This situation can only be handled through the conversion of the Southern economy 
into an assisted one* as was the case in recent decades. The welfare of the Mezzogiorno has 
been to a large extent dependent on transfers from Rome to avoid the collapse of its whole 
productive system.
The final consequence is, as Dioguardi points out, "an endemic inflation permanently 
fixed some point higher than that recorded in other areas having similar development and 
industrialization” (1991, p. 453).
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IV.3.2.1.3.- Economic and political benefits of the intervention in the Mezzogiorno.
As we have seen, active government intervention has tried -and often succeeded- to 
tackle effectively what were considered by traditional development theories the major barriers 
to growth. However, regional intervention has failed in fulfilling its ultimate aims: to boost 
economic growth in order to reduce the existing economic gap between the Mezzogiorno and 
the rest of the country, and to create the favourable conditions for the subsequent expansion 
of private-sector activities in the South (Dunford, 1988).
What are the reasons behind this failure? What makes institutional intervention in the 
Mezzogiorno different from experiences in the Terza Italia? Why has it been maintained for 
so long? and whom has it benefitted?
The reasons behind the failure of institutional intervention in the Mezzogiorno are not 
simple. The combination of a wide group of circumstances has triggered what Trigilia calls 
the ‘perverse effect* of regional development policies in the Mezzogiorno (1992b). The 
immutability of regional intervention is one of the possible explanations of the problem. The 
philosophy behind the extraordinary intervention has not been altered for more than three 
decades, while economy and society, in general, have undergone significant changes which 
have radically modified the socio-economic conditions under which regional intervention was 
conceived. As D ’Antonio indicates, the guiding notions of the Cassa p e r  il M ezzogiorno  did 
not undergo revision in the last thirty years (1991, p. 414). They were anchored in 
Myrdalian and Hirschean development postulates and were not adapted to shifting socio­
economic conditions.
Nevertheless, the main barrier to growth is provoked, as Triglilia has tried to 
demonstrate (1988 and 1992b), by the adverse political and institutional context which has 
for long distinguished conditions in the Mezzogiorno and which has cut short the possibilities 
of endogenous growth and reduced internal entrepreneurship to its minimal expression
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(Gianola, 1982; Trigilia, 1988; Fadda, 1992). Lack of entrepreneurship has also contributed 
to an imperfect adjustment of Southern industry to the new market conditions, generated by 
the processes of socio-economic restructuring, and to the progressive orientation of public 
intervention in the Mezzogiorno towards the support of income and aggregate demand 
(Cersosimo, 1990, p. 64)
The first evidence of this adverse political and institutional context is the excessive 
fragmentation of the social and political spectrum. The Mezzogiorno lacks the concentrating 
poles around which the entrepreneurial activity has been developed in Central and North- 
Eastern Italy. Trade Unions are weak and even groups encouraged by the local church or 
municipalities are less developed than in the rest of the country. The result is a lower level 
of collective identification with the local economy and, hence, a lower level of 
institutionalization of the economy. The shortage of collective tradition in the Mezzogiorno 
has thus led to a reinforcement of the role of the family and of parallel political structures 
(including the Mafia), whose particular interests do not always coincide with collective ones 
(Triglilia, 1988). In other words, the Mezzogiorno might have experienced a phase of growth 
of personal income, but at the same time it has been "besieged by formidable social 
regression" (Dioguardi, 1991, p. 428).
The absence of poles of collective action has led to the formation of a vicious circle. 
The lack or relatively little importance in social life of collective organizations as in other 
areas of Italy (chambers of commerce, cooperatives, leagues, rural saving banks, etc) 
emphasizes the role played by the family and clientèles in the social panorama. Social activity 
is governed by very simple social structures (Trigilia, 1988 and 1992b), facilitating the 
expansion of corruption and of connection between local politics and organized crime 
(Caciagli, 1977; Cazzola, 1988; Trigilia, 1992b; Della Porta, 1992).
In addition, the lack of dynamism of local political forces and local administrations 
has become another barrier for the success of institutional intervention. The presence of two
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regions with a special statute since the early 1950s (Sardinia and Sicily) and a political 
panorama dominated by the Christian Democracy since the restoration of democracy at the 
end of the second world war could have been, a p r io r i , favourable conditions for the 
development of similar links between politics and the economy to those noticed in the Terza 
Italia. In fact, from this perspective, the political panorama does not differ greatly from what 
were the main characters in which Industrial Districts were developed: a strong dominating 
party and a certain degree of autonomy. The combination o f a regional government, with the 
clustering of population around a given political option and the financial means to carry out 
an adequate development policy could have contributed to the setting up of the ideal 
conditions for the promotion of growth. However, in the Mezzogiomo the situation has not 
evolved in the same way as in the Terza Italia. In contrast it has developed in what can be 
considered as an Olsonian way. Lack of political change has led to institutional sclerosis and 
little political dynamism. This is, to a certain extent, a result of the ‘clientelistic’ organization 
of the society of the Mezzogiomo, and of the important role played by the family in the 
economy, Family clientèles have been reproduced in the political party system, and the long 
dominant Christian Democratic party probably represented the paradigmatic example of this 
reproduction. Although comfortable coalition majorities were the norm in the South, internal 
fights among party fractions have rendered regional government stability and any intention 
o f developing any coherent programm almost impossible. The average life of regional 
governments in the Mezzogiomo is lower than in the rest of Italy, and, in the cases o f Sicily 
and Sardinia, in spite o f the fairly constant patterns of vote, they average less than a year9. 
Under these conditions of instability, the capacity of regional governments to design and 
implement their own development policies -as the regional administrations in the Terza Italia 
have done- is severely limited. Therefore, regional politics and institutions have played a 
subsidiary role to national institutions in the design and implementation of development plans 
in the Mezzogiomo. And the policies designed at a national level have not always been the
9 323 days on average, while the second lowest Sardinia averages 350. In contrast, a region with 
a much more fragmented political setting, like Umbria, holds the Italian record, with 1681 days 
(CHNSIS, 1992, p. 68).
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most adequate for the Mezzogiomo. The national industrial policy during the 1980s 
represents a clear example of this disadjustment (Vinci and Cardone, 1990, p. 49).
The political panorama in the Mezzogiomo has thus been featured by a strange 
amalgamation between formal stability and internal instability caused by the constant need 
to look for political consensus both at a regional and, above all, at a national level. Political 
activity in the region has been handcuffed by internal quarrels among clientèles and by the 
strategic importance of the Mezzogiomo in the national political panorama. Hence, the 
political agenda of the regional government has been restricted for years to demanding more 
money from Rome, an activity which has not hampered the growth of some of the largest 
regional bureaucracies in Italy10. This subsidiary role has been readily accepted by national 
government coalitions in Rome for several decades, because coalition parties at a national 
level were capable of extracting large benefits from this system in term of electoral 
outcomes. The main parties in office both at the central and local level -the Christian 
Democracy and the Socialist Party- clearly gained ground during the high-point of the 
activities of the Cassa p e r  il M ezzogiom o. In contrast, the main opposition party -the 
Communist Party- was always under-represented in the South, with respect to the Centre and 
North of Italy (Trigilia, 1992b, p. 66).
This situation has led to the creation of perverse effects of public intervention 
(Trigilia, 1992b, p. 75). Several vicious circles of political activity have been formed. In fist 
place, economic backwardness has been used by politicians in the Mezzogiomo as the main 
argument to demand greater capital transfers from Rome. However, those transfers, intended 
to promote economic development, are redirected to maintain unemployment levels at a 
manageable size and to satisfy clientelistic compromises and electoral agreements 
(Cersosimo, 1990) by the creation of public employment and the promotion of public works 
of doubtful social and economic interest. A large amount of these transfers have also ended
10 I.e. the Sicilian regional government had 10.043 employees in 1989, that is twice the size of 
the regional administration in Lombardy and four times that of Piedmont.
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in the hands of organized crime. According to D ’Antonio "policy for the South [...] would 
seem to be very dependent on a role of the State as a deus ex m achina  providing necessary 
finance; the policy has paid too much attention to the quantity o f financial resources to use 
and has been rather neglectful about where they were going to or the quality of the results 
they produced" (1991, p. 415). This vicious circle goes on continuously generating more and 
more misery, since parties in office extract from it serious advantages in electoral terms, 
especially in those areas where the dependency on public intervention attains its maximum 
degree (Trigilia, 1992b, p. 126-127).
Secondly, the expansion of bureaucracy is another factor which limits the capacities 
of growth. Self employment is perceived as too risky in the Mezzogionmo. A great 
proportion of the Southern youth longs for what is regarded as a secure salary as civil 
servants. This is achieved mainly via clientelistic links and thanks to the fact that capital 
transfers are redirected to this sector. However growth in the administrative sector constrains 
growth in other more productive activities and reduces the ‘offer’ of young businessmen and 
entrepreneurs, since the prospective of a salary for life pushes job-seekers towards public 
employment, rather than towards private activities (Cersosimo, 1990, p. 73).
And finally, there is the vicious circle of institutional transparency. The perception 
most Southerners have of their region is rather indefinite. In contrast to what happens in the 
Centre and in the North of Italy, where the limits of state and regional administration are 
more clearly delimited, in the Mezzogiomo there is a complex coexistence of local and 
regional administrations, together with agencies and structures inherited from the system of 
the Cassa p e r  il M ezzog iom o , and a powerful network of peripheral entities of the central 
administration (Cammelli, 1990, p. 165). In addition, very few people know exactly what 
are the powers and prerogatives of the region. Nevertheless, the regional government, being 
paralyzed by institutional sclerosis, has not succeeded in making its role and competences 
clear, which has ultimately led to a poor consideration of regional institutions (Cammelli, 
1990).
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In sum, socio-political conditions have led economic growth in the Mezzogiorno to 
an impasse. Political dependency and lack of real local and regional dynamism have fostered 
what Trigilia calls a collective deresponsabilizzazione of the Southern society with regard to 
economic activities (1992b, p. 9). Economic intervention has thus contributed to destroy the 
old and isolated productive structure without solidly setting the bases of a new one. As 
Noci fora indicates, the Mezzogiorno has passed in the space of a few decades, from being 
a rural economy, based on large state ownership and protected by its isolationism, to being 
an economy dependent on external transfers (Nocifora, 1981) without having significantly 
altered its traditional social and political arrangements. Hence and despite the fact that 
political intervention has provoked a considerable growth of personal income, its stretch in 
time has finished by discouraging entrepreneurship, particularly through the unfair 
competition of either politically protected economic activities or activities controlled by 
criminal organizations (Trigilia, 1992b, p. 85)
IV.3.2.2.- National politics, development policies and regional growth in lagging Spanish 
regions.
Traditionally, the interaction between politics and regional growth in Spain has been 
carried out in a very similar context to that of the Italian Mezzogiorno. Spain is -and has for 
long been- also a country with strong internal contrasts in terms of income. The 
industrialized regions of the North East, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, and the 
area around Madrid, have concentrated most of the wealth of the country, while the Southern 
regions of Andalusia, Extremadura, Castile-La Mancha, the Canary Islands, and Galicia in 
the North West were placed clearly behind in the development scale.
IV.3.2.2.1.- Spanish regional development policy under Franco.
The evidence of the strong internal disparities led the national administration during 
the 1960s to implement a development policy, whose main aim was to reduce the gap in
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GDP between advanced and lagging regions, and to set the bases for the autonomous growth 
of backward areas. This type of policy was inspired in similar experiences which where 
taking place in France and, particularly, in Italy. The Italian strategy was, in fact, the 
guiding line for Spanish development policies. Conditions in both countries were quite 
similar: the borderline between advanced and backward areas was quite clearly established 
and the level of devolution of powers to the regions was almost non-existent at that time 
(with the exception o f the five Italian special statute regions). However, there was one 
significant difference which set apart the Spanish experience from the Italian one. Whereas 
Italy was a stable democracy, Spain was administered by the Francoist regime,
The implementation of regional development policies under a dictatorship entailed 
some special characteristics which greatly thwarted the effectiveness of development policies. 
Not only no intermediate levels of government participated in the process of design, 
implementation and evaluation of development policies, but also even the regional factor was 
maintained at a low profile, in order not to awake Spanish regionalism. Francoist 
development policy thus was focused mainly at a provincial and local level, a factor which 
implied a serious handicap in the capacity to set in motion a comprehensive development 
policy (Cuadrado Roura, 1987, p. 34). In addition, development policy was always 
subsidiary to general economic policy. Concrete intervention in lagging regions did not differ 
greatly from the industrial policy which was developed elsewhere in Spain. As Suarez-Villa 
and Cuadrado Roura (1993) underline, the same types o f industry and the same industrial 
sectors received institutional support both in advanced and lagging areas, a factor which 
ultimately led to the creation of large industrial complexes with few connections to the local 
industrial fabric in lagging regions (Cuadrado Roura, 1987).
The concentration of public intervention on the local, rather than on the regional 
realm, led to the implementation of a territorial industrial policy based on development plans 
and development poles. In the first Development Plan (1964-1967) seven development poles 
were defined in lagging areas. These development poles were divided into two categories:
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the promotion poles, located basically in cities with a reduced industrial structure, but with 
what was considered as an adequate endowment of human and natural resources for the 
development of industry; and the industrial development poles, placed in cities with an 
already developed industrial fabric (Cuadrado Roura, 1987, p. 36-37).
The second Development Plan (1968-1971) was conceived along similar lines. 
Although some efforts were made in order to approach the question of regional development 
and growth in a wider territorial context, the practical implementation of the plans did not 
differ greatly from the previous one. The establishment of large production complexes in 
development poles was once again the chosen strategy.
The third Plan (1972-1975) introduced greater changes. The objective was to 
implement territorially integrated actions, instead of focusing on development poles. 
Development poles gave way to ‘large areas’. This strategy was conceived to achieve the first 
results in the medium and long term. Franco’s death and the advent of democracy cut short 
the development strategy conceived in the three development plans.
Was the development policy set in motion in Spain in the 1960s and early 1970s 
efficient? Did it succeed in achieving its goals of reducing the development gap among 
Spanish regions, and in setting the bases for autonomous growth in lagging areas? Although 
the Development Plans represented a significant progress with respect to the previous and 
somewhat erratic attempts to correct spatial inequalities, the results can be considered as 
modest (Cuadrado Roura, 1987; Suarez-Villa and Cuadrado Roura, 1993). Some of the 
development poles were quite successful in attracting industries and investment and in 
developing around these new centres a network of industries. However, in most cases 
incentives and subsidies in development poles were only capable of attracting -as happened 
in numerous areas of the Italian Mezzogiomo- what Lipietz called cathedrals in  the desert 
(Lipietz, 1980), that is large industrial complexes with almost no connection with the 
surrounding environment. Moreover, the excessive concentration of industries in certain poles
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generated congestion, pollution and other urban problems, whereas, due to the territorially 
reduced dimension of the poles and the lack of adequate outlets, neighbouring areas remained 
anchored in a traditional rural economy. The rest of the region thus hardly benefited from 
the dynamism of certain poles, whose problems became, to a certain extent, more related to 
those of the national industry than to those of the regional economy. Hence, interregional 
contrasts were not only not resolved, but new intra-regional disparities where engendered 
within lagging regions (Cuadrado Roura, 1987).
In sum, regional policy was completely incapable of countering the tendency to an 
increasing concentration of wealth in the economically most dynamic regions. During the era 
of the implementation of the Development Plans the highest growth was achieved in the 
tourist resorts of the Balearic and the Canary Islands, and in Madrid and Catalonia. Bar the 
Canary Islands, these regions were already among the wealthiest Spanish territories. This 
evidence lead to an increasing questioning of economic planning and o f the regional 
development plans designed by the central administration (Cuadrado Roura, 1987; Suarez- 
Villa and Cuadrado Roura, 1993).
IV.3 .2 .2 .2 .- Regionalization and regional policy in lagging regions.
The scarce results of the development plans, and the rapid process o f devolution of 
power to the regions which was launched with the return to democracy, provoked a shift in 
the structure of Spanish development policies. Despite the fact that national development 
strategies lingered on, the main protagonism in regional development policies was passed 
onto the regions. Spanish regions had access to various degrees of self government in the 
second half o f the 1970s and first half of the 1980s. This rapid process was, as Pérez Díaz 
points out (1990, p. 21), influenced by Francoist repression of national identities: the 
suppression o f all territorial autonomy led to the reinforcement of Catalan and Basque 
nationalist sentiment. As a consequence, the will to achieve political freedom and to establish 
democracy became associated with a strong determination to accomplish a devolution of
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autonomous powers to regions with a strong national or regional identity.
The Spanish decentralization model is not unique and homogenous across regions. As 
mentioned, there are several constitutional ways of accessing regional autonomy, which also 
imply different levels of self-government. The development of a greater or lesser degree of 
self-government has depended mainly on the interpretation of the strength of local identity. 
The three historical nations (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) achieved a speedy 
access to a full autonomous status. Similarly, regions with ‘fueros’n -the Charter regions 
of the Basque Country and Navarre- were included among those to gain full devolution. 
Other regions could also access regional autonomy in a quicker and more complete way. 
Andalusia led the way in the fight to attain the same rights granted to historical regions 
(Pérez Díaz, 1990, p. 30-31). Valencia and the Canary Islands followed later. A final 
regional typology of the devolution process is summarized in Table IV. 1.
Different levels of autonomy across Spanish regions imply also diverse financial and 
budgetary capacities. As has often been mentioned (Castells, 1987), some Spanish regions 
have acquired a financial capacity that is parallelled only by that of meso-govemments in 
federal states. However, other regions lag behind in their capacity to finance, and thus to 
design their own development policies at a regional level. This implies that regions which 
have had the dynamism and budgetary capacity to set up their own development schemes and 
development agencies have contributed more to foster economic activity and economic 
growth. Recent evidence shows that the regionalization process has injected a certain 
dynamism into the economic arena, especially evident in those regions with greater capacities 
to implement their own policies, and which is reflected in slightly higher growth rates -when 
other factors are controlled for- of regions with greater political autonomy during the 1980s, 
than during the 1960s (Rodríguez-Pose, 1996). From this perspective, it could be said, as 1
11 The ‘fueros’ are economic charters which were granted to some Spanish Kingdoms in the 
Middle-Ages and respected henceforth by the Spanish state after unification. Most regional fueros 
were suppressed in the early 17th century by Philip V, the first Bourbon king. Nevertheless, Navarra 
and the Basque Country managed to keep their own privileges until this century.
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Table IV.l
REGIONAL TYPOLOGY RESULTING FROM THE DEVOLUTION PROCESS
Type of region Level of political and 
financial autonomy
Regions
Charter Very high Navarre and the 
Basque Country
Access to autonomy 
via Art. 151
High or very high Andalusia, Canary 
Islands, Catalonia, 
Galicia, Valencia
Access to autonomy 
via Art. 143
Low Aragon, Asturias, 
Balearic Islands, 
Cantabria, Castile-La 
Mancha, Castile-León, 
Extremadura, Madrid, 
Murcia, Rioja
Vázquez Barquero stresses, that "the creation of the regional state and the transfer o 
competences to the autonomous communities permit them [at least in the early stages o 
devolution] to overcome restrictions that impeded the political and administrative dimensioi 
from working within the local endogenous development processes" (1986, p. 16). As a result 
regions seem to have set the basis for a more efficient use o f local resources which, ii 
several cases, has been translated into better economic performances.
Unfortunately, regions with a greater capacity to foster their own developmen 
schemes have not always been the regions which needed them most. The most successfu 
development schemes have been carried out in two o f the most advanced regions, whicl 
perhaps least needed them. Development schemes set up by regional governments in the
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Basque Country and in Catalonia have been greatly inspired by similar structures in the 
regions of the Terza Italia. Regional institutions and newly created regional agencies have 
worked together with chambers of commerce, associations of entrepreneurs and trade unions 
in order to promote the creation of networks of SMEs and to link these networks to the 
existing industries, in a manner which in some areas (i.e.: Mondragon in the Basque 
Country) greatly resembles the experience of industrial districts. In contrast, governments 
in lagging regions with the constitutional and financial prerogatives to fulfil their own 
development schemes have been less proficient than the Catalan and Basque governments. 
Regional administrations in Andalusia and Galicia remained anchored in traditional demands 
to obtain greater investment from the central government, disregarding the industrial and 
development policies set in motion by their Basque and Catalan counterparts. Only in the 
beginning of the 1990s new and promising paths inspired in endogenous development 
strategies have been started in these two regions.
Administrations in other lagging regions like Castile-La Mancha, Castile-Leon, 
Extremadura, and Murcia were incapable of setting up their own development strategies since 
very often they lacked the competences and the necessary budget to pursue autonomous 
policies in these fields.
7 i
In short, a long tradition of active intervention in lagging Spanish regions has 
achieved sparse results. Backward regions are as affected by lack of dynamism as they were 
several decades ago. The causes of this relative failure of regional intervention can be divided 
into two groups. During Francoist times, the design of development policies at a national 
level, which did not always reflect and respond to specific regional problems lead to a 
detachment of local economic and social forces from the development process, and, as in the 
case of the Italian Mezzogiomo, to the formation of a mentality of assisted economy. 
Moreover, the emphasis of growth poles, instead of in more comprehensive and territorially 
integrated policies, contributed to the development of new intra-regional disparities within 
lagging regions. The advent of democracy and the regionalization process has solved the
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problem of central planning, but lagging regions have been less competent than advanced 
ones in grasping the advantages of the new system. Some of them because their regional 
governments and institutions showed little dynamism during the early stages of the devolution 
process. Others, because they lacked the sufficient competences and budget to develop their 
economic and industrial policies.
*
* *
In contrast to what was observed in the ‘new growth spaces’, political and institutional 
intervention in certain lagging regions in Western Europe has had either no effect on 
economic outcomes, or even has led to the creation of perverse effects and vicious cycles 
which, in the long-run, have tended to discourage economic activity. Lack of regional 
autonomy in the early stages of economic intervention can be considered as one of the causes 
for the creation of assisted economies in the Italian Mezzogiorno and regions in the South 
and West of Spain. Imposing transfers of funds and the location of industrial complexes with 
few connections to the local economy, and the failure to foster local entrepreneurship led to 
the progressive transformation of what was conceived as a development and industrial policy 
into a policy o f income support. Even in those regions such as Sicily or Sardinia, which 
enjoyed a certain level of autonomy, similar processes were reproduced; what can be called 
collective deresponsabilizzazione of regional institutions has become the norm.
Regionalization processes in Italy and Spain did not imply a substantial change. The 
mentality of assisted economy had already set its roots, and often national political contexts 
contributed to the maintenance of policies whose impact on local economic performance was 
much lower than expected.
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IV.4- REGIONAL POLITICS AND GROWTH AT THE EUROPEAN 
LEVEL.
As we have seen, recent literature has extensively dealt with the relationship between 
politics and economic performance, either to highlight that politics and political issues have 
contributed to generate higher growth, or to underscore that, in certain cases, political 
conditions have had a detrimental effect on growth trends.
Several factors stand out in the review of the literature as the variables and conditions 
which seem to have contributed the most to fostering the relationship between politics and 
economic performance. First, the presence of encompassing trade unions has been generally 
considered as a favourable element. Both the corporatist economies of Scandinavia, or the 
industrial districts of Emilia-Romagna have been able to progress under -or even better, 
because of- conditions of large trade union membership and under the presence of 
encompassing and well-organized labour organizations. Trade unions have actively 
contributed to the pursuit of collective gain strategies by actively participating with 
governments and employer associations in policy making.
Secondly, the orientation of parties in office -and, especially in relationship to the 
characteristics of the labour movement- are regarded as another factor bolstering the 
connection between political conditions and economic performance. Left-wing governments 
in combination with an encompassing labour organization, as well as right-wing policies in 
a setting of weak trade unions, are considered by some authors to have positive effects on 
the economy.
Public expenditure and taxation are other factors which have captured the attention 
of researchers. Taxation is related to the capacity o f governments to set up wealth 
redistribution strategies, which are broadly considered -despite some exceptions- to have a 
beneficial effect on economic progress. Public expenditure reflects the capacity of
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governments to set up their own economic policies, which, despite conflicting arguments on 
the topic, are considered by large sections of the literature on corporatism and socio­
economic restructuring as valuable tools to promote economic activity.
Moreover, the capacity of governments to articulate and structure networks of 
collective interest and to provide the necessary and basic collective goods, the congenial 
organizational ecology, the redundant capacities and the adequate institutional exoskeleton 
to pursue economic activity, is increasingly judged as a key element in the positive or 
negative association between politics and economic performance. Governments which have 
the power and the ability to articulate these networks and to provide the institutional 
exoskeleton play a non negligible role in fostering economic activity. In contrast, 
governments and institutions lacking the capacity and the ability to provide such a setting are 
regarded as hindrances in order to promote growth.
According to the literature, the power and ability o f governments to structure these 
networks seems to be closely related, not only to their administrative and budgetary 
competences, but also to the existence of constant patterns of vote. A large identification of 
the population with a given political party seems to confer parties in office and governments 
the legitimacy to act as promoters of local, regional or national level alliances of 
governments and institutions, employer associations, labour groups and political parties which 
are at the base of the proclaimed connection between political conditions and the economy. 
Strong governments or governmental coalitions have thus a greater power to design and 
implement their own development strategies and to act as patrons of local networks consisting 
of economic, social and political agents.
In sum, the capacity of politics and governments to influence economic outputs, and 
thus to impinge on economic performance, is greatly determined by the level of autonomy. 
Both constitutional autonomy in order to tackle relevant issues in relationship with economic 
activity; and financial autonomy in order to be able to redistribute wealth and to implement
2 8 6
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autonomous economic, industrial and development strategies and policies, which in spite of 
the increasing globalization of the economy, are still viewed as important differentiating 
elements in the genesis of economic activity.
Nevertheless, the relevant factors which determine the association between politics 
and economic performance have been extracted either from national approaches to the topic 
(corporatism), or on a case study bases (literature on socio-economic restructuring). And 
national and case study approaches to the topic have been, in my opinion, extremely 
restricted. The corporatist literature has been centred around the advanced capitalist 
economies, and much of its theoretical corpus is derived from the analysis of the 
Scandinavian institutionally rich economies. The geographical setting on which literature on 
socio-economic restructuring has concentrated, has also been amazingly reduced. Together 
with the examples of the Terza Italia, Baden-Württemberg, and the industrial districts of 
Western Jutland and Southern Norway, reviewed in the previous pages, few other spaces 
have captivated the attention of researchers. The region of Rhône-Alpes, the London- 
Reading-Bristol corridor, and the scientific and technological poles complete the relationship 
of the areas in Europe where research on the ‘new growth spaces’ has been carried out. 
These are what can be considered as the most favourable cases to test the territorial effects 
of recent changes. In contrast, other areas have attracted little attention. Insufficient research 
has been performed in intermediate regions, and although there is an increasing interest on 
industrial declining areas, this interest has by no means reached the level of enthusiasm 
raised by the ‘new growth’ areas. Literature on the problems of some peripheral regions, like 
the Italian Mezzogiomo antedates and has little in common with that on the process of socio- 
economic restructuring.
The units of analysis and methods used when tackling the association between politics 
and economic performances raises interesting questions about the possibility to apply the 
findings o f the literature on corporatism at a regional, instead of at a national level. Similar 
questions are raised about the capacity to build, on the basis of a few case studies, a global
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theory on the relationship between politics and economic performance in a post-Fordist 
environment. Is the association between politics and the economy which has been detected 
at a national level by the analysts of corporatism applicable at a regional level? Does the 
dose relationship between political conditions and economic outcomes in the ‘new growth 
spaces’ hold for a larger territorial setting? Can it be maintained when cross-sectional, 
instead of case study analysis, is performed?
There have been very few attempts to address the question of the relationship between 
political conditions and economic outcomes in a large regional setting. Perhaps the most 
significant one has been Putnam’s attempt to measure the performance o f Italian regional 
institutions, and how this performance impinges on growth. In his recent book (1993), 
Putnam proposes an ingenious method of evaluating institutional performance. He determines 
a set of twelve indicators for Italian regions which try to capture aspects such as the stability 
of regional governments, the efficiency in presenting regional budgets, the capacity to 
generate legislative reforms, the accuracy and reliability of the regional statistical services, 
the instruments of industrial policy, etc. (pp. 73-85). After conducting the analysis, he finds 
that some regions perform significantly better than others from an institutional point of view 
(1993, p. 95). The performance o f institutions is closely associated to civic traditions (defined 
by the interest of the population in public life and in community problems) present in certain 
areas of Italy. And despite a few exceptions12, he considers local civic traditions or the 
degree of *civic-ness’ as capable o f predicting economic outcomes (1993, p. 182). According 
to Putnam, the degree of ‘civic-ness’ has a strong impact on the economy and not vice versa 
(1993, pp. 182-183).
However, are Putnam’s conclusions applicable to other regional contexts outside Italy? 
Are factors such as encompassing trade unions, institutional sclerosis, the orientation of 13
13 Campania, he argues, is better off from an economic point of view than Molise or Basilicata, 
but the regional institutions of the former perform worse than that of the latter. Similarly, regional 
administrations in Liguria, Lombardy, and Piedmont are less efficient than those of Emilia-Romagna 
or Umbria, despite enjoying higher levels of GDP per capita (Putnam, 1993, p. 101).
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parties in office, public expenditure and taxation, constant patterns of vote and so on, still 
associated to economic performance when they are taken out of the territorial settings where 
they have been studied?
The following sections will try -in light of the factors underlined by the literature on 
the topic- to address the question of the relationship between regional political conditions and 
growth in Western Europe, using cross-sectional analysis techniques. First I will try to 
operationalize the concepts used by the literature and to transform them into variables, before 
performing regression analysis with the variables in order to determine the degree of 
association between individual political indicators and growth. Later, I will execute a cluster 
analysis with the resulting political variables with the aim -as was already done in the 
previous chapter- of calculating whether there is a significant association between the 
resulting regional clusters and the groups of regions according to their growth rates 
established in Chapter II.
IV .4.1.- OPERATIONALIZING POLITICAL CONCEPTS.
One of the main problems that researchers working on cross-sectional analyses must 
face when trying to test hypotheses is how to transform concepts and theories into variables. 
This problem is magnified when tackling the association between political conditions and 
economic outcomes at a regional level. How can we measure factors such as the presence 
of encompassing trade unions, the capacity of regional governments to articulate and 
structure networks of collective interest, and local and regional level alliances? How do we 
operationalize complex concepts such as autonomy or the capacity to set the adequate 
institutional exoskeleton in order to promote growth?
As was already mentioned, postulates on the association between political conditions 
and growth have been developed either with nations as the unit of analysis, or on a case 
study basis. In this way researches have been able to dodge the problems of lack of data at 289
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a regional level, and have been capable of developing rich and complex theories about the 
interaction between social, economic and political conditions which become difficult to 
disentangle into separate variables.
Lack of regional political data is perhaps the most serious handicap when trying to 
operationalize theory into variables. Contrary to what happens with economic and social data, 
there is not a single data set at a European level which includes regional political data. The 
European Union’s REGIO database can be regarded as limited and lacks basic information 
from a social perspective, but at least it includes a series of variables which have been 
standardized and are thus perfectly comparable. In the political field there is no similar 
database. This limits the possibility of conducting most types of cross-sectional analysis. 
Moreover, since the regionalization process is still quite new in most European countries it 
is impossible to trace back most of the variables for more than five or six years. As a 
consequence, all the indicators which will be used in this analysis have been compiled by 
resorting to national yearbooks and newspapers.
In addition, and considering the different levels of devolution of power to the regions 
in Western Europe, only complete sets of regional data could be gathered for those countries 
whose regions enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. Therefore, no data at a regional level 
has been used for Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal, 
whereas in the case of the United Kingdom the indicators reflecting electoral support 
represent the results of national elections divided on a regional basis.
Even more important than the actual lack of political data is the existing gap between 
the political variables available at a regional level and the theories that support the existence 
of a certain association between local institutional and political conditions and economic 
growth. These theories -as was already mentioned- consider that the link between politics and 
institutions, on the one hand, and growth, on the other, is achieved via a complex system of 
networks in which political parties, trade unions, associations of firms and other social and
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political actors interact. Regional institutions and intermediate levels of government play a 
fundamental role in fostering the formation of these networks. This complex relationship 
between politics, institutions, and growth, developed on a case study basis, is almost 
impossible to test on a cross-sectional basis, and especially with the available political data. 
Available variables can only give us a very feeble hint of the power parties in regional office 
may have in order to try to develop similar networks to the ones described in the case of 
industrial districts or other similar industrial formations. However, they do not say anything 
about local government activism or about how meso levels of government across Western 
Europe are using the strong or weak power they have in order to contribute to the formation 
of networks and to try to promote growth.
These handicaps seriously condition the analysis. Significant factors such as the 
presence o f encompassing trade unions cannot be introduced in this type of analysis simply 
because of lack of reliable regional data. Other factors such as institutional sclerosis, and 
local and regional level alliances are hard to define on a quantitative measure, and even when 
this is achieved, there is no data available. In addition, other political indicators do not 
reflect the complexity of the arguments developed on a theoretical basis. The absence of data 
on institutions and institutional networks precludes any serious attempt to empirically test the 
main theories that relate political and institutional factors to regional growth. Therefore my 
intention in this section is -using a Popperian approach- to try to determine whether there is 
a certain statistical association between several political factors relevant for these theories and 
regional growth on a cross-sectional basis, and not to question the existing theoretical corpus 
as a whole. As a result, the final political database used in this analysis includes thirteen 
variables for the regions delimited in Chapter II, which in some way try to reflect the 
political factors considered by the literature to have a greater relationship with economic 
growth in regions in the beginning of the 1990s (Table IV.2).
The lack of data on trade unionism at a regional level, leads us to consider other ways 
to measure the presence of support for what can be considered as encompassing organizations
291
The socio-political bases of regional growth...
Table IV.2
VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE POLITICAL DATABASE
Variable Definition *
ELECSUPP Electoral support for main regional party in the last regional 
elections (in %)
DIFBEPAR Difference between first and second party in the last regional 
elections (in %)
ELECEVOL Electoral evolution of the main regional party (in %) between 
the last and the previous election
PERSEATS Percentage of seats held in regional parliament by the main 
regional party (in %)
POLORMAI Political orientation of the main regional party (alphanumerical 
variable with seven entries)
POLOROFF Political orientation of the parties in office (alphanumerical 
variable with seven entries)
POLORPRE Political orientation of the president of the regional government 
(alphanumerical variable with seven entries)
TYPREGGO Type of regional government (alphanumerical variable with five 
entries)
POLIL1NK Link between regional and national government (alphanumerical 
variable with three entries)
VOTEGOVE Does the most voted for party govern? (yes/no)
REGIBUDG Regional budget (in Ecus per capita)
REGTURNO Difference between turnout in regional elections and turnout in 
national elections (in %)
AUTONOMY Trichotomous variable reflecting the capacity of regional 
administrations to set up their own autonomous policies and to 
levy taxes (high/medium/low)
Note: Data included in all variables reflect the political panorama in January 1994 in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain. Regional data for the United Kingdom corresponds to the last national elections.
The variables POLORMA1 and POLORPRE include the following alphanumerical entries: Communist parly. Socialist 
pany, Social Democratic party. Regional party. Centre and Liberal parties, Christian Democratic parties, and Conservative
panics.
The variable POLOROFF includes the following alphanumerical entries: left, centre left, "great coalitions’ , centre, 
regional, centre right, and right.
The variable TYPREGGO includes the following alphanumerical entries: one party governments, single party minority 
governments, coalition governments, coalition with regional parties, and great coalition governments.
The variable POL1LINK includes the following entries: same party in office, coalition parties, and opposition. 
Alphanumeric data in independent variables have been transformed into numeric data in order to perform correlations.
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j at a regional level. Electoral support for the main party (ELECSUPP) and the difference
I between the first and second party (DIFBEPAR) are a way to measure the power and
i legitimacy political parties might have in order to intervene in the decision making process.
I
Other theoretical factors such as constant patters of vote are partially reflected in the 
electoral evolution of the main regional parties (ELECEVOL). The political orientation of 
governments is represented in three different variables: the political orientation of the main 
, political party (POLORMAI), of the parties in office (POLOROFF), and of the head of
I regional executives (POLORPRE).
The capacity of regional governments to design and implement their own autonomous
policies is covered by political and budgetary variables. The percentage of seats held in
I regional parliaments (PERSEATS), the type of regional government (TYPREGGO), the link
I between the regional and national executive (POLILINK), and whether the most voted party
j governs try to reflect the political dimension of policy making. The measure of regional
budgets per capita (REGIBUDG) tries to capture the financial capacity.
i
The degree of civic involvement in regional politics and the importance regional 
politics has for the community is at least partially represented in the difference between 
turnouts in regional elections and turnouts in national ones (REGTURNO).
i
' And finally, the presence or lack, and the degree of autonomy is summarized in the
trichotomous variable AUTONOMY.
As in the case of social variables, the political indicators of the database were 
standardized in order to get rid of the national effect13.
/
13 Cf. section III. 1 .2 .3 . for additional information on the procedure o f  how to standardize the data 
set nationally.
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IV.2.- REGRESSION ANALYSIS.
The analysis of the political panorama at a regional level in Western Europe is 
indicative of a complex political landscape. As in the case of social conditions, national 
differences are highly noticeable and few common transnational features can be highlighted. 
National contrasts in regional voting patterns, electoral systems, electoral turnouts, transfers 
of competences and actual budgetary power of regions, contribute to confirm this extremely 
heterogenous structure which defines the political ‘Europe of the Regions*.
Individually taken, none of the variables included in the analysis show a significant 
positive or negative correlation with regional growth (Table IV.3). In fact, the correlation 
coefficients of the political variables with growth tend to be even less significant than those 
observed for social variables (see Table III.2). This implies that there is no statistically 
significant association between the existence of a right wing or left wing regional government 
and economic growth; that the type of regional government is irrelevant to growth; and that 
political tensions or consensus between national and regional governments or the existence 
of a strong regional identification with a certain party does not seem to affect growth 
possibilities in any given region.
There is only an extremely slight positive association between an upward evolution 
in electoral results of the main political party at a regional level and economic growth. This 
correlation confirms the theory that voters tend to support the ruling party in times of 
economic prosperity.
Almost the same conclusions can be extracted when using regression analysis of 
individual variables. In these regressions the variables included in the dataset are considered 
as independent variables, while regional economic growth is the dependent variable. The 
analysis (Statistical Appendix) shows that there is no statistically significant association
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Table IV.3
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT 
POLITICAL VARIABLES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Independent Variable Correlation coefficient 
with growth
ELECSUPP 0.17
DIFBEPAR 0.16
ELECEVOL 0.24
PERSEATS 0.13
POLORMAI 0.06
POLOROFF 0.11
POLORPRE 0.06
TYPREGGO 0.01
POLI LINK 0.02
VOTEGOVE 0.13
REGIBUDG 0.10
REGTURNO -0.18
AUTONOMY 0.14
between economic performance and all the variables reflecting the potentiality or likelihood
of regional political parties to act as encompassing organizations. R2 rarely exceed levels of
2 or 3% , and /-statistics and p-levels do not reach the thresholds of what is considered as 
statistically significant14. No significant results can be extracted from the residual analysis. 
It could be envisaged that if variables representing the support for regional parties were not 
associated with regional growth rates, that at least the cases which have been pinpointed by 
the literature as the areas in which there seems to be a closer association between political
conditions and economic outcomes, would appear as outliers in the analysis. However, 
neither Baden-Württemberg, nor the regions in the Terza Italia are significant outliers. In
14 E.g. /-statistics for ELECSUPP are 1.428, and 1.313 for DIFBEPAR (cf. Statistical Appendix).
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fact, they are included among the regional cases in which observed values tend to match 
predicted values (see Statistical Appendix). On the contrary, regions which have not been 
specially focused by the literature on post-Fordism are among the most significant outliers: 
the Canary Islands, Lorraine, Corsica, Picardy, Hesse, Asturias and Galicia.
Similarly, there is no statistically significant correlation between variables indicating 
the political orientation of regional governments and economic performance. The level of 
statistical significance of variables such as the political orientation of the main regional party, 
or the parties in office or of the head of the regional cabinet are fully unrelated with growth, 
/-statistics and /7-levels are even below the levels of significance observed for variables 
representing the electoral support of political parties. High growth and low growth occur 
under left- and right-wing governments. And the residual analysis demonstrates that the 
orientation of parties in office is not associated at all with economic growth. The maximum 
variation of predicted growth rates in the case of the political orientation of the main regional 
party is of only two percentage points, whereas the observed variation reaches almost 40 
points (Statistical Appendix). Once again the main outliers are regions such as the Canary 
Islands, Corsica, Picardy, Lorraine or Hesse, which have been the focus of little attention.
No significant results are achieved either when the variables reflecting the capacity 
of regional governments to design and implement their own autonomous policies are taken 
into account. The type of regional government, the parliamentary power of parties, the link 
between national and regional governments and the regional budget are fully unconnected to 
growth. R2 values, as well as f-statistics and p-levels in these regressions clearly indicate the 
lack of association between these regional political conditions and growth. Once again, the 
main outliers are to be found in the regions already mentioned in the previous categories.
The analysis of electoral turnout in regional elections with respect to national ones, 
as measure of civic involvement in regional issues, also gives no significant results. Although 
f-statistics are slightly higher than in previous cases, they are still not statistically significant.
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Once again the observed variation in regional growth rates is much greater than the predicted 
one, and none of the ‘new growth spaces1 comes out of the analysis as a significant outlier.
The only exception is the measure of the electoral evolution of regional parties. There 
is a slightly significant positive association between growth of electoral support for the main 
regional party and economic growth. This evidence seems to support the hypothesis that 
parties in office at the regional level tend to improve their performance in times of economic 
expansion.
IV.3.- CLUSTER ANALYSIS.
In sum, individual political factors at a regional level seem to be unrelated with 
economic phenomena and growth. A fact that could lead us to conclude that there is no 
statistically significant connection between political conditions and economic growth at a 
regional cross-sectional level. However, if instead of taking the political indicators 
individually and comparing them with growth, we performed a multivariate cluster analysis, 
could we extract regional political clusters which -in the same way as social clusters did- 
would to a great extent reproduce groups of regions with similar levels of economic growth? 
Are there certain sets of political indicators which are associated to positive or negative 
behaviours in terms of regional growth? Does politics at a regional level -in the countries 
where regional representatives are elected by universal suffrage- affect economic growth or 
vice versa, or, conversely, is there no clear cut relation between politics and growth in the 
regional arena?
The hypothesis behind this test is the same one which underlies the whole thesis: the 
process of socio-economic restructuring and the diminishing influence of capital and 
technology in the location of economic activity, may have rendered the relationship between 
regional and local political conditions and growth more visible. Therefore -as in the case of 
social conditions- if growth patterns are now more closely related to political circumstances,
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clusters stemming from the political analysis will tend to reproduce the regional typology 
established in chapter II. If, in contrast, there is no significant relationship between regional 
politics and growth levels, political clusters and the pre-established regional typology will be 
fully unrelated. It is supposed that factors such as patterns of regional voting, the type and 
orientation of regional governments, the relationship between regional and national 
governments, as well as the budgetary capacity of regional administrations to set up their 
own economic, industrial, and development strategies may lead to the implementation of 
different types of policies. And if the relationship between policies and growth has become 
more visible, the implementation of different economic policies, or simply the capacity to 
carry out active policies at the regional level, might be associated with diverse economic 
outcomes.
The steps followed in the analysis are the same as in the previous chapter:
a) Data is standardized nationally, in order to get rid of the national effect.
b) K-means clustering techniques are used in order to establish 6 different 
regional clusters.
c) Resulting clusters are compared with the 6 sets of regions established a 
priori according to their levels of growth and the existence of similar 
economic characteristics, in order to determine whether there is a certain 
association between political and growth clusters15.
The results of the cluster analysis, nevertheless, do not reveal any significant 
association between the conditions and changes in regional politics and regional growth. In 
contrast to social clusters, clusters stemming from this multivariate analysis o f regional 
politics embrace very heterogenous groups of regions with few or no common features in 
terms of economic attributes and growth levels during the past decades. In the same cluster, 
we find regions with extreme levels of growth like Bavaria (109) on the one hand, and
IS For an explanation in greater detail of the method, please refer to section II. 1.1. in Chapter III.
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Asturias (85.25), Rioja (87.44), or Nord-Pas de Calais (87.80), on the other (Cluster 4). 
Similar contrasts are observed in all other political clusters. In some clusters (mainly cluster 
1) very dynamic capital regions share similar political conditions at the regional level as 
regions affected by industrial decline or peripheral less dynamic regions. In other cases, 
intermediate dynamic regions are included in the same cluster as peripheral less dynamic or 
financial centres. No single set of economically defined regions predominates in any of the 
resulting political clusters.
Table IW4
MEAN ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF REGIONS 
INCLUDED IN THE POLITICAL CLUSTERS
Cluster Mean annual growth rate of the members
of the cluster (EUR12=100)
Cluster 1 
Cluster 2 
Cluster 3 
Cluster 4 
Cluster 5 
Cluster 6
96.77
98.97
98.02
100.16
99.67
101.49
The lack of association between the regional political environment and regional 
growth is clearly illustrated when the average rate o f growth of the members of each cluster 
is calculated. The average rate of growth is close to 100 in all of the clusters but number 1 
(Table IV .4), whereas in the social clusters of the previous chapter, well defined differences 
in terms of economic growth during the 1980s and early 1990s were observed (c/ Table
III.6).
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If we descend from the European to the national level, a similar lack of association 
between the political indicators included in the analysis and growth is observed. In the case 
of Italy, for example, regions in the Mezzogiorno such as Campania, Abruzzi, Molise and 
Basilicata share similar political indicators as the Veneto, and yet economic performance 
during the 1980s and early 1990s tends to be quite different, especially between Veneto and 
Basilicata. These regions shared in common the presence o f a strong majority party (the DC), 
whose electoral scores relegated political opposition to a distant background. Turnovers at 
regional elections tended to be below average and, despite massive electoral support for the 
DC, the Italian electoral system and traditions of coalition making, resulted in coalition 
governments everywhere within this group, bar Molise. And yet, this seemingly similar 
political structure does not say anything about other factors such as the dynamism of regional 
governments, the internal stability within the main party or the capacity o f the party to 
articulate networks involving economic, social and political actors at a regional levels. Other 
groups of regions sharing similar political conditions at a regional level is that made up of 
the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Lombardy, and the one including 
Piedmont, Liguria, Trentino-Alto Adige, Marche and Lazio. However, regions in these 
clusters perform very differently in economic terms. Poor economic scores in the regions of 
the Terza Italia during the 1980s and early 1990s contrast with average growth in Lombardy; 
and the high levels of economic performance of Lazio and Trentino-Alto Adige differ from 
average growth in the North-East.
In a similar way, Spanish regions with comparable political panoramas, clearly differ 
in their growth rates. The regions of Galicia, Castile and León, the Balearic Islands, and, 
with certain nuances Catalonia, have been characterized in recent years for stable right-wing 
majorities, which have been capable of improving their electoral scores, below average 
regional electoral turnovers and an increasing capacity to set up their own autonomous 
policies (although the level o f regional autonomy is much higher in Catalonia and Galicia 
than in the other two regions). And yet, economic outcomes differ clearly. Growth has 
soared in the Balearic Islands and Catalonia, whereas Castile and León, and Galicia are
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amongst the Spanish regions experiencing the lowest economic expansion.
Analogous contrasts in groups of regions sharing fairly common political contexts at 
a national level and yet experiencing very different growth levels can be highlighted in the
cases of France and Germany.
IV .4.4.- TH E REASONS FOR THE LACK OF CONNECTION BETWEEN 
PO LITICA L CONDITIONS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL AND ECONOMIC 
G ROW TH.
What are the reasons for this lack of association between political conditions at the 
regional level and regional economic growth in Western Europe? Several factors could be 
highlighted as the basic causes of the absence of connection between political circumstances 
at the European regional level and growth.
First of all, politics at a regional level means different things in different European 
nations. Dissimilar levels of transfers of powers to regions condition the influence regional 
politics, in particular, and all regional events, in general, may have in the overall evolution 
o f the economy. As it was mentioned in Chapter II when analyzing the choice of the unit of 
analysis, there is not a unique and homogenous system of regional state in Western Europe. 
From the well developed federalism of Austria, Germany, and Belgium, to the centralism of 
Greece. Denmark, or the Netherlands, a wide range of regional regimes has been established 
in European nations.
Contrasts are not only evident across nations. Within states (as in the cases of Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) regions enjoy different levels o f autonomy. For example, in the Spanish 
case, the Spanish Constitution did not provide for a single way to access autonomy. In fact, 
it contained different procedures for accomplishing devolution to the regions, which de facto  
led to the establishment of different degrees of regional autonomy, as a recognition of 301
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"variations in the vigour of nationalistic feeling or the sense of singularity in different parts 
of the country" (Cuchillo, 1993, p. 214). ‘Historical* regions (Catalonia, the Basque 
Country, and Galicia) had leeway to reach quasi federal autonomous powers in a short period 
of time, according to article 151 of the Constitution, while in other regions devolution could 
only be accomplished slowly and with difficulty following the procedures of article 143'6. 
In Italy, two different systems of regional autonomy are to be found: that of the special 
statute regions (Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Valle 
d ’Aosta) and the 15 ‘ordinary’ regions, which enjoy an inferior degree of self-government. 
In Portugal, the level of autonomy of the Azores and Madeira clearly exceeds that of the 
regions on the Continent.
Different systems of regional states also imply diverse capacities to design and 
implement their own regional policies. Regions in Austria, Belgium, and Germany have a 
considerable degree of self-rule in key sectors for economic growth like planning, industrial 
and social policy or education, together with strong transfers of powers in other fields which 
might have a less direct impact on growth. Spanish regions come immediately after, but -as 
was mentioned before- internal contrasts in terms of transfer of competences between 
‘historical’ and ‘non-historical’ regions are substantial. Italy is the other regional state in 
Europe, but the capacity of regions to execute their own autonomous policies is -with the 
exception of the five special statute regions- inferior to that of most Spanish regions.
Among the European states which are in a process o f being regionalized France and 16
16 Article 143.2 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that "the right to initiate the process 
towards self government lies with all the Provincial Councils concerned or with the corresponding 
inter-island body and with two-thirds of the municipalities whose populations represent at least the 
majority of the electorate of each province or island. This requirement must be met within six months 
from the initial agreement adopted to this effect by any of the local Corporations concerned". Should 
this requirements not be successfully met, they may only be repeated after five years. However, 
article 151 establishes a much quicker way to access self-government, provided the following 
conditions are met: approval by three quarters of the Municipalities of each Province concerned, 
representing at least the majority of the electorate of each one, and that the initiative is ratified in a 
referendum by the absolute majority of the electors in each province.
3 0 2
The political bases o f regional growth
Portugal stand out. In France regions have been acquiring greater political autonomy since 
the passing of the 1982 Deferre law on regionalization. Nevertheless, and despite significant 
advances in recent years, the level of self-rule in France is still extremely restricted in 
comparison to that o f regions in federal states, or in Spain. In Portugal, a considerable level 
of autonomy has been granted to the islands of the Azores and Madeira. On the Continental 
regions, the decentralization process is still at its early stages. In both countries the process 
of regionalization is still relatively weak, and the power granted to the regions, or their 
capacity to implement their own autonomous economic policies is seriously limited by law 
and budgetary shortages.
Lastly, in the rest of the EU, regions are nothing more than administrative entities. 
In spite o f the lively debates going on fundamentally in the United Kingdom on the 
advantages and disadvantages of devolution of powers to the regions, little progress has been 
made. Consequently, regions in these countries have no power to design and execute their 
own autonomous policies.
Contrasts in regional autonomy go hand in hand with differences in budgetary 
allowances to regions in order to implement growth promoting policies. There are strong 
contrasts in budgetary capacity among countries where a certain transfer of power and 
competences to regions has been achieved. Whereas in Belgium regions and language 
communities have at their disposal a budget which amounts to 50% of the total federal 
budget, and similar percentages are administered by German Länder, budgetary allowances 
to regions in France and Portugal are almost negligible. Although the budget at the disposal 
of French regions has been multiplied by 8 between 1977 and 1990, it still represents a 
meagre share of the total French budget. In between those two poles we find Spain and Italy. 
In Spain, after the brisk regionalization process of the 1980s, regions will control shortly 
30% of the total national budget. Italian regions have less financial autonomy, but this is 
likely to increase with the rising territorialization of Italian politics. 30
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However, even in the cases of most extreme budgetary decentralization (the Belgian 
or the German case), it is highly doubtful that regional governments will have enough power 
to pursue the policies they consider to be more adequate to promote growth within their 
regional boundaries. The lack of budgetary means might prove to be an unsurmountable 
barrier to the implementation of growth promoting policies. And even in the case that 
regional governments have both the legal rights and the budgetary capacity to implement their 
own growth promoting policies, it is unlikely that they will be capable of achieving the 
growth effects they were designed for. The existence of trade and monetary unions within 
nations contributes to diluting the positive or negative effects of regional measures over the 
whole national territory. Therefore, growth promoting policies might not only foster growth 
in the regions where they have been implemented, but -via industrial and trade links- in 
neighbouring regions, which thus became free riders of the process of growth.
The difficulties of implementing growth promoting policies by regional governments 
are exacerbated by the fact that there is not a clear image of the competences of regional 
governments. Even in countries at the early stages of devolution -like France- regions are 
starting to have greater competences in certain key sectors like socio-economic planning, 
education and infrastructure. In Belgium, Germany, and in several Spanish regions, regions 
enjoy great levels of autonomy which limit the action of the State. Education, scientific 
policy, industrial policy, public works, transport, urbanization, environment, social policy, 
and policing, are to a greater or lesser extent in the hands of regions. However, the line 
separating national and regional competences is not clearly perceivable by citizens, who often 
find it difficult to discern what is being done at a national level and what at a regional one. 
Consequently, in regional elections, parties encounter enormous difficulties in order to 
articulate competing options, centred around policy issues at a regional level. This fact 
contributes to the polarization o f regional election campaigns around general national issues, 
rather than on matters on which regions have real competences. The relationship between 
regional electoral results and the policies applied by regional governments is thus weakened, 
since debates in electoral campaigns at a regional level often focus on questions which have
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little to do with the actual electoral programmes of the competing parties.
In connection to the previous factor, we discover the lack of a clear cut perception 
of regional institutions and politics by the electorate. The regionalization process in most 
Western European countries is still too young to be completely perceived and comprehended 
by the electorate, aside from those regions where historical identity constitutes a cohesive 
force, that is reflected in regional electoral outcomes (Hueglin, 1986). In France, for 
example, only 43% of the electorate considered themselves well informed about the activities 
and competences of the Regional Councils (OIP survey, 1994), and almost half of the 
regional electorate did not even know the name of their local president of the Regional 
Council. In Spain the perception of the activity of regional governments is blurred by a lack 
of information about regional policies, and in some cases, by what is regarded as a certain 
duplication of competences between the State and the region (i.e.: in Spain some roads are 
dependent on the regional governments, while others are under the authority of the State). 
In the Italian context, the activities of regional governments are neither well known by the 
population (especially in contrast with the activities of the State), nor are they considered 
very highly. As Cammelli points out, the region as an administrative entity lacks visibility 
(1990, p. 166). And even in Belgium -a country which has been strongly split along regional 
lines- the cost-effectiveness, visibility and legitimacy of regional policies is far from being 
self-evident (de Winter, 1994).
This meagre visibility o f regional institutions turns out to be a serious barrier also for 
the promotion of networks of economic, social and political actors, as in the case of the 
Italian industrial districts. Regional governments, official and regional development agencies 
are thus often not considered as valid poles on which to secure the heart o f these networks.
The lack of visibility o f regional institutions and regional policies is translated into
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meagre electoral turnouts17. As a general rule18, turnout in regional elections tends to be 
lower than turnout at national elections, with the exception of extremely contested electoral 
campaigns or strong turnouts in regional elections in order to punish the ruling party at the 
national level. Only European elections attract in most countries a lower percentage of the 
electorate to the polls. Relatively low electoral turnouts are thus a clear sign that regional 
politics matter less -or are perceived to matter less- than politics at a national level.
In addition, regional elections are often the battlefield where citizens cast a vote on 
national political conflicts, which have little to do with the actual regional situation. The use 
of regional voting by the electorate as a punishment vote for the national government is not 
uncommon. It is more extended in the countries where the level of devolution of powers to 
regions is limited. This is clearly the case of France, where regional elections are often 
transformed into referenda in order to sanction or condemn the action of the national 
government. Even countries with a stronger regional tradition, such as Belgium, Germany, 
or Spain cannot escape this tendency. In Germany, there is a long practice of protest vote 
in regional elections, which resulted in high vote at the regional level for the SPD during the 
1950s and 1960s, increases of vote for the CDU during the governments of Brandt and 
Schmidt, and a decline of CDU vote during the 1980s. As a consequence, the political 
orientation of regional governments often counterbalances the power of the national 
government.
Despite the recent expansion in regional competences and the progress of the 
regionalization process in several European countries, the tendency to cast protest votes in
17 Electoral turnouts in regional elections, however, are strongly influenced by factors like 
whether regional elections coincide with national or local elections, or are held alone. Whenever 
regional elections coincide with other calls to the polls, turnouts tend to be higher. This fact greatly 
influences factors such as high electoral turnouts in Italian and Spanish regions with probably a 
weaker regional identity, with respect to other ‘historic’ or ‘special’ regions, where regional elections 
are often held separately.
18 This rule does not hold in countries with compulsory vote, like Belgium, where turnout at 
different elections is very similar (Ackaert, de Winter and Swyngedouw, 1994).
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regional elections has not decreased. Regional elections in the early 1990s show that in all 
of the countries included in the analysis (but in Italy, and Belgium) the regional vote seems 
to be not only a vote to select a certain regional political option, but also a protest vote 
against certain policies led by national governments. As a consequence of this, the end of the 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s marked a clear decline of the sway of left wing parties 
in the regional scene of those countries with left government. France and Spain are the most 
clear examples of these trends. Protest vote against Socialist-led governments at the national 
level resulted in a rightward shift of the regional electorate. In France, this situation 
convened a previously very heterogeneous political scene at the regional level into a right- 
wing field and led to the formation of right-wing regional councils in all French regions but 
Burgundy, Limousin, and Nord-Pas de Calais. The gaulliste RPR became the leading 
regional force in 11 regions, while the liberal UDF held the greatest share of votes in ten 
other regions. Only in the Nord-Pas de Calais was still the Socialist pany the leading political 
force.
The 1995 regional elections in Spain have accentuated the role of regional vote as a 
protest vote. Electoral strategies of opposition parties everywhere were based not on regional 
issues, but on national questions (and mainly in corruption and other scandals affecting the 
governing socialist party). The consequence was a major Socialist defeat. The Socialist pany 
has only been able to cling to power in its three southern strongholds of Andalusia, Castile- 
La Mancha, and Extremadura. A meagre compensation in comparison to the 12 regional 
governments they held eight years before.
In contrast, the German SPD experienced at the beginning of the 1990s a significant 
advance in regional elections. The vote for the Social Democrats was partly a punishment 
vote for the CDU of Helmut Kohl. The German Christian Democrats had won the first 
national elections held after the reunification almost by a landslide. However, the process of 
reunification and its costs lead to a progressive erosion of the party’s popularity. This was 
translated into significant advances of the SPD in the traditionally CDU led Länder of Lower
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Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate. Out of the 11 Länder of the former Federal Republic, the 
CDU remained as the leading regional party only in Baden-Württemberg. This, however, has 
not yet provoked a similar downfall of the CDU at a national level, and right-wing forces 
have continued to govern in most of the former GDR Lander (bar Brandenburg) and in 
Bavaria, were the CSU managed to defeat all opposition parties in the last regional elections.
Only in certain areas of these three countries which display a strong regional identity, 
the incidence of national issues on regional vote is less conspicuous. The existence of a 
strong regional identity often comes hand in hand with the formation of strong regional 
parties, whose main immediate focus and source of power is concentrated on the regional 
arena, rather than on the national one. Regional parties have long remained in office in 
Bavaria, Catalonia, and the Basque Country. In Bavaria, the conservative CSU -in spite of 
having a permanent alliance with the Christian Democratic party- has been capable of 
maintaining its deep Bavarian roots. The Bavarian CSU has long been the most successful 
of regional parties. This conservative Bavarian party has secured the first spot in all regional 
elections in Bavaria since the end of the second world war, and has clung to power since 
1958, after a short period in opposition, due to the coalition of all the other political forces 
in the Bavarian parliament. Nevertheless, the CSU is the only example of a successful 
regional party in a country in which regional politics almost completely dominated by 
national parties, and national elections by politicians who grew up in regional politics.
A fairly similar case to the CSU in Bavaria is that of the nationalistic right-wing 
Convergencia i Unió in Catalonia. This party has achieved a relative majority of votes in all 
five regional elections since the restoration of regional autonomy in Catalonia. Majority 
nationalistic right-wing parties are also found in the Basque Country and in Navarre. In the 
first case the Christian Democratic PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco -Nationalist Basque 
Party) which in recent regional elections has not surpassed the 30% threshold of votes. In 
Navarre, the UPN (Unión del Pueblo Navarro -People’s Union o f Navarre) has been able in 
recent years to displace the Socialist party from the top spot.
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Moreover, in several other Spanish Autonomous Communities, regional parties enjoy 
a considerable degree of support. In most cases (Andalusia, Aragon, the Canary Islands, and 
Valencia) centre right regional parties predominate. Left wing regional formations are strong 
in the Basque Country and Galicia.
In the Spanish regions with solid regional identities and strong regional parties, two 
different patterns of vote are observed in regional and national elections. Parties of national 
scope score better in national elections, than in regional ones. This is clearly the case of the 
Socialist party in Catalonia: whereas in several national elections it has been the main 
political force in the region, it has never been capable of defeating Convergencia i Uniò in 
regional elections. Similarly vote for nationalistic parties decreases in the Basque Country 
in national elections.
Protest votes are less evident in the cases of Italy and Belgium. Patterns of vote in 
regional elections in these two countries do not differ greatly from the patterns of vote in 
national elections. In Italy, the vote for the left is concentrated mainly in the Centre (the 
regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria) and in the industrial declining region of 
Liguria. In the rest of the country, the dominant party had long been the Christian 
Democratic party, a position which in some regions had held for over forty years. The 
collapse of the traditional Italian political panorama in the last few years is, however, not 
very likely to bring about radical changes in this right-left distribution. In the last general and 
regional elections majority vote for the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) has been 
geographically concentrated in the Centre, whereas former right and centre votes in the North 
have been transferred to the Lega and to Forza Italia, and in the Mezzogiorno to the Alleanza 
Nazionale and to Forza Italia.
Moreover, Italy constitutes an example of the rising influence of regional formations 
in the political arena. The special statute regions of Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d ’Aosta, 
have a long tradition of regional parties, whose main aim is to fight to preserve and enhance 309
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the rights of German and French speaking minorities in these regions. The SVP in Trentino- 
Alto Adige and the Union Valdotaine in Valle d’Aosta are at present the main political forces 
in both regions. Furthermore, regional blocs exist in Sardinia, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. 
However, the most significant phenomenon in recent years has been the burst of regional 
parties in the North of Italy on the scene. The growth of anti-system regional formations like 
the Lega Lombarda, first, and, then subsequently, in other Northern regions like Piedmont, 
Liguria, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and to a lesser extent Emilia-Romagna, have 
contributed to the reshuffling of the Italian political system in the last few years.
Finally, in Belgium the whole political spectrum is divided along regional lines. 
Hence regional vote follows long established patterns, which are also reproduced at the 
national level: left wing socialist support in the mainly French speaking areas of Wallonia 
and Brussels, and Christian Democratic hegemony in Flanders.
*
* *
The results of the statistical analyses I have conducted are essentially modest, given 
the lack of political data at a regional level encountered and the above-mentioned numerous 
problems in transforming theory into indicators and variables. Results are not extremely 
robust, and therefore should be considered with extreme caution. Nevertheless, the results 
of the cross-sectional analysis for all the Western European regions with a certain degree of 
self-rule show that there is little or no relationship between regional growth trends and the 
regional political panorama. High growth occurs both in regions with strong absolute 
majorities, as well as in regions with coalition governments; or in regions with left, as well 
as with right wing governments. The degree of autonomy or the nature of the relationship 
between national and regional governments are also not correlated with growth rates. And 
no single combination of political conditions within a group of regions seems to be associated 
with high growth.
3 1 0
The political bases o f regional growth
Is this lack of correlation a result of poor datasets or of the lack of adaptation at a 
cross-sectional level of factors pointed out by theories about the association between political 
conditions and regional growth problems? It is true that the paucity of the datasets to a 
certain extent determines poor results. Acknowledging this, however, does not hide the fact 
that probably the theoretical factors determined and developed either at a national level, or 
on the basis of case study analysis, are to be, at least, regarded with prudence when trying 
to generalize and apply them at a cross-sectional regional level in Western Europe.
The empirical analysis displays that there seems to be no relationship between key 
factors pointed out by corporatist and socio-economic restructuring literature, such as the 
political orientation of governments, the electoral turnouts in regional elections, or the 
capacity to implement autonomous policies. Economic performance in regions sharing fairly 
similar political characteristics vary enormously. And simple access to power devolution or 
to autonomy is not a nostrum to achieve higher economic performance. Although in another 
study I have shown that for the Spanish case, power devolution to the regions brought about 
a very slight conjunctural positive effect, this effect was probably more the result of the 
changing of the dominant elites at a regional and local level (and hence of the implementation 
of different policies), than of the simple process of access to autonomy. The waning of this 
positive effect in the late 1980s and early 1990s seems to confirm this hypothesis (Rodriguez- 
Pose, 1996).
There are plenty of examples of regional institutions and governments, that in spite 
of having large autonomous powers and the capacity to set in motion policies which could 
be considered as more adequate and responsive to local needs, have been incapable of taking 
advantage of these conditions. The case of the special statute region of Sicily is a flagrant 
example. High levels of autonomy over the last forty years have not been translated in a 
closer or different association of political conditions and economic outcomes than in 
neighbouring regions in the Mezzogiorno, which long lacked the minimum capacity to set 
up their own policies and, since 1970 have enjoyed a much lower level of autonomy than 31
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Sicily. Similar patterns are observed in the Spanish case. Comparable levels of autonomy, 
and of overall political conditions in Catalonia, Galicia and Andalusia, have led to the 
implementation of radically different policies. While Galicia and Andalusia adopted for long 
fairly passive attitudes, economic, industrial and development policies were since the very 
beginning top priorities for the Catalan regional administration.
The association between the orientation and power of political parties and growth rates 
is another tenet which cannot be applied at a regional level. Although this result might be 
biased by lack of data on trade unions, there is no evidence to support that the strength or 
the permanence for long periods of a party in regional governments imply higher or lower 
performances in growth. It is true that the longer a party stays in regional office, the greater 
are the chances for it to implement their own policies. This would have seemed to favour 
high growth rates in Bavaria, Catalonia, or Emilia-Romagna, but it has certainly not been 
the case in Andalusia, Basilicata, Calabria, Galicia or Sicily. '
f *
. Electoral regional turnout as a measure of civic involvement in regional issues 
performs no better. Even in some of the regions with higher regional identity there seems 
to be a lower involvement in regional politics. Electoral turnouts in regional elections 
(regardless o f factors such as the coincidence of regional elections with other calls to the 
polls) are significantly lower in regions where, despite having a strong regional identity, civic 
traditions and levels of associaiionism are less developed. Regional electoral turnout in 
Sardinia, Sicily or Galicia has traditionally been lower than, for example in Emilia-Romagna, 
Tuscany or Madrid.
In sum, it could be stated that regional politics still lack the presence at a European 
level to have a discernible association with growth trends. The cross-national differences in 
regional powers, the defective perception of the regional phenomena by electors, the 
tendency to use regional vote for other purposes rather than choosing between distinct 
political options at a regional level, the scant budgetary prerogatives of regions, and, in
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short, the absence in most cases of strong regional identities or the will to transform a strong 
regional identity into political action, make up serious handicaps for the development and 
implementation of growth promoting policies by regional administrations. And even when 
these are set in motion, they are often undermined by national and international economic 
trends which impede the foundation of a close link between economic growth and regional 
politics and institutions at a European level, and by the lack of dynamism of certain regional 
administrations.
Intermediate forms of government and institutions, and regional political issues are 
less related to economic outcomes, than local and regional sets of social conditions. From 
this perspective, I agree with most theorists working on industrial districts on the fact that 
economic outputs and outcomes are more closely related with long social traditions and social 
conditions than with present political circumstances. Phenomena such as the Italian industrial 
districts, or the development of regions like Baden-Württemberg, Catalonia or Rhône-Alpes 
would probably have happened even in the absence of regional governments and institutions. 
Industrial districts in West Jutland and Southern Norway provide a clear example that fairly 
similar structures can be achieved without the participation of intermediate levels of 
government19. Conversely, access to regional autonomy and the setting up of regional 
institutions has not provoked significant changes in economic terms in the Mezzogiorno or 
in Western and Southern Spain.
19 It might be argued that, in the cases of West Jutland and Southern Norway, national 
governments might have fulfilled the role of regional institutions by providing a level of government 
sufficiently local for dense networks to be established. However, institutional power is exerted 
differently by national and regional governments. National governments have a larger sway over the 
economic destiny of their territories than regional governments, and even in cases where regional 
governments have benefitted from a high level of devolution, the genesis of industrial districts is more 
often the result of a consociaiional process than of just active intervention by regional governments. 
Moreover, if national governments in Scandinavia operated similarly to regional governments in other 
European regions, how could the fact that the industrial district phenomenon in Denmark and Norway 
is circumscribed to a few and extremely reduced areas, whereas in Bad en-Württemberg, in Emilia- 
Romagna or in Tuscany it covers a large proportion of the territory?
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Does this mean that regional politics is fully unrelated to regional economic 
performance? Problems with data provide us with no solid grounds to support this claim. 
Regional politics and policy seem to be too recent and too restricted to have a clearly 
discernible influence on economic performance across Europe. But this does not mean that, 
in case specific contexts, the combination of dynamic regional governments and institutions 
with adequate social conditions and traditions has not favoured growth. Recent experiences 
of the industrial districts in the Third Italy, and of the region o f Baden-Württemberg suggest 
that there is a fairly close association between the capacity of a politically and institutionally 
rich environment to set up encompassing networks of economic and social agents, and 
economic growth in a post-Fordist society. Adequate policies and institutional intervention 
often lead to greater co-operation among firms, which in turn results in a more appropriate 
use of local resources and on the genesis of economies of scope and of external economies. 
Regional governments and institutions in these areas have played a non negligible role in the 
formation of networks, and regional agencies and industrial policies have fulfilled an 
important task in the creation of extensive networks of firms and in achieving a closer 
interactions between the local economy and the local society. Therefore, the absence of 
intermediate levels of government can be considered in the long run as a hindrance for the 
full development of the post-Fordist growth spaces. It is undeniable that industrial districts 
in the Terza Italia and similar structures in Baden-Württemberg owe a certain percentage of 
their level o f inter-firm co-operation to the active intervention of regional bodies and 
institutions.
However, one must bear in mind -as Cooke and Morgan underline for the case of 
Baden-Württemberg (1992b, p. 2-3)- that the role played by regional policies, and hence of 
regional politics and institutions, in inciting economic growth in these ‘new growth spaces* 
has been much more a facilitating role than a determining one. Evidence from case studies 
demonstrates that in certain regional cases, adequate politics and policies at the regional level 
seem to have had a positive influence in the genesis o f growth in certain areas, and, in 
contrast, inadequate political action appears to have deterred development in other regions
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where insufficient conditions are met. Nonetheless, the presence of strong and dynamic 
regional governments and institutions, and the implementation of suitable industrial and 
economic policies at the meso level does not by itself suffice to promote high growth in 
Western Europe.
In short, it can be stated that regional politics can do little to spur economic grow th 
without the appropriate infrastructure and human resources, without the necessary capital, 
technology and information, and, above all, without the essential entrepreneurial capacity to 
set productive activities in motion (Trigilia, 1992a). Politics and policies might play a certain 
and restricted part in the genesis of growth in or in the lack of growth of certain areas, 
provided other factors are present. The role of politics and policy at the regional level is, 
nevertheless, a secondary one in the genesis of economic growth.
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In the last decade and a half there has been a revival of the interest in economic 
growth. During the 1950s and 1960s economic growth had become one of the main 
disciplines in economic theory. It was then when the neoclassical theory of growth was 
developed and the bases for the present debates were set. However» during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s the interest and thus the scientific output concerning growth decreased.
The second half of the 1980s and early 1990s have brought a renewal of the attention 
in the topic. Economic growth has once again become one of the leading fields not only in 
economic theory, but also in several other branches of the social sciences.
This renewal of interests has been carried out from two different approaches. On the 
one hand, there has been a rapid development of what is known as the endogenous growth 
theory. This basically economic approach to the fundamentals of growth arose in contrast to 
the neoclassical theory of growth. The neoclassical models of growth are revised and 
modified by introducing other variables into the equation of growth. Factors such as 
technology and, to a lesser extent, human resources and social and political conditions are 
increasingly considered. The main contribution of the endogenous growth theory has been, 
however, endogenizing technological choice, that is, making technology an endogenous 
outcome of an economic system. This apparently simple step has stirred a lively debate about 
questions such as constant and diminishing returns to capital, convergence across nations and 
regions, perfect competition and innovation. Endogenous growth theorists have also paid 
some attention to the relationship between economic growth and social and political 
conditions. Variables depicting social and political structures have been increasingly 
introduced into growth equations. Nevertheless, the role reserved for non-economic variables 
in equations o f growth has been essentially a secondary one. The correlation between social 
and political factors and economic growth has been always considered as statistically fragile, 
especially when confronted with economic variables. Capital and technology have thus 
remained as the basic explanatory factors in growth models.
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On the other hand, a vast and heterogenous literature on socio-economic restructuring 
and structural change which started at the beginning of the 1980s is becoming increasingly 
concerned with growth and its related questions. This approach, developed together by 
sociologists, political scientists, geographers and economists, has been fundamentally 
concerned with how technological, social, and political changes are affecting the prevailing 
socio-economic model during the mass-production era, and whether we are witnessing the 
birth of a new system. The interest in structural change and in the genesis of a new social 
and territorial structure has led -albeit in an indirect manner- to the analysis of the question 
of economic growth. From this perspective, if the traditional system of production and the 
whole socio-economic structure associated with it are undergoing a serious crisis which 
clearly exceeds the limits of the capitalist cycle, then traditional patterns of growth are also 
being altered. Geographical areas more adapted to the new socio-economic environment and 
to the new market demands are in better conditions to produce more and thus grow at a 
higher rate. In contrast, areas burdened by strong economic, social and political rigidities 
struggle much more to adapt to the new circumstances, and thus grow at a slower pace. 
Hence the process of socio-economic restructuring gives new opportunities for the emergence 
of the so-called ‘new growth spaces’, whereas other areas remain isolated from the benefits 
of the process.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that both approaches deal with different aspects 
of economic growth, the interaction between endogenous growth theory and the literature on 
socio-economic restructuring and regional change has been almost non existent. This fact is 
reflected in almost all fields. Researchers in endogenous growth theory not only come from 
different backgrounds as researchers on socio-economic restructuring; they also use different 
philosophies, theories, methods and even a diverse unit of analysis in their approach to 
growth. Endogenous growth theory has been primarily concerned with the testing of 
neoclassical hypothesis and assumptions. Therefore the theories and methods used did not 
differ greatly from those employed by neoclassical economists. Deductive approaches and 
cross-sectional linear regressions have become the most usual tools for the testing of the 
association between economic growth and sets of independent variables which always
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included capital and technology as basic ingredients. Moreover, since one of the catalysts for 
the renewal of interest in growth in the field of economic theory has been the compilation 
of new and more complete national growth tables, the nation has remained as the most 
important unit of analysis. The regional dimension has been considered by several significant 
studies in the endogenous growth approach, but, as a whole, regions have awaken little 
interest in endogenous growth theory.
Literature on socio-economic restructuring has adopted a considerably different 
approach to the question of economic growth. First of all, and as was already mentioned, 
growth has been dealt with in a much more indirect way than in the endogenous growth 
theory. Whereas in traditional economic growth analysis the original question inspiring the 
research has always been to try to establish which were the factors behind economic growth, 
the literature on socio-economic restructuring and structural change focuses primarily on what 
were the causes provoking the present structural change in advanced economies, and whether 
recent transformations are generating a new spatial distribution of wealth. It is only from this 
perspective, that the question of economic growth has been tackled in some of the ‘new 
growth spaces’ by structural change theorists.
. In general, the approach adopted by the literature on socio-economic restructuring has 
been fundamentally theoretical. Concepts such as regulation models and accumulation 
regimes, stemming from the French Regulation School, are blended with other notions from 
different origins, such as flexible specialization and production, technological paradigms, and 
diversified quality production. The outcome is a complex theoretical body with brings society 
under the mass production model, into opposition with society under the flexible production 
model. The taxonomy is, in brief, the Fordist versus the post-Fordist society.
This approach to growth has put a greater emphasis on the social and political 
conditions which impinge on growth. To a certain extent, this is the result o f a background 
bias. Sociologists and political scientists working on socio-economic restructuring processes 
have introduced their educational background into the analysis of growth. However, the
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stress of the literature on structural change in the association between social and political 
conditions and growth is also a consequence of method. When studying recent 
transformations in the production system and in the social and political structures, these 
analysts discovered that there seemed to be a certain relationship between social and political 
changes and changes in traditional patterns of growth, and that thus the local arena was the 
ideal space for the interaction between social, political and economic conditions in order to 
generate growth.
With regard to the method of analysis, empirical tests of the theories of socio­
economic restructuring and structural change -in contrast with endogenous growth approach- 
have almost never been carried out on a cross-sectional level. Case studies have been the 
main empirical approach. A large number of sectoral studies -mainly in the fields of 
production and industrial relations- have been conducted. The industrial plant and the 
industrial sector have become important units of analysis. Geographically, much attention has 
been focused on the rising areas of the Silicon Valley, the Orange County, the Phoenix area, 
the Industrial districts in the Terza Italia and Western Jutland, or the Regions of Baden- 
Württemberg and Rhöne-AIpes, as the paradigmatic examples of the ‘new growth spaces’. 
Hence, the theory of socio-economic restructuring and structural change has been constructed 
on a extremely reduced basis of sub-national case studies, whose characteristics and scope 
have been thoroughly analyzed and reanalyzed by the literature.
The focus on sub-national entities as the geographical unit of analysis is also an 
exclusive feature of the literature on socio-economic restructuring which is not shared by 
endogenous growth theorists. According to some observers, the processes of globalization 
and de-regulation associated to present changes are increasingly blurring national borders and 
bestowing a greater protagonism to place-specific phenomena. As a consequence, sub-national 
entities, in general, and regions, in particular, tend to be considered as one of the most 
adequate units of analysis in the post-Fordist environment.
The failure of these two theoretical strands to meet has led to completely autonomous
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developments of both theories. And yet, in my opinion, a greater interaction between both 
approaches would have definitely given rise to a better comprehension of the phenomenon 
of economic growth. On the one hand, the excessive concentration of the endogenous growth 
theory on capital and technology as the main factors spurring growth could have been 
tempered by more socio-political ways of analyzing the question. On the other hand, theories 
of socio-economic restructuring could have benefitted from a long tradition of cross-sectional 
approaches to growth in economic theories of growth, instead o f focusing only on a few case 
studies, which, in my opinion, constitute more the exception than the rule.
In this thesis, I have aimed at bringing together these two branches of the analysis of 
growth, in order to try establish the connection between economic growth and social and 
political conditions at a regional level in Western Europe. The idea driving the research is 
that, according to the literature on socio-economic restructuring and structural change, recent 
transformations are introducing significant changes in traditional patterns of growth. As a 
consequence, new growth areas seem to be emerging in formerly intermediate and lagging 
regions, whereas some of the former core regions are undergoing a serious decline, due to 
the crisis of mass production industries. From this point of view, not only the shift in the 
economic arena is responsible for these changes, but also local social and political conditions 
play a significant role in determining the growth potential of any given area. The 
decomposition of the Fordist mode of mass production during the 1970s and 1980s is 
transforming radically the setting in which traditional growth analysis have been conducted. 
Economic factors which had inspired -and still inspire- the study of economic growth seem 
to be becoming increasingly mobile. The globalization of capital, information and technology 
and the lifting of trade barriers, could thus -at least in theory- lead to the promotion of 
growth in areas which traditionally had remained aside from world economic circuits. Hence, 
the traditional locational constraints for the establishment of production units and, thus, for 
the outset o f economic growth, are apparently being removed.
The literature about socio-economic restructuring has put a strong emphasis on these 
phenomena and has looked for alternative explanations o f the factors behind growth in certain
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areas. These explanations do not disregard traditional economic factors, but are also heavily 
embedded in the relationship between social and political conditions at a local level and 
growth. In contrast, economic analyses of growth have remained almost completely unaware 
of the phenomenon of structural change. With the exception of some incursions in the fields 
of the increasing globalization of the economic and international trade, endogenous growth 
theorists are continuing to test the hypothesis of neoclassical analysts and trying to make 
other factors endogenous in the equation of growth.
However, it could be stated that the theoretically greater mobility of the traditional 
factors generating growth is not being paralleled by similar changes in cross-sectional growth 
patterns. It is certainly true that the last two decades have witnessed a significant 
transformation in regional growth across Europe. On the one hand, capital and urban 
financial centres and certain well-placed and well-endowed intermediate regions have 
prospered greatly, whereas the crisis of industrial declining regions has become more 
important in relative terms. In addition, some peripheral regions and specially tourist areas 
have enjoyed periods of economic expansion, which contrast with a serious slowdown in 
growth rates in other peripheral areas. The post-Fordist literature on growth has tended to 
focus on those areas which have undergone a more radical transformation: core cities, 
technological corridors, and industrial corridors. Nevertheless and as was said before, these 
examples in the literature represent more often the exception than the rule. The genesis of 
‘new growth spaces’ and industrial districts is to a large extent circumscribed to a few 
dynamic areas. Empirical evidence tends to demonstrate that, despite the recent important 
structural transformations, patterns of growth at a regional level are more resistant to change 
than what could be inferred from changes in locational factors. Some growth trends which 
were already observed during the Fordist era are still evident. There is a ever greater 
concentration of wealth in large urban areas and in financial centres, while most of the 
formerly backward areas still lag behind. Taking this evidence into account, it could be 
thought that the processes of socio-economic restructuring and the supposedly greater 
association between growth and local social and political conditions is not affecting the whole 
territory, but just those areas which, because of their greater dynamism can be considered
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as ‘new growth spaces’.
This analysis of the socio-political basis of regional growth in Western Europe has 
tried to check whether the close association which has been observed between social and 
political conditions and growth behaviours in the ‘new growth spaces’ can also be established 
on a cross-sectional basis for a large number of regions in Western Europe; whether the 
increasing removal of barriers which impeded the mobility o f traditional growth factors is 
rendering more visible the role of social and political factors in the genesis of economic 
growth; and whether economic performance across Europe can be explained by purely 
regional and local factors, rather than national ones.
The empirical analysis relies on the use of statistical methods which try to overcome 
the problem which endogenous growth theorists have faced when introducing social an 
political variables into growth equations; namely the lack of robustness in the association 
between social and political factors and growth. The use of linear regressions in the analysis 
would have reproduced the problems o f simultaneous causation, spatial autocorrelation, 
omitted variable bias and an excessive focus on parsimony and linearity common to most 
economic models of growth. Therefore, there was a need to resort to more unusual statistical 
analysis techniques, capable of superseding these shortcomings. Cluster analysis was the 
chosen method since it provided a feasible way of grouping regions according to their social 
and political structure and comparing the resulting clusters with the sets of regions 
established a  p r io r i, based on economic growth criteria.
The results obtained should, however, be handled with extreme care. Several 
obstacles restrict the elaboration o f large cross-sectional analyses at the regional level for 
Western Europe. Lack of data is perhaps the most important one. Although a considerable 
effort was made in order to gather social and political data over time and across regions in 
Western Europe, shortage of data represents a serious handicap for an adequate testing of 
hypothesis. Complete sets of data for Greek regions were impossible to compile, and missing 
cases and variables are common features for regions in other countries such as Denmark,
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Ireland, or Portugal. Short time series is also a significant obstacle. The absence o f data prior 
to 1970 in all cases (bar GDP), and to 1980 in most variables has impeded the application 
of other alternative quantitative methods, such as time-series analysis.
Data shortcomings are enhanced by the fact that existing variables are perhaps not the 
most adequate to test theories about the connection between growth and social and political 
factors. This problem has been especially evident in the political analysis. In the social 
database, variables involved aspects such as the make-up of the labour force, unemployment, 
demographic structure, population change, educational enrolment, and urban structure, 
which, to a greater or lesser extent, had been subject of attention by the major theories about 
the relationship between social structure and economic growth. In the political field this is 
simply not the case. Variables about the political power of regional parties, their 
parliamentary strength, the orientation of the parties in office, the relationship between 
national and regional governments, and the budgetary autonomy of regions are possibly the 
best available on a cross-sectional basis, but, at the same time, are insufficient and 
incomplete to undertake the task of checking for a large number of European regions the 
theories about the formation of networks of political, institutional, social and economic agents 
developed for a few European cases, and which represent the main examples of recent 
theories linking political and institutional frameworks at the regional level with economic 
outcomes.
Aware of these limitations, some significant conclusions can be extracted from the 
empirical testing of hypothesis. First of all, it can be stated that, despite growing claims that 
regions are becoming the basic unit of economic analysis, and that the regional dimension 
is turning out to be the most adequate realm for the interaction of political, social and 
economic conditions in a post-Fordist world, the empirical analysis does not provide enough 
signs to support these statements. The globalization of the world economy, the flexibilization 
of the production system, the current processes of political integration and de-regulation 
trends might have contributed to bring regions and the regional dimension to the fore. Much 
attention has been directed towards the emergence of individual regions and local areas as
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the new post-Fordist growth spaces. However, on a cross-sectional level, this phenomenon 
is far from being widespread. Regional growth patterns in Europe during the 1980s are still 
as bound by the national dimension as they were during the climax of the mass-production 
era in the 1960s. The greatest variation in social and political data is found across nations 
and not across regions within a nation. Hence, it could be stated that economic, social and 
political indicators are still greatly determined by the national dimension, and that the nation­
state still constitutes a very solid unit for the analysis of current social, political and 
economic transformations. Regional specific characteristics and diversity only come to light 
when social and political variables are nationally weighted. It is only then, when the major 
features described by the literature on socio-economic restructuring and structural change 
become visible at a sub-national level.
The results of the empirical analysis also show that there is a fairly close association 
between regional social conditions and economic outcomes during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The groups of regions stemming from the cluster analysis performed with social variables 
tend to reproduce the regional sets which were established a p r io r i according to their growth 
performance and the literature on the topic. This implies that, contrary to what has been 
inferred in endogenous growth models, the degree of association between economic outcomes 
and the social conditions of the area where economic activity takes place is fairly robust. 
This robustness is by no means the consequence of the correlation between only a limited 
number of social variables and growth levels, but of the interconnection o f a large number 
of social factors and indicators (the whole local social community) that interact in order to 
furnish a set of adequate or less adequate conditions for the development of economic 
activity.
However there is no clear cut relationship between a single set of social conditions 
and the possibility o f high or low growth. High regional growth seems to occur under very 
different social circumstances: very high initial activity rates, low growth of labour activity, 
average initial unemployment levels, and high levels o f educational enrolment are identified 
with high growth in capital regions and urban financial centres. Contrasting social conditions,
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such as high initial activity rates, low unemployment levels, an initial symptoms of an ageing 
of the population, and low educational attainment are also related to high growth levels, but 
in intermediate dynamic regions.
The same could be said for poor economic performance. Social conditions in two of 
the regional clusters with the lowest growth rates differ greatly. Peripheral less dynamic 
areas are distinguished by low initial activity rates, with high growth levels of labour activity, 
high initial unemployment rates and well below-average educational levels. Similar low levels 
of growth are achieved in industrial declining regions and the Italian Mezzogiomo. However, 
in this last group, initial activity rates fluctuated around the European mean, growth of 
activity was fairly low in the European context, unemployment rates were among the highest 
in Europe, the population structure was dominated by the youngest cohort, and educational 
levels were higher than in peripheral less dynamic regions.
In the light of empirical evidence, it could thus be claimed that there is a close 
association between rates of growth and certain sets of place-specific social conditions. 
However, does this mean that socio-economic restructuring has rendered the connection 
between social conditions and growth more meaningful or even more visible? There is no 
clear indication to support or reject that hypothesis in the analysis. The empirical results only 
reveal that in a time that has been considered as the outbreak of the post-Fordist era there 
is a clear cut connection between social and economic factors; that the persistence of 
disparities in growth levels in a world characterized by a much greater mobility of the 
traditional factors influencing growth might well be the result of underlying social structures. 
Nevertheless, no evidence deriving from the empirical analysis allows us to claim that this 
was not also the case in the era of mass production. The tenuous association between social 
variables and growth rates constantly described by neoclassical and endogenous growth 
theory might well be the consequence of the theories and methods used in their analyses, 
rather than of a real lack of connection between underlying social conditions and growth 
levels in the Fordist period. Using these premises, there is no ground either to assume or to 
reject that the relationship between growth and social conditions has experienced any change, 327
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and that growth levels in the mass-production era were less correlated to place-specific social 
conditions than they seem to be in the age of flexible production. The only way to verify 
whether the process of socio-economic restructuring, the passage from a system of mass 
production to a more flexible one, and the globalization o f the economic, are provoking 
changes in the relationship between growth and social circumstances would be to carry out 
similar analyses with data representing the social structure during the mass-production period.
For similar reasons, the close association between place-specific social conditions and 
growth levels does not imply that in the post-Fordist era, traditional growth promoting factors 
are losing a certain sway on the genesis of growth. It is true that under the new 
circumstances capital and technology, as well as other predominantly economic factors, are 
becoming much more mobile and that traditional development bottlenecks are being 
eradicated. Nevertheless, greater mobility does not necessarily signify a more equal access 
to these resources. In fact, as has often been mentioned, capital and technology have never 
reached in history such a high level of geographical concentration as they have in recent 
years. Large financial centres, and research and university complexes concentrate a 
considerable percentage of world capital and of basic and applied research. In contrast, most 
other areas of the world still have a limited access to these resources. Capital and technology 
still play thus a determining role in the genesis of economic growth. However, the empirical 
results of the analysis suggest that all the above-mentioned factors are closely related. Growth 
is to a large extent determined by the availability of capital and technology; and inherited and 
present social structures and conditions, in turn, determine the capacity o f any given area to 
attract foreign or to produce its own capital and technology. Hence, the capacity of any area 
to grow at a higher or lower speed is intimately connected to the existence of satisfactory 
combinations of social conditions in any given space.
The connection between political and institutional conditions and economic growth at 
a European regional cross-sectional level is much less manifest. No statistically significant 
association between rates of growth in the 1980s and early 1990s and a series of variables 
reflecting the regional political structure could be extracted from the analysis. These negative
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results might be strongly biased -as was already mentioned- by the lack of adequate sets of 
data and by the existing gap between the political arguments put forward by regional growth 
theories and the available data.
Nevertheless, several other explanations could be raised in order to try to interpret 
the lack of association between regional politics and institutions in the Western European 
countries where a certain degree of self-rule has been granted to the regions, and economic 
growth. First of all, the national influence over regional politics and institutions is even 
greater than on social conditions. Levels of autonomy and of transfers of competences are 
totally determined by national conditions. Moreover, contrasts within a group of countries 
whose levels of devolution range from the federalism of Germany or Belgium, to the 
centralism of Greece, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom are far too great to be able 
to extract any common denominator.
Diverse levels of devolution are also reflected in the capacity of regions to design and 
implement their own autonomous policies and to create their regional institutions and 
agencies; factors that are of primary importance when it comes to analyzing the influence of 
local politics and institutions in the setting up of wide socio-economic networks. And 
different levels of revolution influence not only the constitutional capacity to create and set 
in motion these policies and institutions, but also determine the power to Finance them. Once 
again significant national contrasts limit the capacity to compare dissimilar regional 
phenomena on a cross-national basis. Very often regions lack the competences and financial 
power to implement their own autonomous strategies directed to achieve greater levels of 
growth.
Finally, and given that the process of devolution of powers to the regions is in most 
cases still nascent and, in some cases, still under way, the visibility and perception of 
regional politics, policies and institutions by social and economic agents is still fairly 
indefinite and affects the transparency and efficiency of the actions undertaken by regional 
institutions. Consequently the regional political arena becomes quite often the field in which 329
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to dispute over national arguments, or a springboard for politicians with national ambitions, 
rather than a forum for the development of regional interests*
An even if certain regions do have the power and competence to design and 
implement their own growth strategies and to set up their own institutions and local 
development agencies, nothing can be inferred on the degree of success of those policy 
schemes from a set of variables describing the local political structure. There are plenty of 
examples of regions which, in spite of having the necessary competences and budgetary 
powers to develop their own industrial policies, have either overlooked this type of action, 
of have pursued strategies and methods which have brought about little results. In contrast 
more imaginative actions undertaken by regions with less prerogatives have been more 
successful.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that, when considered from a cross- 
sectional point of view, the connection between sets of regional political variables and 
regional growth is difficult to untangle. This does not mean, however, that in case specific 
contexts, regional politics and institutions do not contribute to the formation of structures and 
networks, embracing large layers of the local society, which have become the germ of 
greater economic activity and greater growth. Regional institutions have played a substantial 
part the development of what have been considered as the genuinely post-Fordist landscapes 
of the industrial districts of the Terza Italia or Baden-Württemberg. However, these are the 
most favourable and successful cases in an overall panorama of regional administrations 
whose contribution to economic performance has been generally either very low, or almost 
non-existent. This is for example the case of restricted or non dynamic regional 
administrations in the Italian Mezzogiomo and in certain areas of Spain, where several 
decades of national intervention via development policies, and the corresponding contribution 
of regional administrations to these processes have not yielded the expected results. Some 
authors claim that long-term intervention together with lack o f autonomy and of dynamism 
by regional institutions have indeed provoked perverse effects, discouraging rather than 
encouraging economic activity.
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From a global viewpoint, the results of this thesis raise interesting questions about the 
emergence of a post-Fordist spatial model, as presented by some and -to a certain extent- 
radical sectors of the literature on the topic. In fact the elimination of traditional growth 
bottlenecks, and the greater mobility of the conventional growth factors have brought about 
considerable changes in growth rates, but they have not provoked the widespread and radical 
change that the profound technological and economic transformations would seem to suggest. 
Regional growth patterns and territorial models across Europe in the post-Fordist period tend 
to follow patterns which were already observed during the Fordist era. This evidence 
suggests that the process of transformation from a mass production society to a flexible 
production one is not just the result of changes in traditional locational factors, but of a long­
term and very complex causal process, difficult to grasp by the analysis of a limited number 
of individual variables.
The results also raise questions about the extent and scope of the process of socio­
economic restructuring. Radical and perhaps naive interpretations of the approach of 
structural change have tended to generalize as global patterns the processes of change and 
growth which have been observed in the ‘new growth spaces’. This is, however, clearly not 
the case. The process of transformation in most areas is anchored by the specific social and 
political setting of every space, and local social and political conditions differ in most regions 
greatly from those which have contributed to the development of the ‘new growth spaces*.
This thesis has been mainly concerned with the question of why did spatial patterns 
of growth linger on when, according to large sections of the literature, we were witnessing 
an era of substantial social, political and economic changes; why did recent transformations 
provoke only a limited reorganization in growth patterns; why has the phenomenon of the 
‘new growth spaces’ not become a general one. In this respect, the empirical results of the 
analysis (and particularly of the social analysis) provide sufficient evidence to claim that 
pervading growth patterns at a regional level in Western Europe can be -to a greater or lesser 
extent- considered as the result o f existing social and political conditions. 31
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Nevertheless, too many questions have been raised throughout the analysis that still 
have to be answered. There is a need to conduct further cross-sectional research on the socio­
political bases of growth in order to try to resolve questions like whether the association 
between socio-political circumstances and economic growth is more than a simple statistical 
association, or whether phenomena like those of the ‘new growth areas’ will gradually start 
to set their roots in areas which up to now have shown little sign of radical transformation. 
The time and spatial scopes of the analysis also need to be broadened.
Case studies and sector analysis should also not be ignored. There is a strong 
necessity to conduct further specific research on the socio-political bases of growth, 
particularly in lagging and intermediate regions and at the national level. In sum, there is a 
need to proceed the analysis of recent changes and transformations outside the traditional 
framework of the ‘new growth spaces’, in order to determine what complex set of 
relationships contributes to generate growth, and what are the social and political conditions 
under which the growth potential of any given area is severely limited. Only in this way, our 
knowledge of the complex combination of the economic, social, political, and cultural factors 
which determine growth across time and space will be improved.
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Table A.l
Animal Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Electoral
Support for the Main Regional Party
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable ß o f ß B of B t(69) p-level
ELECSUPP .169 .119 1.299 .909 1.429 .158
R: =0.028  
adjusted R: =0.014  
F ( 1,69)—2.041
Figure A.l
Electoral Support for Main Regional Party
334
Table A.2
Annual Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Difference 
Between the First and Second Regional Party
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable ß o f ß B o fB  t(69) p-level
DIFBEPAR .156 .118 1.225 .932 1.313 .193
R: =0.024  
adjusted R:=0.010  
F (1,69) =  1.725
Figure A.2 35
Difference Between First and Second Regional Party
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Table A.3
Animal Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Electoral
Evolution of the Main Regional Party
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable B of ß B of B t(69) p-level
ELECEVOL .238 .116 1.800 .884 2.036 .045
R2=0.056  
adjusted R: =0.043  
F (I,69)=4.146
Figure A.3
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Electoral Evolution of the Main Regional Party
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Table A.4
Annual Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Percentage
of Seats Held in the Regional Parliament by the Main Party
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable fi of fi B of B t(69) p-level
PERSEATS .128 .119 .982 .913 1.075 .285
R: =0.016  
adjusted R: = 0.002 
F (1.69) = 1.157
Figure A.4
120
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Percentage of Seats Held in the Regional Parliament by the Main Party
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Table A.5
Annual Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Political
Orientation of the Main Regional Party
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable B o f B B of B t(69) p-level
POLORMAI .058 .120 .455 .929 .490 .625
R: =0.003  
adjusted R2= -0.011 
F (1.69)=0.240
Figure A.5
-3 -2 - l  0 1
Political Orientation of the Main Party
338
natili
Table A.6
Animal Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Political 
Orientation of the Parties in Office
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable 6 of B B of B t(69) p-level
POLOROFF .113 .119 .904 .955 .946 .347
R2 = 0.012 
adjusted R: = -0.001 
F (1,69) = 0.8963
Figure A.6
115 *-
! Hf»»
Political Orientation of the Parties in Office
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Table A.7
Annual Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Political
Orientation of the President of the Regional Government
St. Err. St. Err,
Variable ß of ß B of B t(69) p-level
POLORPRE .055 .120 .431 .933 .462 .644
R: =0.003  
adjusted R: = -0.011 
F ( 1.69) =0.214
Figure A.7
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Table A.8
Annual Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Type 
of Regional Government
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable lì of fi B of B t(69) p-level
TYPREGGO .005 .120 .044 .906 .049 .961
R: =0.000  
adjusted R:= -0.014 
F (1,69)=0.002
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Table A.9
Annual Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Link
Between the Regional and the National Government
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable B of B B of B t(69) p-Ievel
POLILINK .024 .120 .195 .943 .207 .836
R: =0.012  
adjusted R: =-0.001 
F (1.69)=0.8963
Figure A.9 *15
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Annual Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Regional 
Budget (measured in Ecus per capita)
Table A. 10
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable ß of ß B of B t(69) p-level
REGIBUDG .131 .119 1.110 1.010 1.099 .275
R: = 0.017 
adjusted R2=0.002 
F (1,69)= 1.208
Figure A.10
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Table A .ll
Annual Rates of Regional Growth Regressed on the Difference
in Turnout between Regional and National Elections
St. Err. St. Err.
Variable ß of ß B of B t(69) p-level
REGTURNO -.181 .118 -1.377 .896 -1.535 .129
R2=0.017  
adjusted R2=0.002  
F (1,69) = 1.208
Figure A.ll
D ifference B etw een T u rn o u t in R egional a n d  N ational E lec tions
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